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ABSTRACT
The Politics of Crisis Management in Post-1997 Hong Kong:
A State-society Interactive Framework
by
CHAN Hin Yeung
Doctor of Philosophy

Most studies and research on crisis management and government crises put their
focus on advanced, democratic nations, where governments have to bear the
responsibility of handling of a crisis through elections. However, relatively little
attention has been given on the consequences of crises, particularly governance
crises, in regimes without full democracy. By using post-1997 Hong Kong, a
liberal society with limited democracy, as an example, this thesis aims to examine the
applicability of crisis management theories and models currently available, and to
introduce an entirely new State-society Interactive Framework 1 to tackle their
limitations.
The Five Tasks Leadership Approach suggested by Boin, 't Hart and Stern, et al.
(2005) and the Pattern of Politicization Approach of Brandstrom and Kuipers (2003),
which respectively represents the top-down and bottom-up crisis management
approaches, are selected as the analytical framework. This thesis begins with an
application of these two approaches on an analysis of two noticeable crisis cases in
post-1997 Hong Kong – the 1 July 2003 Demonstration and the Anti-High Speed
Railway incident. Based on the results, this research found that the applicability of
current theories and models derived from previous studies is restrictive in two
aspects - First, the level of severity of the crises affects the validity of those studies.
Hence, for the purpose of effective interpretation, only mega-crises are chosen for
this thesis. Second, instead of explaining the incident, most of the current theories
view crises as a clue for fault-finding in the aftermath, with little attention devoted to
the development process.
Drawing upon different approaches in the field, this thesis has developed a heuristic
1

A condensed version of this thesis - an article entitled “Crisis Politics in Authoritarian Regimes:
How Crises Catalyse Changes under the State-society Interactive Framework” - was published in the
Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management, Volume 21, Issue 4, December 2013, pp. 200-210.

Crisis Development Ladder and the State-society Interactive Framework more
relevant for limited democracies, such as Hong Kong and Mainland China. The
Crisis Development Ladder refers to the flow from crisis to governance crisis and
from governance crisis to change. At each stage of this process, there are
interactions between the Crisis Strengthening Forces and Weakening Forces. By
focusing on the Catalytic Effect of Crisis that accelerates reforms and changes, this
research argues that critical crisis is politically influential and decisive in
authoritarian system with an increasingly proactive civil society. This research has
illustrated the deliberation of developing a crisis-driven society as an alternative to
influence decision-making under non-democratic rule with valid examples. The
current result suggests that crises are far beyond unfavourable situations that
challenge the legitimacy of the government. More importantly, in the context of
Hong Kong as well as other non-democratic systems, crises provide opportunities to
initiate political changes. The current political institution in Hong Kong makes it
possible for the government to pay no heed to the wants of the general public. Thus,
the cases explored in this thesis show how activists and those who are not involved in
the decision-making process use crises as a catalyser to impose sufficient political
influence to the government so as to force a real change under a closed political
system.
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background
For a long period of time since the establishment of the Hong Kong Special
Administration Region (HKSAR) in 1997, the general public does not seem to be
satisfied with the performance of the government, especially on its crisis
management technique.

This is especially the case in recent years, as a popular

discourse exists suggesting that there are many crises in Hong Kong.

As scholars,

politicians, and also members of society, it is of interest to investigate why some
events would eventually become crises while others would not.

The underlying

questions would be: Who is responsible for “creating” or generating crises, and why
different crises may have different outcomes.

The civil society of Hong Kong is rapidly developing. This is to some extent
related to (or attributed to) the arising of different crises, among which the “1 July
2003 Demonstration” would serve as a good example.

The aim of the current

research is to study how the expanding civil society can influence a crisis and the
crisis management of the government, with a focus on different stages of a crisis in
which the public react to government decision/action.

Specifically, an in-depth

investigation on the extent to which those public reactions influence the next
decision/action of the government is carried out.

Moreover, since a crisis involves

different stakeholders, including politicians, media, and pressure groups, the
stakeholders’ own agenda could affect the whole crisis management process and
even the outcomes of a crisis.

The effects of these various forces on the

decision-making process of the government are also thoroughly examined.
1

1.1.1 Crisis and Crisis Management: An Overview
Various scholars have attempted to provide a definition for crisis. For example,
Kimenyi and Mwabu (2007, 11) addressed crisis as “an unfavourable state of
instability or disequilibrium” and “something demanding for an immediate
response…… [while] the appropriate response is usually unknown”, whereas
Robinson (1972) emphasized crisis as an occasion for decision, and Rosenthal and
Kouzmin (1997, 279) considered it “the necessity to make critical choices”.
Kouzmin (2008, 159) further provided three prerequisites for a crisis: A triggering
event that critically destabilizes existing mechanisms of functionality to the point of
seizure, affects constituency, and requires major redistribution of resources and
recognition by the authority.

Any happening that merely fulfills one of those three

requirements should only be identified as an accident, a tragedy, or a disaster instead
of a crisis.

Crisis management is a new and diversified field with different schools of
perspectives.

Despite the varying points of view, previous studies mostly agree that

governments are the ones to take the lead in the crisis management process.

While

there is no clear definition for the term “crisis management”, government is expected
to be responsible for managing crisis as crisis is “a situation that threatens
high-priority goals of the decision-making unit, restricts the amount of time available
for response before the decision is transformed and surprises the members of the
decision-making unit by its occurrence” (Hermann 1972, 13).

From a public administration perspective, there are three features of crisis that may
threaten the normal operation of the bureaucracy: Severe threat, time pressure, and
high uncertainty ('t Hart, Rosenthal and Kouzmin 1993). The shock stemming from
2

crises has the ability to paralyze the daily routine of bureaucrats, and therefore,
leadership and centralization of decision-making are important.

As such, when

investigating crisis management, the majority of literature in the field has adopted a
top-down approach, which emphasizes on the leadership of governments in crises
(Table 2.1).

In general, the top-down approach focuses on the question of what

should be done by the government during a crisis.

In contrast, the bottom-up approach focuses on how different non-state actors would
react, and the effects of their reactions, during a crisis.

This is especially the case

during election periods, as McConnell and Stark (2002) explained in their study on
the 2001 foot-and-mouth disease crisis in Britain, which suggested that crises could
be highly sensitive issues during elections due to the super-sensitivity of the
government, especially the ruling party, on public opinion.

The bottom-up

approach also associates crisis with political communication, and in this regard,
decision-makers could not neglect real politics and should have the deliberate
intention to explain the situation (Olson 2000).

In the aftermath of crises,

government officials are often faced with three political questions: 1) What happened?
2) Why were the responses inadequate? 3) What is going to happen?

These

questions reflect the significance of crisis communication as a topic for investigation.

Although the field is interdisciplinary in nature, the current research in crisis
management is restricted by a relatively solid geographical boundary.

A study on

articles published by the Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management (JCCM),
the only crisis management journal on the list of Social Sciences Citation Index

3

(SSCI)2, found that there is an imbalance in the number of research articles from
different parts of the world. As seen from Table 1.1, which shows the number of
articles that were in print with JCCM from 2008-2012 categorized by case studies
and authors from different regions, the western world (i.e. America and Europe) has
dominated both in the number of case studies and authors’ affiliations.

However, it

is worth noting that even though research on Asia or by scholars affiliated with Asian
academia are relatively thin, it is not a proof that there is no or very little crisis
studies in Asia. Rather, this is to point out that current crisis management theories
and models are mainly driven by western scholars.

In particular, a liberal

democracy is often taken for granted when the study of politics of crises is concerned,
leading to a research gap for such topic in Asia, where full democracy is yet to be
established in many countries.
Articles:

Articles:

Authors’

Authors’ affiliation

Case study

Case study

affiliation

(percent)

(N=85)

(percent)

(N=85)

America

22.5

26.5 %

25.9

30.5 %

Europe

44.5

52.35 %

55.1

64.8 %

Asia

3

3.5 %

1.5

1.8 %

Oceania

2

2.35 %

2.5

2.9 %

Others / Not

13

15.3 %

0

0

Region

Specified
Note: The number would be less than one if authors or case studies came from different regions
Source: Data compiled by the author from the Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management, 2008
– 2012 (Special issues were excluded)

Table 1.1 Articles published in the Journal of Contingencies and Crisis
Management (JCCM), 2008-2012

2

Social Sciences Citation Index (SSCI), is a data base produced by Thomson Reuters accesses to the
bibliographic and citation information from 3,000 of the world's leading social sciences journals
across 50 disciplines. For details, please see:
http://thomsonreuters.com/products_services/science/science_products/a-z/social_sciences_citation_in
dex/

4

1.1.2 Conceptualization: The Civil Society, State, and Government
The current thesis involves the development of a “State-society Interactive
Framework”. As such, this section aims to provide background information, and
probably a workable “definition”, for both “state” and “civil society”.

In

contemporary discussion, there is no agreement on the definition of civil society,
which stems from various origins and varies among different schools of thoughts in
disciplines as diverse as sociology, political science, and philosophy.

As Fine (1997,

7) suggested, the question ‘what is civil society?’ has produced various answers.

Fine (1997) pointed out a number of features of civil society, such as free
associations, social movements, and non-governmental organizations.

However, he

argued that merely identifying its features is insufficient for understanding what civil
society is, and thus further suggested a common ground of civil society theory, which
places civil society “on the side of agency, creativity, activity, productivity, freedom,
association, life itself” (Fine 1997, 9).

In general, civil society and the state are put on opposite ends by scholars discussing
the topic.

A civil society exists when individuals and groups are free to form

organizations that function independently of the state and that can bridge citizens and
the state (Hann 1996, 1).

In enlightenment thought, civil society is put between the

poles of private property on the one side and the state on the other (Fine 1997, 16).
The origin of civil society in Europe, from the perspective of the classical school,
could be dated back to the Roman Empire, in which the removal of the centralized
authority of the government placed power in the several set of hands (Hall 1995, 4).
Hall (1995, 1) further explained that “civil society was seen as the opposite of
despotism, a space in which social groups could exist and move – something which
5

exemplified and would ensure softer, more tolerable conditions of existence.”

In contemporary studies, there are discussions on whether the economic domain
should be part of the civil society. As Khilnani (2005, 13) suggested, from a liberal
perspective, the effective powers of civil society are basically residing in the
economy.

In contrast, the radical perspective placed civil society in a position

independent from the state and the economy. As the current study focuses on state
and non-state actors, the business sector and their representatives (e.g. pro-business
groups or parties) would be treated as non-state actors under the civil society from a
liberal position.

Apart from the business sector, the definition of civil society would lead to confusion
on the categorization of political parties. Theoretically, political parties and the
members who serve in the Legislature should be regarded as state-actors or part of
the government.

However, in the political context of Hong Kong, the political

parties, at least until now, cannot perform the full function of a “party” as understood
in western democracies, as the current laws and regulations on elections do not allow
them to rule and to govern.

In this regard, the Pan-democrats in Hong Kong have

long been described as permanent oppositions. Under an immature party politics
environment (please refer to Section 1.2 below), the role of social activists, pressure
groups and politicians are, to some extent, indistinguishable in the local context.
With such consideration, the current study would regard the political parties in Hong
Kong, especially the Pan-democrats, as non-state actors or located somewhere
in-between the state and the civil society.

Two other terms that need clarification would be “state” and “government”. A state
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is generally considered to have its own population, territory, sovereignty and
government.

In contrast, the government is mostly referred to as an institution

consisting of the executive, legislature and judicial branches that makes and enforces
public policies for and on a society.

In addition, the state is relatively permanent

and continues from time immemorial, but the government is temporary and changes
frequently.

In Skocpol’s (1985, 4) words, “government was viewed primarily as an

arena within which economic interest groups or normative social movements
contended or allied with one another to shape the making of public
policy…Government itself was not taken very seriously as an independent actor.”

However, as opposed to the definitions adopted by political scientists, in Hong Kong,
the terms “state” and “government” are very often used interchangeably.

In fact,

the term “state” has two meanings, “government” in narrow and “country” in general.
As will be demonstrated in the following chapters, interviewees or media reporters,
as well as common people, may use the two terms in an identical sense, and to some
extent there are overlapping areas in those concepts, especially in Chinese
expressions.

Some local scholars also used “government” and “state”

interchangeably.

For example, in Lee, et al.’s (2013, 9-10) recent work on “Civic

engagement and state-society relations”, the authors argued that the current HKSAR
Government is highly impervious to input from civil society, and is worsening the
state-society relations after 1997.

In line with the common usage appearing in

newspaper and other media discourses, the current thesis will use the terms
“government” or “state-actors” to refer to the executive branch of the Hong Kong
SAR Government.

It is important to note that the State-society Interactive Framework proposed in the
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latter part of this thesis is not aimed at dividing “state” and “civil society” into two
competing groups.

Instead, actors within the state and the society would have

different interactions during crises, a characteristic different from the managerial
approaches of crisis management, which views the government as the sole agent in
tackling crises.

1.1.3 Hong Kong as a Sub-Sovereign State
As a Special Administrative Region of China, Hong Kong enjoys a high degree of
autonomy under the Basic Law.

Obviously, from a normative perspective, the

definition of state cannot be fully applied to Hong Kong as it is just a “region” under
the rule of an internationally recognized sovereign state – the People’s Republic of
China. However, in reality, Hong Kong is very different from other Chinese cities
such as Beijing and Shanghai in terms of the degree of autonomy that Hong Kong
enjoys.

For example, Hong Kong is allowed to issue its own currency (i.e. Basic

Law Article 111) which is always viewed as an act of a sovereign state.

As stated in

Article 151 of the Basic Law which is listed below, Hong Kong has the privilege to
join certain international organizations.

“The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region may on its own, using
the name ‘Hong Kong, China’, maintain and develop relations and
conclude and implement agreements with foreign states and regions and
relevant international organizations in the appropriate fields, including
the economic, trade, financial and monetary, shipping, communications,
tourism, cultural and sports fields.” (Article 151)

Hong Kong is currently entitled to independent membership (separate from China) in
the International Olympic Committee and World Trade Organization. However, in
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recent years, the debate on Hong Kong’s “international identity” heated up on the
occasion when Hong Kong tourists were being held hostage in Manila as Donald
Tsang in his capacity as the Chief Executive of Hong Kong, which is a special
administration region or rather say a city of China, called the Philippine President
Benigno Aquino directly on 23 August 2010.

The media had questioned on the

appropriateness of Tsang’s action soon after the incident.

As Simon Shen argued, on newspapers and in his works, Hong Kong is a
“sub-sovereign state” which “refers to the power held by some parts of nation-states
which normally belong exclusively to sovereign states, such as the issuing of postage
stamps, membership of international organizations, the ability to negotiate and enter
into treaties with foreign government, and the like” (Shen 2013a, 105).

Shen

further substantiated his viewpoint in his later work that there is no clear
differentiation between “foreign” relations and “external” relations in international
law (Shen 2013b, 473).

In the case of Hong Kong, with endorsement from Central

People’s Government, the SAR government is allowed to maintain some sorts of
external relations with other sovereign states (i.e. Basic Law Chapter 7).

To summarize, Hong Kong enjoys a comparatively high level of autonomy in
internal affairs such as public policy and governance.

For the purpose of the

discussions on the “state-society” interactions in this thesis, it is important to clarify
at this early stage that the application of the word “state” as referred to hereinafter
should be in line with Shen’s perspective on viewing Hong Kong as a sub-sovereign
state under the rule of China.
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1.2 The State-society Relationship in Post-1997 Hong Kong
With some basic concepts of crisis management in mind, this section will provide an
overview of the political situation in Hong Kong, especially after the return of
sovereignty to China in 1997 - the focus of the current study. More importantly, as
this thesis focuses on the state-society interaction in crisis management, this section
aims to discuss the state-society relationship in Hong Kong, with special attention on
the incompatibilities between the executive–led government and the legislature,
immature party politics (weak political parties), and the vibrant civil society.

In the

latter part of this section, some statistical data from newspaper analysis and
government documents will be presented to give a clear picture on the tense between
the state and the civil society and provide a situational context for current study.

1.2.1 Hong Kong in Transformation
Hong Kong is located at the mouth of Pearl River on the southeastern coast of China.
After one hundred and fifty years of colonial rule of the city by the United Kingdom,
the People’s Republic of China (PRC) reclaimed the sovereignty of Hong Kong on 1
July 1997, and the city is now a Special Administrative Region (SAR) under the rule
of China. As promised by the late Deng Xiaoping, former leader of China, Hong
Kong would generally maintain its capitalistic systems for at least fifty years after the
handover under the principles of “One Country, Two Systems”, “Hong Kong People
Ruling Hong Kong” and “A High Degree of Autonomy”.

Prior to the handover, the Basic Law was passed by the National People’s Congress
of the PRC to serve as the mini-constitution for Hong Kong SAR after 1997. As
stated in the Basic Law, except for foreign affairs (Article 13) and defense (Article
10

14), the Hong Kong SAR Government is vested with executive power of its own to
conduct local administrative affairs (Article 16).

After fifteen years of Chinese rule,

the Hong Kong SAR Government, headed by the Chief Executive, is still believed to
maintain a relatively high degree of autonomy on economic and social affairs.
However, the political autonomy of Hong Kong SAR is in doubt, as, since 1997, the
Central People’s Government of the PRC (CPG, commonly known as “Beijing” or
“the Beijing Government”) has exercised its powers to interpret the Basic Law in
four occasions3 within its first sixteen years of rule.

The current situation is that,

although Hong Kong will not have universal suffrage until or at least 2017, the city is
still a relatively liberal society from a macroscopic perspective, as Hong Kong
people are enjoying a high degree of freedom of press, freedom of speech and
freedom of assembly.

1.2.2 The Executive-led Government under Semi-democracy
According to the Basic Law (Article 43), the Chief Executive (CE) is the head of the
Hong Kong SAR Government. The Chief Executive is elected every five years
through an Election Committee (EC), currently comprised of one thousand and two
hundred members categorized into four sectors, with each sector consisting of three
hundred members4. However, most of the EC members are not selected by direct
election but by the domination and appointment of different Pro-Beijing

3

The first interpretation in 1999 was related to the controversies on the rights of residency. The
second in 2004 was on political development, regarding the path towards universal suffrage. The
third, related to the period of term for the next Chief Executive, was a result of the resignation of the
first Chief Executive, Tung Chee-hwa in 2005. The fourth, in 2011 was on whether Hong Kong
should follow the practice of Mainland China on executing the absolute immunity.
4
The four sectors include 1) Industrial, commercial and financial sectors, 2) The professions, 3)
Labour, social services, religious and other sectors and 4) Members of the Legislative Council,
representatives of district-based organizations, Hong Kong deputies to the National People's Congress,
and representatives of Hong Kong members of the National Committee of the Chinese People's
Political Consultative Conference (Basic Law Annex 1).
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organizations and trade unions. Thus, the Chief Executive elections were in fact
strongly influenced by the CPG.

Further, the Chief Executive elected has to be

appointed by the State Council of PRC before he/she could officially assume the post.
Including the Chief Executive, all principal officials of the HKSAR Government
have to be appointed by the CPG based on the CE’s nomination.

The legislative power of the HKSAR is vested in the Legislative Council (LegCo).
The LegCo is divided into two sections, namely the Geographical Constituencies
(GCs) and the Functional Constituencies (FCs).

Each of the two constituencies

contains thirty five members in 2012. The GCs are further sub-divided into five
constituencies, and the seats are elected directly by proportional representation.

On

the other hand, the FCs consist of twenty nine constituencies categorized according
to occupational and professional sectors in Hong Kong.

Except for the

newly-introduced District Council (Second) sector, all other sectors are selected by a
rather small number of electors5.

Not surprisingly, the FCs elections are mainly

controlled by the Beijing government, and voters in some sectors would not even
have the chance to vote as only one candidate would emerge after consultations
among the stakeholders.

From a policy-making perspective, Hong Kong is under an executive-led or
executive-driven (Li 2007, 32) system, with the executive branch being dominant in
the decision-making process as compared to the legislature. The power of LegCo is
tightly limited by the Basic Law:

5

Apart from the District Council (Second) FC, the remaining twenty eight traditional FCs consist of
around two hundred and forty thousand eligible electors in total. But the total number of eligible
voters in Hong Kong (i.e., those who can vote in the GCs) should be more than three million.
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“Members of the Legislative Council of the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region may introduce bills in accordance with the
provisions of this Law and legal procedures. Bills which do not relate to
public expenditure or political structure or the operation of the
government may be introduced individually or jointly by members of the
Council. The written consent of the Chief Executive shall be required
before bills relating to government policies are introduced” (Basic Law,
Article 74).

Thus, it is almost impossible for a Legislative Councilor to initiate a bill related to
any policy issue, as it may be treated as a matter related to public expenditure.
Further, bills introduced by legislators have to garner support from the majority in
both GCs and FCs to be passed.

Given that the Pro-government camp always

controls the majority in the FCs, those pan-democrat lawmakers elected directly
through the GCs would not have much political influence in the decision-making of
the SAR government.

In this regard, the policymaking process is mostly held in the hands of Chief
Executive and his cabinet (i.e., the executive branch).

Before July 2002, all

principal officials, except for the Chief Executive, were under the civil service
system.

They were tenured, and should be free from bearing political

responsibilities.

In the beginning of his second term, former CE Tung Chee-hwa

introduced the Principal Officials Accountability System (POAS) due to critiques
that government officials were being (politically) irresponsible. Under the POAS,
all policy bureaus are headed by a politically-appointed Secretary, while the original
civil servant position of Secretary was retitled Permanent Secretary.

The POAS6

was expanded in 2010 by adding politically-appointed Undersecretaries and Political
6

The system was retitled “Principal Officials Appointment System” by Donald Tsang, the second
Chief Executive (2005 - 2012) of Hong Kong.
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Assistants to aid the Secretaries. The team of political appointees is separated from
the civil servants, and is responsible for political work including the design and
promotion of government policy proposals, while civil servants are only responsible
for execution and operation.

The first ten years of implementation of the POAS (2002 - 2012) saw the resignation
of several principal officials due to different reasons (C.-y. Cheung 2005).

Of these,

the stepping-down of then-Financial Secretary Antony Leung and then-Security
Secretary Regina Ip are widely accepted as consequences of the 500,000-people
protest on 1 July 2003 against the legislation of Basic Law Article 23 regarding the
National Security Ordinance.

Despite this, the effectiveness of POAS has been in

doubt, especially regarding the performance of unprofessional politicians, unclear
division of labour between the political appointees and senior civil servants, and the
collective denial of responsibility among different officials.

The dramatic changes in the political system in the past 20 years, to some extent,
have led to the incapability of institutions in Hong Kong.

Great challenges can be

found in the relationship between the executive and the legislature, as a
non-democratic executive is now facing a more democratic legislature.

Christine

Loh, a former lawmaker, suggested, “the executive branch’s fear of sharing power is
stunting the development of the political system … (the ExCo) sees the legislature as
an inconvenience that has to be overcome rather than as an active partner to build
participatory governance” (South China Morning Post, 12 April 2000). As Huque
and Lee (2000, 118) observed soon after the handover, under the new political setting,
“relationship between the executive and legislature emerges a critical element in the
management of crises”.
14

In general, the institutional arrangement after the handover has proven to be
incapable.

The SAR Government still relies mostly on the bureaucracy and

advisory committees, and efforts to rebuild strong governance have ended largely in
frustration.

“In the absence of more novel institutional means to link up the

executive and legislature, the overall system has remained disjointed. Old-style
consultative politics no longer works” (A. Cheung 2009).

Besides, the Pro-Beijing

bloc has controlled the appointment of personnel in almost all public sectors in such
a way that even moderate Pan-democrats are largely excluded. The state’s policy
network is highly exclusive and centralized. However, in return, the effectiveness
of the executive-led government is declining, as the entire governance is highly
impervious to input from the broader society by formal channels (E. Lee, et al. 2013).
The above discussion shows that tension exists in the interactions between different
actors in crisis management under the newly emerged Hong Kong political context.

1.2.3

Political Controversies and the Immature Party Politics

Hong Kong has adopted the representative political system since the 1980s. Under
institutional restrictions, the party politics in Hong Kong is not as mature as some
other East Asian societies (such as South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan).

In general, the

polity of Hong Kong can be divided into Pro-Beijing (or Pro-government /
Pro-establishment) and Pan-democrats (or Anti-government, as some leftists call
them). Under the current political settings, the Pro-Beijing bloc, which includes
political parties serving as Beijing delegates, trade unions and professional bodies
with strong Mainland China background and connections, has the privilege of
holding different formal and informal positions in the government and
15

semi-governmental bodies.

Statutory bodies, commissions, advisory committees

and the District Councils with appointed members are mostly occupied by the
Pro-Beijing bloc.

In contrast, the Pan-democrats have been actively participating in

direct elections in the LegCo GCs and District Councils7.

Due to the presence of

FCs, which are always in control by the Pro-Beijing bloc, the Pan-democrats have
never been able to control the majority in the LegCo despite winning the majority of
votes8 in past Legco elections.

The conflicts between Beijing and the Pan-democrats are heated on the issues of
universal suffrage and the democratization of Hong Kong, especially when the CPG
demonstrated greater intention to intervene after the 2003 demonstration (Sing and
Tang 2012).

First of all, according to the Basic Law Annex I and II, the Hong Kong

SAR Government is able to amend the method for selecting the Chief Executive and
forming the Legislative Council after 2007.

In this regard, the Pan-democrats had

reasonable expectation of the democratization of Hong Kong or even the immediate
introduction of universal suffrage. However, the path of democratization in Hong
Kong was not as smooth as the Pan-democrats had imagined.

In December 2007,

the National People’s Congress announced that Hong Kong would be able to elect its
Chief Executive and Legislative Council by universal suffrage in 2017 and 2020
respectively.

Owing to the great expectation gap between the two sides, the 2007 political reform
package was voted down in 2005, and no amendment would be made on the methods
7

Hong Kong is divided into 18 District Councils; they are local level administrative entities with
some power on affairs related to local livelihoods. District Councilors are either directly elected
every four years, or are appointed by the Chief Executive (a practice to be discontinued in 2016).
8
The Pan-democrats won 56.6% of vote in the LegCo Election 2012. See “Pan-democrats election
setbacks blamed on infighting” South China Morning Post, 11-9-2012
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of 2007 CE Election and 2008 LegCo Election.

Notwithstanding of the deadlock

and the proximity of 2012 CE Election, the League of Social Democrats (LSD, a
Pan-democrat party) called for the resignation of five lawmakers in July 2009 in
order to imply a “de-facto referendum” on universal suffrage.

This “de-facto

referendum” was criticized badly by Beijing9, and even the Democratic Party (DP)
did not take part.

Nevertheless, the “cut-off” between DP and the “referendum”

provided a common ground for Beijing and DP for further negotiation (Sing and
Tang 2012). Finally, they agreed on the proposal of having five FCs new seats in
the LegCo - the District Council (Second) constituency10, which all popularly-elected
DC members would be eligible to run for, and all Hong Kong eligible voters who do
not have any other FC affiliation would be allowed to vote on.

1.2.4 Hong Kong-Central Government Relations
The Chinese Central Government has demonstrated its interest in affairs in Hong
Kong since the establishment of the PRC. Over the past 60 years, in regard to the
political change in Mainland China and the normalization of diplomatic relations
with the British, the Chinese Government’s strategies towards Hong Kong have
experienced dramatic changes.

Loh’s (2010) work “Underground Front” examined

the role the Chinese Communist Party has played in Hong Kong since the creation of
the Party to the present day, with focus on the key targets of the party’s united front
activities, which illustrated the strategies adopted by CCP in gathering political
support from different sectors.

9

No party form the Pro-Beijing bloc took part in the by-election brought by the resignation of the
five Pan-democratic lawmakers.
10
See Sing and Tang (2012) for details regarding to the “de-facto referendum” and the negotiation
process between Beijing and DP.
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In the same vein, Sunny Lo (2008) identified Beijing as the most powerful patron
that dominates over any political actor in Hong Kong.

In fact, the CE-Beijing

relations and CE-Hong Kong people relations are in dilemma. As Lo argued, the
Chief Executive is bound to be politically loyal to Beijing.

Thus, comparatively,

the CE is far more accountable to the central government than to the Hong Kong
people (S. Lo 2008, 35), leading to the complicated interactions and tensions among
CE, Beijing, and Hong Kong people during serious political crisis, as will be
discussed in the case studies section.

As suggested by Loh (2010), Beijing’s involvement in local affairs has become
obvious after the 2003 Protest.

In line with Sing and Tang’s (2012, 153) argument,

shocked by the withdrawal of the Liberal Party in the Article 23 legislation in 2003,
Beijing has found the indirect control of Hong Kong via Pro-Beijing delegates
ineffective.

The 2012 political reform controversies have further exposed the issue

of whether the CPG wished to develop a “second governing team” through the
Central Liaison Office of PRC in Hong Kong (J. Cheng 2013, 24), as Beijing
officials directly took part in the political reform negotiation process.

The election

of Leung Chun-ying as CE in 2012 was rumored to be the consequence of Central
Liaison Office’s direct interference on the CE election (Apple Daily, 25 March 2012).

In fact, the tension between Pan-democrats and the Beijing Government is deeply
rooted.

Through the 30-year transitional period11, two major issues had significant

impact on Hong Kong-Beijing relations. First, the introduction of direct election in

11

The Sino-British Joint Declaration was signed by the People's Republic of China and the United
Kingdom governments on 19 December 1984 in Beijing. As agreed in the Declaration, the PRC
would resume its sovereignty over Hong Kong on 1 July 1997. The period between 1984 and 1997
is commonly known as the “transitional period” in Hong Kong.
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the Legislative Council in 1991 and 1995 had substantially sowed the seed of
democratization in Hong Kong, as “democratization against Communism” was a
notion that was widely whispered as a British tactic towards Hong Kong’s handover
to China. Chris Patten, the last Governor of British Hong Kong who attempted to
introduce direct democracy to Hong Kong, was even named “wrongdoer who would
be condemned for a thousand generations” by Chinese official Lu Ping for his
aggressive political reform on LegCo soon before 1997.

Second, the June-Fourth Tiananmen Square Incident in 1989 was a triggering point
that provoked the long-term distrust between Hong Kong people and the Chinese
Communist government (which is extended to the HKSAR Government appointed
by Beijing) (Li 2003, 619).

Even now, the Tiananmen Incident is still deeply rooted

in the heart of many Hong Kong people, and a party’s stand on the Tiananmen
Incident is still a clear watershed that distinguishes it between being the
Pan-democrats or the Pro-establishments in the post-handover Hong Kong polity, as
Pro-establishments leaders are rarely seen asking for vindication of the Incident in
public or participating in the annual candlelight vigil after the handover.

In fact,

some Hong Kong people consider a vote for the Pan-democrats in LegCo elections a
protest to China (Leung 1993), and the Anti-China syndrome (Leung 1993, J. Lee
1999, 38) brought by the Tiananmen Incident has provided consistent public support
for the Pan-Democrats and the annual candlelight vigil at Victoria Park.

In general, the distrust between Beijing (and its delegates) and Pan-democrats has
developed a crisis-provoking politics. The legitimacy deficit along the years of the
HKSAR Government has made any sensitive political issues, be them public policy
controversies or scandals on principal officials, provocative to the general public, as
19

well as the “permanent opposition” Pan-democrats.

Thus, it is crucial to include

political factors (i.e., political interactions between the state and the society) that
work to complicate the development process of the crisis event itself when studying
crisis management in Post-1997 Hong Kong.

1.2.5 The Corporatist Regime: Government-Business Relations
The business sector has been acting as a middleman between Hong Kong and Beijing
since the 1980s.

Since the colonial era, businesspersons, as political conservatives,

have been actively engaged in different political institutions, such as the ExCo and
the LegCo. As Ma (2007, 70) suggested, the close relationship between Beijing and
the business sector has been taken as a strategy to maintain the prosperity of Hong
Kong under capitalist system after the handover.

After the establishment of HKSAR, the business bloc continued to enjoy political
prestige by holding positions in Election Committee, District Councils (as appointed
members), advisory bodies and also the Functional Constituencies in the Legislative
Council. More importantly, C H Tung (the first Chief Executive who previously
was an entrepreneur) was said to be an example of “businessman ruling Hong Kong”,
leading to the formation of the “Corporatist Regime” (Ma 2007, 70, Ma 2012, 71).

As mentioned, the political power of business elites is vested in different level of
government institutions. In the Election Committee, they control one-fourth of the
votes in electing the Chief Executive, while in the Legislative Council, lawmakers in
the FCs with business background account for almost half of the total seats in the
LegCo. With the aid of the separate voting mechanism, they can easily vote down
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any bill and amendment proposed by the Pan-democrat lawmakers, who are mostly
elected through direct election.

However, as discussed in the previous section, party politics in Hong Kong is still
immature.

In this circumstance, the business sectors in Hong Kong do not converge

into a unified political force as in western democracies.

Instead, “eclectic

corporatism” is emerging, in which business elites with diverse interests seek their
own particularistic rents and favour: “The eclectic corporatism brought with (the
state) a form of multilateral, ad hoc, particularistic bargaining, resulting in ad hoc,
particularistic and eclectic interventions in various sectors after 1997 with no clear
development goals” (Ma 2012, 80).

The business sector is recognized as a key component of the Pro-establishment bloc.
But in fact, the “political alliance” between the business bloc and the SAR
Government has seen several challenges after 1997, as Pro-business parties, such as
the Liberal Party, held different views from the government (and thus, voted
differently), on some critical issues, some of which had finally led to policy failure.
In this sense, the role of the Pro-business parties as a key minority has brought
dramatic political consequences.

This will be discussed in details in the case study

of Basic Law Article 23 legislation incident.

1.2.6 A Vibrant Civil Society in the Post-1997 Hong Kong
The development of civil society in Hong Kong can be traced back to the Chinese
elites’ communities developed from the assembly in Chinese temples12 in the early

12

Tung Wah Group of Hospitals (TWGHs, the largest Chinese charity in Hong Kong) was set up by a
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colonial era (K.-m. Chan 2010, 148). Prior to the Sino-British negotiation on the
future of Hong Kong in the late 1970s, Hong Kong society was mainly described as a
“refugee society” or “lifeboat” (Hoadley 1970).

The most famous illustration was

Lau’s (1982, 72) “utilitarianistic familism”, which described Hong Kong people as
family-oriented, economic interest-driven, and lack of intention to engage in politics.
In general, as K.-m. Chan (2010, 161-163) argued, Hong Kong civil society in the
1970s was diversified, uninterested in monitoring the authority, and void of active
participation.

The development of civil society in Hong Kong got a significant boost after the 1
July 2003 Demonstration, and the huge demonstration was regarded as a
breakthrough (Chan and Chan 2007).

From an institutional perspective, as

guaranteed by the Basic Law, Hong Kong people enjoy freedom of speech,
publication, and assembly, making the exchange of information and ideas possible
without barriers.

In contrast with Chan’s (2010, 161-163) and Lau’s (1982)

observations on the passive civil society in pre-1980s, Chan and Chan (2007)
generalized three discourses to describe the post-handover civil society in Hong
Kong:

1) Civil society as a defender of its autonomy
Chan and Chan (2007, 81-82) argued that this is “the most common function
attributed to civil society”, especially after the National Security Ordinance
group of Chinese elite in late 19th century. In fact, the TWGHs was a politically-influential Chinese
organization that acted as a bridge between the British colonial government and the Chinese
community. Its establishment could be traced back to Kwong Fook I-tsz, a small temple on Tai Ping
Shan Street on Hong Kong Island in 1851. Temples were a place for making major decisions under
Chinese traditions. For the political role of TWGHs in pre-WWII Hong Kong, see Elizabeth Sinn
and Thomas Lau (2006)-edited “A collection of commemorative works of Tung Wah in celebration of
its 135th anniversary” (in Chinese), Hong Kong: Joint Publishing.
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controversy in 2003. This discourse shows the need for civil society to stand up
against the interruption of civil rights and freedom enjoyed by the people.

The idea

of civil society becomes clearer to the people as they gain awareness of the existence
and importance of the civil society. Civil society would be jeopardized if it is not
defended by the public themselves.

2) Civil society as third sector and social capital
This discourse revealed the definition of Non-government Organization (NGO) - “the
association of civil society with non-profit, voluntary associations as well as the
notions of social capital” (Chan and Chan 2007, 83).

Civil society could be a

problem-solving agency especially during economic downturns.

Initiated by former

Chief Executive Tung Chee-hwa in his 2000 Policy Address, voluntary organizations
would be helpful in finding solutions to problems then headstrong to both the
government and market (Policy Address, 2000, para 98).

In the same vein, K.-m.

Chan (2010, 187) identified the roles of Hong Kong civil society in response to
different social crises, such as during the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS)
outbreak in 2003.

He listed eight major roles of civil society in the fight with SARS,

namely, initiating and monitoring the government, providing prevention guidance,
supporting the patients, conducting research and development, providing public
education, supporting health care workers, fund raising, and diminishing the damages
of SARS.

3) Civil society as a partner of governance
As stated by Chan and Chan (2007, 84), it is a worldwide trend to acknowledge the
role of civil society in governance, as it is increasingly desiring and demanding to
have meaningful participation in the government’s decision-making process.
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In

recent years, the Hong Kong civil society has become more pro-active in its
engagement of the policymaking process, especially on environmental protection and
conservation issues.

This is especially the case since 2003, when a number of urban

policy issues have raised public attention on conservation, including the protection of
Victoria Harbour from further reclamation, and the conflicts regarding the
conservation of Lei Tung Street (also known as “Wedding Card Street”) in Wan Chai
and the Queen’s Pier and the former Star Ferry Pier in Central.

Compared to

Discourses 1 and 2, which are more self-interest oriented, the recent movements on
conservation emphasized a sense of belonging, self-expression, and quality of life.
In this regard, the Hong Kong civil society now believes that “post-materialist values”
(Inglehart 1981) should be considered in policymaking process along with the
principle of economic efficiency (Chan and Chan 2007, 87).

1.2.7 Post-2003: the Crisis Provoking Politics and New Social Movement
The discussion on civil society development in Hong Kong in the previous section
was based on the change in people’s demands and concerns. However, a number of
scholars also suggested the evolution of civil society mobilization process – the
usage of internet, especially with reference to recent social movements, since 2003.
As argued by So (2008), recent developments in information technology, such as the
popular usage of internet, have contributed to the growth of social movements - an
observation in line with those of Chan and Chan (2007, 92) and Chan and Chan
(2006).

Furthermore, So (2008, 246-247) suggested a post-modernist approach on

social mobilization with four major characteristics:

First, activists depend on

high-tech to spread information and mobilize people. Second, instead of having
systematic organization, social activists are disorganized and spontaneous.
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So

(2008) drew this remark based on the 1 July 2003 Demonstration, but it was also
observed in the Anti-High Speed Railway Incident in 2009-2010.

Third, the

movements themselves are mainly not ideology-driven, but stay close with some
local and community issues such as environmental protection and conservation.
Finally, although activists are in general peaceful, they dare to have confrontation
with the police, as seen in the recent rapid development of radical political parties,
such as the League of Social Democrats (LSD) and the People Power.

LSD’s

election publicity even suggested using radical politics to confront current
institutions in order to fight for political changes13.

The Anti-High Speed Railway Incident in late 2009 also brought a new term to social
movement – the “Post-80s”.

While there is no single definition for Post-80s, when

illustrating the formation and characteristics of the Post-80s, mass media and
commentators usually refer to the discussion by Lui (2007), who defined the fourth
generation of Hong Kong people as those who were born after mid-1970s, and Lam
(2010), who illustrated the formation of Post-80s from a social movement
perspective.

Despite the different perspectives on the phenomenon of Post-80s, it is

generally agreed that the diminishing social upward mobility is a major reason for its
formation.

Compared to their parents, the Post-80s are more educated but

encountered difficulties in climbing the social ladder due to the lack of opportunities
nowadays in contrast with 1970s to 1980s when the Hong Kong economy was
rapidly developing.

Lam (2010) conducted an in-depth analysis of the actions of the Post-80s activists in
the Anti-High Speed Railway Incident and the reasons behind, and discovered some
13

“Street Protest – Philosophy of Action”, League of Social Democrats, 28 Oct 2011.
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new social movement strategies that distinguish the Post-80s from their predecessors,
such as carnival-style assembly, ascetic practice and “secondary creation”14 on the
internet.

Regarding the reasons behind, Lam shared similar views with So’s (2008)

“post-modernist” mode of social movement and Chan and Chan’s (2007) idea of
“post-materialist”, stating that Post-80s come from a diversified political background,
have less organizational binding, lack a culture of seniority, feel dissatisfied with the
current mode of political and social development, are full of creativities, and hope for
a better Hong Kong (Lam 2010, 255-262).

With no doubt, the rise of Post-80s

activist, along with the popularization of information technology, has speeded up the
development of a fruitful and diverse civil society in post-handover Hong Kong.

In summary, in line with the rapid development of civil society since the 2003
Demonstration, rally and demonstration have become a major means for different
non-state actors to express their ideas.

Social activists, regardless of their

backgrounds, consider demonstrations a method of opposing controversial
government policies, such as the National Security Ordinance legislation and
construction of the high speed railway.

It is foreseeable that civic engagements in

different social movements or collective actions will become a trend in pushing
certain political agenda that fail to attract government attention using normal
channels under the limited-democratic system of Hong Kong. The observation by
A. Cheung (2009, 6) would best conclude the current state-society relations of Hong
Kong:

“As society becomes more differentiated and politicized, sometimes not just

over conflicts in interests but also in values, and as new civil society activism

14

Secondary creation is the local expression of parody or spoof. Activists would make use of
different media products, such as movie clips, advertisement, and news photos, etc., to make pointed
fun of the politician regarding different social and political issues through online social network sites,
such as Facebook.
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emerges and escalates, the traditional form of absorption politics based on the
co-optation of business and professional elites has proved insufficient to carry the
public view and confer policy legitimacy.”

1.2.8 Observations: Statistical Data on State-society Interactions
Before defining the research questions for the current thesis, it is imperative to
understand the choice of post-handover Hong Kong as case study.

According to

conventional wisdom, crises happen regardless of time and location.

However, the

transfer of sovereignty from Britain to China and the implementation of “One
Country, Two Systems” have provided an unprecedented political context. Hence,
it is of interest to understand the extent to which civil society development and
governance crises differ during and after the colonial era.

This section presents

statistics on Hong Kong civil society development and governance crises, with an
aim to demonstrate the rapidly changing situation in Hong Kong from a quantitative
manner and to demonstrate the huge changes in crisis-provoking politics since the
handover – the time frame of the current study.

On civil society
In an attempt to investigate the extent to which Hong Kong people are aware of their
belonging to civil society, Chan and Chan (2007, 79-81) reviewed the number of
times the term “civil society” was mentioned in local newspapers from 1998 to 2006.
The current study uses the same method to extend the period of investigation to 2012,
and the combined results are displayed in Figure 1.115.

It can be seen that the use of

the term gradually increased from 30 in 1998 to 179 in 2002, then almost doubled to
15

Data in Figure 1.1 was obtained from WiseNews search on the term “civil society” between 1998
and 2006 (Chan and Chan, 2007: 81) and between 2007 and 2012 (by author of the current study)
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304 times in 2003.

In 2006, the term was mentioned 995 times (Chan and Chan

2007, 79), whereafter the number maintained between 700 and 800 for the next five
years until 2012, when the number reached a peak of 1191. As suggested by Chan
and Chan (2007, 19), the discourse of “civil society”, which was rarely discussed in
the public a decade before, has now become an everyday expression. The data is
also in line with the developmental trend of civil society after the handover.

With

reference to the “post-materialist” or “post-modernist” social movement, the civil
society of Hong Kong reacted strongly not only during the 2003 Demonstration, but
also in a number of issues, such as conservation of the former Star Ferry Pier (2006),
Li Tung Street (Wedding Card Street) (2006) and the Queen’s Pier (2007).

Source: Data from 1998-2006 was collected by Chan and Chan (2007, 81), while that for 2007-2012
was collected by the current author using the same method as Chan and Chan.

Figure 1.1 Number of mentions of “civil society” in newspapers, 1998-2012

On social movements
Studies on social movement in Hong Kong face a challenge, as the Hong Kong
government does not release a full set of data on social movement activities, such as
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individual numbers of demonstrations, public assemblies, and rallies, to the public,
and, considering the huge diversity on social movement formats, newspaper
discourse analysis often fail to reach a high validity16.

The Hong Kong Police does

release “lump-sum” data of the number of public assemblies and rallies in Hong
Kong to the Legco and local newspapers, and these are summarized in Figure 1.2 and
Table 1.2.

Source: Hong Kong Police Force (cited in Apple Daily, 22 Jun 2012)

Figure 1.2 Number of public assemblies and rallies in Hong Kong, 1997-2011

A comparison of Figures 1.1 and 1.2 shows that along with the rapid increase since
2003 and the large number of public discourse mentioning “civil society” since 2006
(Figure 1.1), the number of protests also started to rise after 2006 (Figure 1.2).

An

interpretation could be that the civil society development has been represented in the

16

Chan and Chan (2007: 80) produced a table by using WiseNews search on demonstrations, rallies,
and petitions in Hong Kong. The authors divided the data into sub-groups based on the participants’
demands (e.g., human rights, education and health, etc.). However, their comprehensiveness on
over-detailed classification casts doubts on their data validity, and thus their results are not quoted in
the current study.
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form of protests.

Although there is no data on the number of participants, a

significant increase in protests is in the same vein as the characteristic of civil society
diversities was discussed in the previous section.

1997-2010

Public assembly:

23,422

Rally:

12,169

Average per day:

7.5

Source: LegCo document CB(2)205/10-11(04)

2007-2009

Public assembly:

9,340

Rally:

2,990

Average per day:

11

Source: LegCo document CB(2)832/09-10(09)

2009-2011

Public assembly:

13,000

Rally:

3,670

Average per day:

15

Source: LegCo document CB(2)2452/11-12(06)

Table 1.2 Number of public assemblies and rallies in Hong Kong, 1997-2011

Table 1.2 shows the number of public assemblies and rallies in different time periods
after the handover.

It can be seen that the average number of public assemblies,

rallies and all social movement activities per day has increased significantly between
2007-2009 and 2009-2011.

Further, out of the total of 23,422 public assemblies

from 1997 to 2010, 9,340 or 39.8%, were recorded in the three-year period between
2007 and 2009. Obviously, the civil society has become more active in social
movement by using demonstrations as a means to express its opinions to the
government, compared to the early post-handover era (prior to 2003).

The

observations also imply that sudden crises and crisis management could be possible
solutions to explain why Hong Kong has become a “city of protest”17.

17

Many discourses have mentioned Hong Kong as a “city of protest”, see The Sun (Hong Kong), 1
Nov 2011 and Apple Daily, 22 Jun 2012.
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On governance crisis
Data collected from discourse analysis of four local newspapers18 in “governance
crisis” presents similar pattern to previous studies on “civil society” and social
protests.

Indeed, the term “governance crisis” rarely appeared in public discourse

before the 1 July 2003 Demonstration, with only less than 15 articles mentioning
“governance crisis” per year.

This number recorded a dramatic increase to 328 in

2003, reducing to 30 in 2006, and gradually increasing again in the recent six years
(2007-2012) to 135 in 2012. Figure 1.3 shows that the trend in the number of
mentions of “governance crisis” could be divided into three periods – 1) the pre-2003
period (i.e., 1998-2002), 2) 1 July 2003 Demonstration and its aftermath (2003-2006),
and 3) the period from 2007 to 2012.

Source: Compiled by the author from WiseNews search

Figure 1.3 Number of mentions of “governance crisis” in newspapers, 1998-2012
18

The four local newspapers are: Apple Daily, Ming Pao, Oriental Daily, and Wenweipo.
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The data could be associated with the development of civil society with the 1 July
2003 Demonstration as a watershed, as discussed previously.

Obviously, Hong

Kong is now experiencing an unprecedented crisis-provoking politics, that is, the use
of different kinds of crisis events to create a window of opportunity for government
change, since the public is more aware of governance crises, and more protests could
be seen with a proactive civil society under a limited democracy.

A comparison

between the data pre- and post-1 July 2003 Demonstration shows the close
relationship between governance crisis and the development of civil society in
post-handover Hong Kong, and justifies the necessity and empirical importance of
studying the state-society interactions in crisis management, especially in the
socio-political context of Hong Kong - the focus of the current thesis.

1.3 Research Questions
Regardless of their nature, crises present challenges to the government in all aspects the political consequences of scandals and policy failure can be explosive, for
example. Simultaneously, the public is also highly concerned with the performance
of the government in crisis management during natural disasters.

Thus, the major

research question for the current study would be: “How did the state-society
interactions affect the development process and outcomes of crisis politics?”
Answering this question requires a review of current crisis management literature to
seek for potential analytical framework(s).

However, as briefly mentioned

previously and would be detailed in the next chapter, current crisis management
research is mostly based on western liberal-democracies, a system that Hong Kong
has yet to achieve.

Therefore, a sub-question would be: “What are the strengths and
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weaknesses of applying western crisis management theories to a limited-democracy,
such as Hong Kong?”

This thesis can be regarded as a theoretical inquiry on current crisis management
theories. The current literature, which will be thoroughly reviewed in following
chapter, demonstrated that current theories are inadequate for non-democracies, as
both the top-down and bottom-up crisis management approaches assumed that the
government is fully accountable to its people through regular elections.

By

adopting the suggested State-society Interactive Framework, this thesis aims to
analyze the action and reaction processes between the state and different non-state
stakeholders in crisis politics, given that the Hong Kong political system is not yet
democratized, and the check-and-balance mechanism is not comparable to western
countries.

Nevertheless, it is unwise to claim that western theories by default could not be
applied to non-democratic countries. However, questions remain when studying
crisis management in the absence of democracy.

First, leaders are not totally

responsible to the people, as they are not constrained through regular elections.
Thus, channels monitoring their crisis management performance are both insufficient
and ineffective. The weak linkage between leaders’ performance and their political
accountability would lead to the seeking of alternative ways by non-state actors to
influence the crisis politics.

Second, from a policymaking perspective, in

non-democratic regimes, and to a large extent in Hong Kong, policymaking is a
top-down process under a closed system.

The policy community (Kingdon, 1995)

is controlled by a small group of political elites, and thus a gap exists between public
opinions and government decisions - a political time bomb waiting to turn policy
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failure into governance crisis.

At the same time, considering the observations on current Hong Kong politics,
another sub-question would be: “What was the reason behind the high frequency of
crises after the handover?”

In the first few months after the handover, the

newly-established Hong Kong SAR Government was already faced with mounting
public dissatisfaction and political pressure, as cases such as the Bird Flu, chaos
during the opening of the new airport, and the Asian Financial Crisis followed one
another. The poor crisis management of the government was associated with the
incompetent administration of the first CE, Tung Chee-hwa (J. Cheng 2007, 25).
However, his unpopularity did not prevent him from being “re-elected” for a second
term as Chief Executive in 2002. The crises, however, did not give a blessing to his
newly-appointed cabinet under the POAS, as then-Financial Secretary Antony
Leung’s Car-Gate Scandal, the outbreak of SARS, and some other serious crises
exploded one after the other. Thus, this research would also explore the relationship
between the occurrence of crises and the Hong Kong political system that lacks full
democracy.

Last but not least, the thesis also attempts to answer a third sub-question: “Given a
hybrid political system, what is the role of crises in Hong Kong politics since the
handover?” This question frames crises in a rather constructive angle - as events
that would trigger political opportunities for non-state actors, including the
oppositions and social activists.

Under the current political system, legitimacy is by

default an institutional weakness of the Hong Kong SAR Government.

This thesis

also studies the increasingly significant role of crises in influencing the political
environment of post-1997 Hong Kong.
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1.4

Structure of the Thesis

This thesis is structured as follows.

Chapter One: Introduction
A brief introduction on crisis management concepts is followed by some background
information on the Hong Kong political context.

More importantly, this chapter

addresses the major research gaps in the field, and introduces the socio-political
context that makes post-1997 Hong Kong a critical moment for studying crisis
politics. The chapter also serves as a blue print of the whole thesis by addressing
the major research goals and research questions.

At last, it introduces the structure

of the thesis by providing an overview on each chapter.

Chapter Two: Literature Review
This chapter is a review on the current literature on crisis management, and serves as
a navigator for potential theoretical gaps in this field by pointing out the weaknesses
of current theories and approaches.

It begins with the definition and typology of

crisis, followed by an introduction of the major crisis management models and
methods.

In the second section, some issue-based crisis study, including political

scandal and natural disease, is presented. The third section of this chapter covers
literature related to crisis and public policy, followed by a review of literature on the
role of mass media and political communication in crisis management.

The final

part of this chapter discusses crisis research in the Hong Kong context.

Since the

return of sovereignty to China in 1997, Hong Kong has experienced different types
of crises of varying scales. This part points out the major trend of crisis research in
Hong Kong and discusses their focuses as well as the extent to which those works are
theory-based.
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Chapters Three and Four: Analytical Frameworks
Three analytical frameworks are applied in this thesis, two of which are from current
crisis management literature - Boin, 't Hart, Stern, et al.’s (2005) “Five-step
Leadership Approach” (Leadership Approach), in which the authors identified five
major tasks to be performed by decision-makers during a crisis: Sense-making,
decision-making, meaning-making, termination, and learning, and Brandstrom and
Kuipers’s (2003) “Pattern of Politicization Approach” (Politicization Approach).

After a brief discussion on the weaknesses of the above-mentioned approaches, the
third framework to be discussed will be the State-society Interactive Framework
(Interactive Framework), which is developed in the current study, and serves as an
alternate model to illustrate the crisis provoking politics in non-democratic or
limited-democratic regimes, such as Hong Kong.

The Interactive Framework

consists of four major components, namely, the Crisis Development Ladder, Crisis
Strengthening Forces, Crisis Weakening Forces and the Catalytic Effect of Crisis.
The Interactive Framework mostly concerns the development of crises as a
battlefield for different political actors under the absence of regular elections as an
effective check-and-balance mechanism.

This framework will fill the current

research gap, and will be a useful contribution to the crisis management literature.

Chapter Five: Research Methods and Design
After explaining the three approaches, this chapter introduces the research methods
(i.e., documentary and archival study, in-depth interviews and media discourse
analysis) and research design of using two case studies (i.e., the 1 July 2003
Demonstration and the Anti-High Speed Railway Incident).
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Also, this chapter

would provide detail justification on the research methods and brief introduction on
the case study arrangement.

Case Study Part I: 1 July 2003 Demonstration
Chapter Six: Antony Leung’s Car Gate Scandal
Chapter Seven: The Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) Epidemic
Chapter Eight: National Security Ordinance Controversy
Case Study Part I consists of four chapters. Chapters Six to Eight recount the three
events that led to the 1 July 2003 Demonstration respectively: Antony Leung’s
Car-gate scandal, the outbreak of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS), and
the controversies regarding the legislation of the National Security Ordinance (Basic
Law article 23) legislation.

Each of these three chapters starts with a collection of

news reports relating to each event, details of the decisions made, and a record of the
critical moments. The Leadership Approach and the Politicization Approach is then
applied to analyze the events.

The aim is to evaluate the strengths and weaknesses

of these crisis management theories as applied to different types of real cases.
Finally, a brief summary identifying the important issues that have not been
addressed by the theories is given.

Chapter Nine: The 1 July 2003 Demonstration - State-Society Interactive
Framework Analysis
The 1 July 2003 Demonstration, with more than half-a-million participants, was the
most eye-catching historical event and the most serious social crisis in Hong Kong
since the handover. The demonstration was said to be the consequence of a chain of
poor governance under former CE Tung Chee-hwa’s administration.

In the first

attempt on crisis management literature to assess the multi-crisis effect for a chain of
37

crisis events, the State-society Interactive Framework is applied to analyze the effect
of these crises.

In order to support the argument, data from newspaper discourse

analysis is also presented to assess the changes in the different forces during different
stages of the event.

Case Study Part II
Chapter Ten: Anti-High Speed Railway Incident
This chapter analyzes the crisis brought by the Hong Kong section of Express Rail
Link (High speed railway) project.

In a similar layout as the previous chapter, news

reports is first presented, followed by Leadership and Politicization Approaches
analysis and a brief summary on the analyses.

Apparently, the nature of this

incident is different from that of the 1 July 2003 Demonstration.

By applying the

State-society Interactive Framework, this case serves as a comparison to emphasize
the importance of catalytic effect in influencing the crisis politics.

Chapter Eleven: Discussion and Analysis
After making a detailed analysis of the case studies by adopting the three approaches,
the major strengths and weaknesses of both Leadership and Politicization
Approaches are presented respectively in comparison with the State-society
Interactive Framework.

In this regard, this chapter explains the essential elements

that distinguish the Interactive Framework from existing approaches and how it
could possibly provide new perspectives for studying crisis management.

This

chapter serves as an overall evaluation of the three approaches as it provides detailed
theoretical discussion on crisis management literature.

This chapter also presents interview data gathered from different non-state actors in
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Hong Kong.

The interview findings are used to support the arguments in two ways.

First, it provides important evidence for the State-society Interactive Framework
regarding the changes on Crisis Strengthening and Weakening Forces and also the
Catalytic Effect as a triggering point for governmental change.

Second, with

reference to the current crisis provoking politics in Hong Kong, especially after the 1
July 2003 Demonstration, a phenomenon known as the politicization process with
anonymous party identity is observed, in which those non-state actors intend to
create or frame a party identity-free context for escalating a social issue into a crisis
in order to draw public support and government attention.

Chapter Twelve: Conclusion
This chapter presents closing remarks for the current study and is presented in three
parts. The first part summarizes the research findings obtained through answering
the research questions and analyzing the case studies. The second part reviews the
major contributions by this research, especially on how the State-society Interactive
Framework links the western theories with local context.

Finally, some possible

directions for future studies are suggested, including an enhancement in the argument
of the State-society Interactive Framework and the potential of carrying out
governance crisis studies in non-democratic regimes.
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CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW

Literature review serves as a foundation of this research as it presents the major
theoretical discussions in the field in crisis management19. This chapter will be
divided into five sections. First, this chapter starts with “Theories on Crisis and
Crisis Management” which discusses the definitions and typologies of crisis.

In

fact, there is no single universal definition of “crisis”. This section briefly reviews
the classical studies in crisis management and tries to draw a possible definition
which suitable to the current study in this thesis.

More importantly, the two

dimensional approaches in crisis management will be presented as they will come up
with the two theoretical frameworks (i.e. Leadership Approach and Politicization
Approach) which will be applied in the later case study research.

It will be

followed by the alternative approaches in crisis management studies (from the
management school) to enrich the literature which also in line with the
interdisciplinary nature of crisis management.

Second, it comes to the review of “Issue-based crisis studies”.

In this section, three

issues will be discussed, namely political scandal, health crisis and technological
challenges to crisis management.

This section aims to provide some thoughts to the

case selection of this research as most of the current crisis management studies are
issue-based.

In the third section, it covers another major area of crisis study which

relates to public policy.

Policy failure is one of the reasons that lead to governance

crisis while policy change is always presented as a form of post-crisis reform (i.e.
policy window).
19

A condensed version of this chapter was published in the Journal of Contingencies and Crisis
Management under the title of “Crisis Politics in Authoritarian Regimes: How Crises Catalyse
Changes under the State-society Interactive Framework”, Volume 21, Issue 4, December 2013, pp.
200-210.
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The fourth section of this chapter discusses a major component in crisis studies – the
role of media. Crisis communication, a form of political communication, points out
the dramatic power of media in directing the outcomes of crisis through “spin
doctoring”, mediation and “mediatization”.

The media effect would serve as one of

the major component of the State-society Interactive Framework which will be
introduced in the later chapters.

Different with the above four sections, the fifth section of this Literature Reviews
focuses on the governance studies – a common form of crisis studies in Hong Kong.
It starts with reviewing the crisis and governance related studies in Hong Kong.
This section aims to demonstrate the various perspectives of “governance crisis”
mentioned by different scholars and to distinguish the “crisis” which suggested in
this research.

2.1

Theories on Crisis and Crisis Management

People encounter crises at all times: A forest fire or disorder in a city-state could be a
crisis a thousand years ago. The term “crisis” or “disaster”, which appears in the
research of many academic disciplines, refers to an abnormal situation that casts
challenges to people.

As defined in the editorial statement published in the first

issue of the Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management, a leading journal in
the field, crisis management is an academic arena which is multidisciplinary and
interdisciplinary in nature (Rosenthal and Kouzmin 1993, 8).

In previous studies,

numerous scholars had tapped into the topic of “crisis situation” when they
conducted research on hot topics or ad-hoc issues in their areas of expertise (Wong
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and Zheng 2004, Powers and Xiao 2008).

However, the field of crisis management

has long been led by researchers in democratic nations.

In the absence of

democracy (i.e., in authoritarian regimes or limited democracies), there should be a
justifiable ground to doubt the applicability of existing theories.

Extended research has been carried out by an increasing number of scholars since
1990s, and this trend will definitely continue into the 21st Century.

Political

occurrences such as the 911 Incident (Parker and Dekker 2008), scandals and riots
that led to the Arab Spring20 in the Arabic world, or natural disasters such as tropical
storms, catastrophic earthquakes, and tsunamis provide more than sufficient case
studies for academic research.

Obviously, crisis management represents a crisis

situation that needs to be “managed”.

However, the effect of crisis may not

necessarily be negative, as it can lead to either threats or opportunities (Rosenthal
and Kouzmin 1993, 1).

This introduces new topics to crisis studies, such as what

crisis is and how crisis and crisis management can be studied.

2.1.1

Crisis: Definitions and Typologies

There is no conclusion as yet on what defines a crisis.

The current study considers

crisis as an abnormal situation, an event or a process of a public issue that pressures
an entity (mostly, but not solely, the government) to respond to it.

However, as

Boin (2008) mentioned, the field is ill-defined, as there has been no concrete
definition on the exact meaning of a crisis, or to what extent a situation could be
labeled as a crisis (or an “issue” in contrast).
20

He even suggested that “crisis” and

The Arab Spring refers to a chain of revolutionary demonstrations, protests, and wars that happened
in the Arab world since late 2010. It began with the Mohamed Bouazizi's (a Tunisian street vendor)
self-immolation in protest of police corruption and ill-treatment, which led to mass demonstration that
overthrew then-Tunisian President Ben Ali’s regime in January 2011.
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“disaster” are often interchangeable.

In fact, in addition to the common reference of

“crisis”, other similar expressions, such as “contingency”, “disaster” and “tragedy”,
can be found being used in various studies in the field.

For instance, the 911

Incident was recognized as a crisis in Parker and Dekker’s (2008) work, but the same
case appeared as a ‘Lesson of Disaster’ in Birkland’s (2006) book.

Traditional wisdom perceives natural disaster as “an act of god that is unwanted,
unexpected, unprecedented and almost unmanageable, causing widespread disbelief
and uncertainty” (Rosenthal, Boin and Comfort 2001, 5).

The authors further

criticized that crisis should be something beyond a discrete event, as it is an on-going
process that features “complexity, interdependence and politicization” (Rosenthal,
Boin and Comfort 2001, 6).

To the government, crisis should be something unfavorable (Kimenyi and Mwabu
2007), but it could be argued whether other stakeholders would view crisis as truly
unexpected and unwanted.

This interpretation is substantiated by the multiple

realities of crises as suggested by Rosenthal and Kouzmin (1993, 4), who pointed out
that crises are heterogeneous in nature as the perceptions and definitions for a crisis
is diverged. Crisis does not bear any connotation or orientation until human beings
provide them with a meaning - a crisis to someone may be an opportunity to another
(Rosenthal and Kouzmin 1993, 4, Rosenthal, 't Hart and Kouzmin 1991).

This is especially true in the case of governance crisis.

For example, the dismissal

of a cabinet can be a governance crisis, but it may also be an opportunity for the
opposition to gain power.

In this respect, Korac-Kakabadse, Kouzmin, and

Kakabadse’s (2002) interpretation, though still not concrete, is recommended, as it is
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more neutral by attempting to define crisis in a more practical (resource distribution)
manner:

“Crisis events occur whenever there is seizure of the existing
mechanisms of functionality; a need for a major resource (re)distribution;
and/or a constituency’s recognition (perception) of one or both of those
events” (Korac-Kakabadse, Kouzmin and Kakabadse 2002, 39, Kouzmin
2008, 159).

This definition deviates from the historical argument on the nature of crisis by
focusing on the outcomes. The three criteria mentioned are basically observable
results in a crisis situation, and are highly reflective in the politics of crisis
management.

Nevertheless, the question of “to what extent” remains, as the

meaning of “seizure of the existing mechanisms of functionality” (Korac-Kakabadse,
Kouzmin and Kakabadse 2002, 39, Kouzmin 2008, 159) is unclear.

It could be as

serious as a change of a regime, such as from authoritarian to democracy, or as
simple as the stepping-down of a principal government official.

In fact, some

previous studies in politics and public policy, such as policy fiasco (Bovens and 't
Hart 1996) and political scandal (J. Thompson 2000), shared similar features with
crisis.

Apart from difficulties in defining crisis, the discussion on crisis typology - if people
attempt to conceptualize crises - will also guarantee to be an endless debate. The
complexity of this debate is best seen in Gundel (2005), who started the discussion
by analyzing previous typologies, including the most common distinction between
“man-made” and “natural causation”, as suggested by Rosenthal and Kouzmin
(Gundel 2005, 107, Rosenthal and Kouzmin 1993, 2), and by extension, “social
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crises” (Gundel 2005, 107, Rike 2003).

Gundel pointed out that this kind of

definition may not be mutually exclusive, as there may be more than one origin for
crises.

In addition, he also disagreed with other detailed distinctions, such as

nuclear crisis, ethnic tensions, and terrorism, as decision-makers could only choose
among limited instruments in tackling the great number of possible crises with
similar characteristics (Gundel 2005, 107, Rosenthal and Kouzmin 1993, 1-2).
Thus, it is impracticable to differentiate crises in such a detailed manner.

Typology I: Crisis matrix by Gundel
Instead of focusing on the nature itself, Gundel saw crisis as a relentless development,
and this view led to his two classification criteria for crises, namely, the predictability
of a crisis and the influence possibilities before it occurs or while it is occurring
(Gundel 2005, 108).

He defined predictability as a crisis that should be noted by at

least a third party and the probability of occurrence should not be ignored. For
influence possibilities, he defined crisis responses, such as ways of “antagonizing the
causes to reduce damages are known and possible to execute” (Gundel 2005,
108-109).

In this regard, Gundel concerned to what extent a crisis can be tackled.

Based on the two classifications, Gundel established a four-area crisis matrix and
distinguished between four types of crises, namely, conventional crises, unexpected
crises, intractable crises, and fundamental crises (Table 2.1). Conventional crises
are known for being predictable and influence-possible, such as the use of
ill-structured technological system.

The challenges faced by decision-makers in

this type of crises are minimal as countermeasures are handy.

Unexpected crises

are rare compared to conventional crises. They are sensitive to influence, but are
mostly unpredictable, resulting in the impossibility to formulate preventive measures
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in advance.

Intractable crises are those that are difficult to respond due to technical

limitation or conflict of interest, and are apparently more dangerous. Social unrests
or nuclear crises often create serious damage apart from unexpected crises.
Fundamental crises are the most dangerous crises, as they are neither predictable nor
influence-possible.

Reponses to such crises would be slow, as the outbreak comes

suddenly without warning. The 911 terror attack would be a very convincing
example (Gundel 2005, 110-113).

Predictable

Influenceable

Easy

Hard

Easy

Conventional crises

Unexpected crises

Hard

Intractable crises

Fundamental crises

Table 2.1 Crisis matrix (Gundel 2005, 112)

Gundel considered the crisis matrix elastic and broad enough, such that all crises
could be allocated to one of the four typologies, and they could be reallocated and
readjusted to different typologies as new insights appear in the future.

Using

Titanic as an example, Gundel (2005, 114) illustrated the transformation of a
shipwreck from an unexpected crisis to a conventional one.

Specifically, as the

most advanced sea vessel in 1912, the Titanic was not expected to sink. However,
one hundred years later, sea vessel collisions are still common, and therefore, can be
regarded as conventional crises.

Nevertheless, the major function for crisis

typology is to assist decision-makers in managing a crisis, though it is doubtful
whether conventional crises and fundamental crises contribute much to crisis
management studies, as they are either too simple or are impossible to tackle.
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Typology II: Crisis development and termination patterns by 't Hart and Boin
As opposed to Gundel, 't Hart and Boin’s (2001, 31-35) proposed two classifications
focusing on timing factors – the speed of development and speed of termination of
crises, which also resulted in four possible typologies (Table 2.2).
crisis” implies that the crisis has ended as it began.

A “fast-burning

Examples include plane hijacks

and hostage-takings - crises that are short, sharp, and decisive.

On the other hand, a

“slow-burning crisis” takes years to reach the status of crisis and more years to
resolve. The status of AIDS as a crisis in the western world would qualify as an
example for this type of crisis, as the disease took years to spread, and is expected to
fade off with breakthroughs in science and medicine. “Cathartic crises” are those in
which tensions built up slowly until they reached a critical point when something
Finally, “long-shadow

snapped or some parties decided to force a break through.

crises” are incidents that suddenly occurred and raised critical issues of a much wider
scope and significance.

Sometimes, this type of crises could become a trigger for a

political crisis.

Speed of development

Speed of
termination

Fast: Instant

Slow: Creeping

Fast: Abrupt

Fast-burning crisis

Cathartic crisis

Slow: Gradual

Long-shadow crisis

Slow-burning crisis

Table 2.2 A typology of crisis development and termination patterns
('t Hart and Boin 2001, 32)

There is no doubt that speed matters in crisis management. However, 't Hart and
Boin’s typology ignored the nature of crises completely.

According to their

typology, long-shadow crisis covers nearly all kinds of crises that happen in daily life,
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such as political scandal, earthquakes, and terror attacks. On the other hand, crisis
management scholars may be less interested in studying slow-burning crises, such as
global warming - a long-lasting ‘crisis’ with effects extending to future generations.

Discussions on typologies
Classifying crises is the first step in studying crisis management, as it is adequate as
an analytical framework (Gundel 2005, 106).

The two typologies introduced in the

previous section did not mention the nature of a crisis.

Ideally, there should be

fundamental differences in crises that are man-made or of natural causation.
However, in real cases, all crises involve human.

Thus, instead of natural causation,

it might be more rewarding to redefine the two categories as man-made crisis and
man-facilitated crisis.

Man-made crises are merely power struggles between people

(i.e., political actors), and may refer to crises such as political scandal and policy
failure.

These crises are considered as “pure”, as they do not involve natural

causation.

In contrast, crises that have certain relationship with the natural world,

regardless of them being initiated by human or not, would be classified as
man-facilitated crises.

Examples include nuclear crises, earthquakes, and diseases.

The component of “nature” distinguishes man-made crises from man-facilitated
crises, as the previous group represents crisis situations that are created or
manipulated by people.

Following Gundel’s (2005) idea of predictability as

suggested in his crisis matrix, since an act of god implies unpredictability and
uncertainty (Rosenthal, Boin and Comfort 2001, 5), natural causation represents a
situation that cannot be predicted, even though it may be initiated by human beings.
However, compared to the crisis matrix that emphasizes the level of hardship, it is
more convincing to concern the causes behind the predictability of crises.
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Man-made crises are mainly related to responses and interactions of actors and
stakeholders, whereas man-facilitated crises are associated with the unpredictability
power of nature.

Another important criterion is speed.

In 't Hart and Boin’s (2001) typology, crises

are differentiated on their development and termination speeds.

While terminating

a crisis or identifying the termination of a crisis21 are to some extent a matter of
interpretation worth studying, it is not easy to understand the speed of development.
If the development of a crisis were expressed as a bell-shaped figure, how would a
fast or slow developing crisis look?

Since crisis recognition is very important for

defining a crisis, a better alternative to the speed of development could be the speed
of recognition, which could either be instant recognition in cases such as earthquakes
and political scandal, or gradual recognition in crises such as disease and policy
failure.

Certainly, the public expects strong and timely response on instantly

recognized crises, and long-lasting interactions between actors in gradually
recognized crises.

The cases selected for the current research is based on the typology suggested above.
This research will focus on purely man-made and non-instant crises instead of
natural disasters, such as earthquakes, tsunamis and nuclear crisis, as these involve
technical knowledge rather than interactions among actors. Thus, chaotic crises,
interactive crises and indefinite crises will be the main focus, followed by detailed
case selection for further investigation.

21

Please refer to Boin, 't Hart, and Stem, et al.’s (2005) illustrations on political and operational
termination of crisis
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2.1.2

Two Dimensional Approaches in Crisis Management

Crisis management is politically significant, as crisis calls for immediate response
from the government.

By revisiting current crisis management literature, two

dimensions of crisis management studies involving the political aspects of crisis
could be distinguished.

The first one is the popular top-down versus bottom-up

approaches, differentiated by who the key men are in a crisis.

Specifically, the

top-down approach emphasizes the leadership of government in a crisis, whereas the
bottom-up approach stresses the importance of different political actors working
together to shape the response of the government in a crisis.

The second dimension

is managerial versus political oriented approach, meaning that crisis is either a matter
of matching problem(s) with solution(s), or how the government interacts with its
people during a crisis.

Top-down Managerial Approach
't Hart, Rosenthal and Kouzmin (1993) noted three features of crisis that may
threaten bureaucracy: Severe threat, time pressure and high uncertainty, which work
together to disrupt the routine operation of bureaucrats.

In this case, leadership and

centralization of decision-making are important, and the top-down managerial
approach, which focuses on the question of what should be done, would be most
effective in tackling the situation.

This approach views crisis management in two ways.
step by step.

First, it should be carried out

One way to visualize this is to plot a graph of crisis situation versus

time: At time zero, crisis situation also starts from zero. The situation grows until it
reaches the peak as crisis, and falls back to zero again as time passes.

Regarding

the management of a crisis, Boin, 't Hart, Stern, et al. (2005) proposed five major
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tasks that a leader should accomplish during a crisis: Sense-making, decision-making,
meaning-making, termination, and learning. The first three tasks were considered
essential by 't Hart, Tindall, and Brown (2009), as sense-making is helpful for leaders
to get a clear and exact picture of the event in addition to its impact and significance.
The authors also drew attention to decision-making, also known as coordination,
which refers to the assembling and enabling of government’s established crisis
response system and network, and meaning-making, which signifies the
government’s responses and announcements to calm the public.

There is no standard solution for the myriad of crises happening around the world,
but it is useful to distinguish an individual crisis from a public crisis: A single
hijacking case may only affect the hostages; however, a terrorist hijacking may
threaten the whole society.

Crisis management scholars, from a managerial

perspective, tend to study the pattern of responses ('t Hart, Rosenthal and Kouzmin
1993), standard policy actions (Kimenyi and Mwabu 2007), and steps (Rosenthal and
Kouzmin 1997).

As a prerequisite for crisis management, Rosenthal and Kouzmin

(1997, 290) proposed five heuristic steps for crisis management scholars or
practitioners: 1) “Does a serious threat exist to the social political system?”
(Rosenthal and Kouzmin 1997, 290); 2) the need for response to threat; 3) the need
of government decision; 4) understanding the promptness of decision; and, 5) the
government’s actual action. Nevertheless, they failed to advise on the consequences
of actions, and what can be done.

On the other hand, Kimenyi and Mwabu (2007) suggested three standard policy
actions during a crisis. First, shock therapies are treatments for emergency case.
They either cure or kill, and have no intermediate result.
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Second, a radical action

or policy may pose a change in almost an opposite direction.

However, while

achieving the intended goals, a radical policy often creates extra problems.
instrumentalism or gradualism is a practice that is contrary to the radicalism.

Third,
It is

a type of policy-making characterized by making minimal changes to the existing
policy.

These three measures are not mutually exclusive, and, as Kimenyi and

Mwabu (2007, 16) pointed out, “an appropriate response in a crisis situation is one
that addresses the urgency of the moment while at the same time searching for a
better and long-term solution”.

These three policy actions provide a foundation for

understanding different crisis management practices, and form a base for evaluating
government crisis management techniques.

The second way of viewing crisis management is as patterns.
focused on different crisis management measures available.

In this case, scholars
Even though the

personality, skills, and style of leaders were distinguished in a crisis, the advisory
configurations, as highlighted by 't Hart, Tindall, and Brown’s (2009), also play an
important role in determining the performance of leaders in a crisis.

The authors

further suggested that the advisory body should be empowered with three capacities,
namely, analytical capacity for shaping the sense-making of leaders; managerial
capacity for facilitating the leaders’ decision-making; and, communicative capacity
for strengthening the meaning-making process of leaders.

An idea that follows from the importance of the advisory body is the centralization
thesis ('t Hart, Rosenthal and Kouzmin 1993), which proposes that major decisions
tend to be made within the small group of elites comprising the chief executive and
his/her advisors during a crisis.

The central government, such as the Federal

Emergency Management Agency in the United States, which always intervenes
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during crises, would be a typical example. The identification of the level of a crisis
(either local or national crisis) may alter the level of centralization and the outcomes
of crisis decision ('t Hart, Tindall and Brown 2009).

There is no contradiction between viewing crisis management as steps (tasks) or as
patterns.

Rather, it is a matter of perspective.

Steps (tasks) are effective in

identifying the important issues that should be taken into account during the different
stages of a crisis, while patterns are being supported by crisis manager as they reveal
trends that could, to some extent, present a causal relationship between different
actions and outcomes.

Top-down Political Approach
This approach views crisis in a highly politicized context.

The term “politicized”

here refers to an issue that is over-influenced by politics as a result of the deliberate
actions of different stakeholders in the society.

Scholars have, for a long time,

acknowledged the importance of stakeholders (i.e. actors in the civil society) in using
public relations techniques to direct public opinion.

In democratic societies, their

actions are even more influential during the election period, as both crises and
scandals are sensitive issues that would threaten the legitimacy and popularity of the
ruling party or leader, especially in the electoral system. Thus, the top agenda for
leaders should be to avoid major threats that may jeopardize the acquisition of the
majority votes (McConnell and Stark 2002).

As mentioned before, it is commonly assumed that the government should take the
lead in managing crises, and this approach emphasizes on the political tactics that
aim to “salvage” individual official(s), the ruling party, or even the legitimacy of the
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whole government.

Through “spin doctors” in a government, three types of

symbolic “crisis handling devices”: Framing, ritualization, and masking, as
suggested by ‘t Hart (1993), are performed.

Within those crisis response patterns, extra credit should be given to McConnell’s
(2003) argument on agenda management, whose logic is simple: Governments do not
like to deal with difficult issues.

In case there is no way for a government to avoid

dealing with them, the government would frame the political agenda to a direction
that is beneficial or less harmful (McConnell 2003, 399).

This can be achieved by

suppressing initial demands for government actions, isolating demands from some
groupings, performing symbolic actions, and manipulating scientific and statistical
measurements.

The strength of the Top-down Political Approach over the Managerial Approach is
that stakeholders are also taken into account.

However, the Top-down Political

Approach puts the government and public in an imbalanced relationship; the
government merely acknowledges the public opinion without carefully consider the
reaction of stakeholders.

This deficiency could be solved by the bottom-up

approach.

Bottom-up (political) approach
Compared with the top-down approaches, some scholars saw crisis management as
something different from situational management.

The bottom-up approach is

known to be political oriented, as it is almost impossible to “manage” from the
bottom in any real situation.

Rather, crisis communication becomes important, and

it is imperative for decision-makers to have a deliberate intention to provide
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explanations to the public during crises (Olson 2000).

In this connection,

government officials are faced with three political questions: 1) What happened? 2)
Why were the responses inadequate?

3) What is going to happen?

Crisis responses are shaped by many political factors, including general elections,
powerful pressure groups, bureaucratic politics, and international pressure.

As

McConnell and Stark (2002) suggested, governments, especially the ruling party, are
super-sensitive to crises, as their popularity is linked to their performance. Thus,
different non-state political actors would take the opportunity to influence
government decisions during crises, and these interaction and interference are the
main reason for the politicization of crises (Stark 2010).

Besides, some scholars had also focused on the impact of representative institutions
on crisis response.

For example, Boin, 't Hart, Stern, et al. (2005) mentioned that,

by viewing crisis as a phenomenon of social deliberation, representative institutions
have performed their functions by challenging the accountability of government
officials during a crisis, and Stark (2010, 11) claimed that “party political
relationships between an executive and a legislature should be considered as a
significant source of variation which affects a legislature’s response to a crisis”.
This is because in most countries, the congress or national assembly holds the power
of investigation towards the executive branch at least to some extent.

Thus, it

should also be treated as an active player in managing crisis.

Moreover, the framing and blaming process should best represent the politicization
of a crisis in the bottom-up approach.

In developing the decision tree of

constructing blame by framing political crises, Brandstrom and Kuipers (2003)
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identified three elements to cast blame, including constructing severity, agency, and
responsibility.

Constructing severity refers to the consideration on whether an event

has violated core values of the society, and whether it can draw public attention and
political debates.
dimension.

This is followed by the discovery stage known as the agency

In the politicization process, actors may seek to extend the time frame

of the event backwards, which, according to Bovens and 't Hart’s (1996)
interpretation, means going up the hierarchy.

Ultimately, the responsible party

needs to be identified to enhance accountability and lay blame on.
blame implies that sanction is avoided (D. Thompson 1980).

A dispersed

Conversely, if an

event is framed as a failure of single actors, scapegoating will be the most likely
outcome (Brandstrom and Kuipers 2003).

Table 2.3 is a summary of the three approaches.

Although it is inaccurate to

conclude that these approaches are mutually exclusive, it is also undesirable if not
impossible to simply combine them and develop a “comprehensive model”.
However, it is worthy to reiterate that the major drawback of the top-down
managerial approach is the government’s omission of the reactions and responses of
other stakeholders. This phenomenon is common in crisis studies related to natural
disasters and external threats.

On the other hand, the bottom-up approach, with its

focus on the politicization process of crisis, is valid for explaining some man-made
crises such as policy failure or political scandal.

However, the effort (i.e., practical

measures) of the government in crisis management is seldom appreciated.
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Managerial oriented
Top-down

Political oriented

Steps







Government crisis decision-making:
Five heuristic steps (Rosenthal and
Kouzmin, 1997)
Process model of crisis management
(Rosenthal and Kouzmin, 1993)
Leadership in crisis: five critical
tasks (Boin, 't Hart, Stern, et al.,
2005)

Pattern





Pattern of crisis responses

(McConnell, 2003)
The centralization thesis
qualified: seven response 
patterns ('t Hart,
Rosenthal, and Kouzmin,
1993)

Foot-and-Mouth 2001 (McConnell and Stark,
2002)
The Use of Inquiries at Times of Crisis
(Resodihardjo, 2006)

Operational challenges in each crisis
management phase (Boin, 2004)


Bottom-up




Table 2.3

Three types of symbolic “crisis handing
device” ('t Hart, 1993)

Summary of the approaches in crisis management
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Framing and Re-framing failures: Patterns of
Politicization (Brandstrom and Kuipers,
2003)
Understanding policy fiascoes: A political
process (Bovens and 't Hart, 1996)
The Relationship between Representation and
crisis management (Stark, 2010)
Foot-and-Mouth 2001 (McConnell and Stark,
2002)

2.1.3

Crisis Management: Alternative Models from the Management School

Crisis management study is interdisciplinary in nature.

Compared with the crisis

management studies in business administration, there is a lack of crisis management
model in the field of politics and public administration.
sections,

scholars

in

public

administration

As presented in previous

mostly focus

on

developing

decision-making structure ('t Hart, Rosenthal and Kouzmin 1993, 35) and typological
frameworks, and are less likely to construct a model.

Even though their

contemporaries in management studies have created different kinds of “models”,
such as the “Coombs’s fifteen characteristics of a crisis management plan” (Seeger,
Sellnow and Ulmer 2003, 170) and Mitroff’s (2001, 31) “best practice model”, which
includes types/risk, mechanism, system and stakeholders interconnected in a circle
linked with “scenarios” placed outside the system, they are only loosely developed as
an analytical framework for further studies, and most of them lack empirical research
support.

It seems crisis management studies in the management school focus

mainly on listing key solutions, but lack explanation on the process of crisis
management and the consequences.

Nonetheless, some scholars from the management school did attempt to develop or
redefine some crisis management models for use in the public administration field.
An example is the “Diamond Model of Crisis Management” (Figure 2.1) developed
by management scholars Mitroff, Alpaslan, and Green (2004) based on Boin’s (2004,
168) observation of the three phases of crisis management – before, during, and after.
The diamond model involves four broad clusters of variables, namely, crisis types,
crisis mechanisms, crisis systems, and crisis stakeholders, and can be applied to
understand crisis management in public sector.
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Through step-by-step guidance, the

model suggests actions to be taken during different phases of a crisis.
begins with “threat sensing”, that is, to recognize potential threat(s).

The model
Based on the

results of crisis audit, crisis assessment is performed in the next phase, and plans and
training are necessary to ensure the capability of an organization to face crises.
This is followed by the “during” phase of crisis, where damage control must be done
to minimize harm and to recover.

The final phase is the “learning” stage, in which

the redesigning of the system would possibly be carried out to prepare for the next
crisis (Mitroff, Alpaslan and Green 2004, 181).

Figure 2.1 Diamond Model of Crisis Management: Interactive Systems
Thinking (Mitroff, Alpaslan, and Green 2004, 181)

To conclude, models developed by the management schools are useful in providing
insights and comprehending the theoretical foundations of the field, and they are
valuable as references for the development of a crisis management analytical model
for use in the public sector.
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The above discussed crisis management definitions, theories, models and approaches
are useful to decide the analytical framework of this research.

Moreover, this

section also discovers the potential areas which provide directions for making
theoretical contributions in the later chapters.

In the coming section, different

issue-based crisis studies will be introduced as it serves as important reference for
case selection of this research.

2.2

Issue-based Crisis Studies

The field of crisis management studies is both multidisciplinary and interdisciplinary
(Rosenthal and Kouzmin 1993).

Scholars in fields as diverse as nuclear technology,

public health, and international relations can be researching on the management of
nuclear meltdowns, natural diseases, and terror attacks.

Moreover, most studies in

this field are issue-based, the advantage of which is the ability to focus on particular
crisis component or crisis management measure helpful in reflecting unique features
of specific types of crises.

Of the wide variety of subjects that can be investigated, natural disasters hold an
iconic position as it has long been a well-developed arena in crisis management
studies.

Conversely, political scandals and policy failure, two topics not bearing the

exact wording of “crisis”, is seldom discussed in main stream crisis management
studies but unwise to be ignored.

Comparatively, natural disaster can be considered

as iconic in crisis case selection as it has long become.

In their canonical work

“Coping with Crises: The Management of Disaster, Riots and Terrorism”, Rosenthal,
Charles, and 't Hart (1989) proposed three main kinds of crises, which will be
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discussed in details in the following section to help comprehend the literature from
alternate perspectives.

2.2.1

Political Scandal

Political scandals are no longer strangers to the public. From the well-known
Watergate scandal to the most “dramatic” sex scandal in the 20th century involving
former United States President Bill Clinton, political scandals have become a
pervasive feature of modern society.

Markovits and Silverstein (1988) provided a

rather restrictive view of political scandal by defining it as the overlap of the logic of
due process with the logic of power.

That is, a “scandal” that merely involves

political leaders cannot be considered as a political scandal.

There has to be an

abusive use of power at the expense of the process and procedure.

This definition is not agreed by Thompson, who argued power scandals (J.
Thompson 2000, 94) mentioned above is merely a kind of political scandals.

He

adopted a broader approach in defining political scandals by proposing four
characteristics: 1) An event or action that transgressed certain norms and values in
moral sense; 2) the said event or action, which is supposed to be secret, is exposed,
or is strongly believed to exist by non-participants, such as general public; 3) the
non-participants criticize and express their disapproval by publicly condemning the
event or action; and, 4) the reputation of the responsible individual(s) shall be
damaged.

In his view, merely defining political scandal as a scandal that involves

political leader or government official was “not particularly helpful and illuminating”.
Rather, social relations and institutions by virtue should be taken into account as the
individual is granted with or meant to acquire political power (J. Thompson 2000,
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91).

Furthermore, Thompson added that the existence of opposition parties and

other interest group have created a challenging political environment in liberal
democracies, increasing the likelihood of political scandal as compared to the
authoritarian regime.

Political scandals could be a powerful weapon to attack and

to discredit opponents, particularly during election period (J. Thompson 2000, 94),
and they are no doubt events that may deteriorate into a legitimacy crisis of
government.

Obviously, the consequences of political scandals can be very serious.

On the

individual level, political scandals can destroy one’s political career as well as the
institution and policy related to him/her.

On the societal level, it can heighten

politicians’ sensitivity on their “private”’ and political life.

More importantly,

political scandals point out the importance of accountability and transparency of the
government, and contribute to the upholding of good and clean governance (J.
Thompson 2000, 234-245).

J. Thompson (2000, 266-268) considered the best way

to respond to political scandals and crises is to create a more open government,
establish clear moral standard for public officials, and comprehend the investigating
mechanism on alleged cases.

Scandal as a mediated event
J. Thompson (2000, 60-63) further described scandal as a mediated event that
involves “interactions”, the focus of the current research.

He differentiated a

mediated scandal from a localized scandal by type of publicity, mode of disclosure,
and mode of disapprobation.

Localized scandals mainly involve face-to-face

communication, and are spread by word-of-mouth, which is an implication that
people should have some prior knowledge about the individuals involved.
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In

comparison, mediated scandals are shaped by interactional mediated communication
(J. Thompson 2000, 60-63).

For example, the sex scandal of Bill Clinton has

spread all over the world through news media.

Therefore, someone located in

another part of the world may know nothing about Clinton but his sex scandal.

The relationship between media and politics is undoubtedly close, as will be further
discussed in later sections.

Political scandals, while unique in nature, share some

characteristics with other crises.

As mentioned before, political scandals are highly

mediated and thus are politicized by opposition and other interest groups, making it a
kind of pure man-made crisis, as defined previously. As a political weapon, the
political orientation of a scandal is quite clear: Attacking the contestant in election
and harming the legitimacy of the ruling party.

The mediating effect of political

scandals is of concern to scholars championing the interactive framework (i.e. the
role of representative institute) of crisis management, and thus a topic worthy of
investigation in the field.

2.2.2

Health Crisis: Man-facilitated Natural Disease

Contrary to political scandal, natural disease is a kind of non-pure man-made crisis.
Alkan (2001, 277) described the golden rule for dealing with natural disease: “As
viral epidemics emerge and re-emerge, it is preparedness, a high degree of suspicion,
and rapid appropriate response that will limit the spread of these diseases in the
future”, and called it cruel dilemmas under conditions of uncertainty that involves
complex network of actors, including government, media, and professionals. With
its own uniqueness, crisis management on natural disease emphasizes the role of
professionals and their mathematical models, as they are the ones who provide
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information and suggestions, whereas the final decision is made by government
officials, who, apart from normal crisis dilemmas, face huge challenges of having to
make decisions based on incomplete database.

A complex situation that involves

includes both political and scientific judgment makes natural disease an arena worthy
of studying (Alkan 2001, 277).

By applying the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) crisis as a case study,
Powers and Gong (2008) proposed five frames describing the responses of different
social actors in Hong Kong to the crisis: 1) The natural disease was treated as a state
secret, reflecting its unwelcome nature to many (local) government officials; 2) it
was taken as a scientific mystery to be solved by the scientist; 3) it was viewed as a
medical epidemic that legitimized the use of emergency power on large scale
collective action; 4) it could serve as a warning to the current public health and
hygiene institutions; and, 5) it was perceived as a government failure that leads to
social unrest and chaos. These five frames are useful in reflecting major issues in
relation to disease management.

2.2.3

New Challenges to Crisis Management

Political scandal and natural disease are nothing new in nature.

However, they pose

new challenges on crisis management under the modern fast-changing world
characterized by globalization.

A crisis is globalized as it is trans-boundary in

nature. Not only does it have the ability to spread across geographical borders and
threatens multiple cities, regions, and countries (Boin 2009), as in the case of SARS,
which drew global concern (Buus and Olsson 2006), but it can also cut cross
functional borders, such as from private sector to public sector (Boin, 2009, 368).
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The combination of the spread of a crisis in both the geographical and functional
spectrums can easily create a “power vacuum”, which allows familiar tensions to
build up and feed off each other: Nations versus international organization; central
authorities versus local respondents; and, public versus private interest.

The

modern world is becoming more vulnerable to relatively small disturbances as
societies have become tightly linked to one another.

Boin (2009) also emphasized

the important role of technology enhancement, especially in information technology,
as speed matters in trans-boundary crisis management.

This will be further

discussed in later sections.

Rosenthal, Boin and Comfort (2001) discovered some critical trends in crisis
management.

First, apart from trans-nationalization, “mediazation”, that is, the

media’s recognition of crisis, plays a critical role at the time of confusion and
uncertainty (Buus and Olsson 2006, 78).

Second, technological developments

contribute to collective actions, such as in the case of 1 July 2003 Demonstration in
Hong Kong (So 2008).

Third, dissipation of state authority, as the government gets

smaller and the civil society becomes bigger.

Finally, there is the phenomenon of

“emotization”, the battlefield of subjective construction on emotion and feelings
during crisis, as the role of individuals becomes more important in crisis
management.

These new trends are evidence that, under the current environment of

increased interactions between government and public, the government can no longer
dominate the crisis management process.

To summarize, this section discussed the studies which relevant to crisis management
although they may not exactly bear the name “crisis”.

In the coming section, crisis

and public policy, a major area in crisis studies in fact, would be discussed to see
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how crises are interrelated to public policy in a public administration perspective.

2.3

Crisis and Public Policy

Crisis is in fact closely related to public policy, as policy failure may lead to
governance crisis, while the crisis-aftermath learning process may induce policy
change (Boin, McConnell and 't Hart 2008).

In other words, change can lead to

crisis (policy failure), and crisis in turn induces change (crisis learning).

Further,

crisis and policymaking share similar characteristics. For instance, both of them are
highly politicized processes that involve many actors and stakeholders.

Both take

time to develop and terminate, and, except for fast-burning crises, crisis management
is a process that involves uncertainty, and so is policymaking.

Therefore, observing

the policymaking process is a constructive method to study crisis management, and
this will be described further in the research framework for the current study.

2.3.1

Policy Failure as Governance Crisis

Policy failure, also known as policy fiasco22 by Bovens and 't Hart (1996, 15), was
defined by the authors as “a negative event that is perceived by a socially and
politically significant group of people in the community to be at least partially caused
by avoidable and blameworthy failures of public policymaking”.

A “semantic tool”

used in political contestation and arguments about controversial policy episodes,
Bovens and 't Hart (1996, 9) further described it as a very negative label that “serves
to contest claims, to diminish power, and to weaken position”. Policy failure is
22

Boven and 't Hart differentiated policy fiasco from policy failure, stating that the former
emphasized on subjectively significant social damage and highly politicized but not the latter.
However, this study will treat these two concepts as the same, under the consideration that
policymaking is an entirely politicized process with subjectivity. See Mark Bovens, and Paul 't Hart.
Understanding Policy Fiascoes. [London: Transaction Publishers, 1996]: 15.
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sometimes used in conjunction with terms such as “crisis”, “disaster”, and “scandal”,
and Bovens and 't Hart (1996, 20) has noted the relationship between crisis and
policy failure:

“Ironically, some policy episodes assume a crisis character precisely
because they become labeled as a policy fiasco becomes apparent (e.g.,
re being “scandalized”), since authorities may then be forced to engage
in damage control under severe public and political pressure, placing
them in a crisis-like predicament”

Rather than perceiving it as a “crisis-like predicament”, policy failure should be
regarded as a type of crisis which may harm government legitimacy.
Meaning-making is an important process to ‘discover’ policy failure, and, similar to
other kinds of crises introduced at the beginning of this chapter, policy failure
engages with different stakeholders in the society, including citizens, the media, and
politicians, especially the lawmakers in the legislature (Bovens and 't Hart 1996, 10).
As a social construction, Bovens and 't Hart (1996, 11-13) proposed the following
four interrelated layers involving the notion of policy failure:

1) Assessing events: How bad is bad?
2) Identifying agents: Who or what brought this about?
3) Explaining agents’ behavior: What prompted their actions?
4) Evaluating agents’ behavior: Who is to blame?

The authors further illustrated the four layers with an example of algae pollution:
An extraordinary large piece of algae was found covering most of the surface of a
lake in a long, hot summer.
rise in fish mortality.

The lack of oxygen thus caused had led to a massive

Bovens and 't Hart (1996, 11) pointed out that the assessment

of this event (first layer) is open to subjective interpretation, as what is upsetting and
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generating strong negative feeling to some may just be regular happening to others.
In this algae example for instance, fishermen might consider it a major disaster,
while marine biologists, for example, might simply regard it as a common cycle in
the ecosystem.

The second layer concerns the identification of agents (Bovens and

't Hart 1996, 12): What was causing the overgrowth of algae in the lake?
act of god? Was it the consequence of the long and hot summer?
to the farming activities nearby?

Was it an

Or was it related

On the third layer, explanations should be given

on the policy process producing the negative event (Bovens and 't Hart 1996, 13).
In this example, the water department should provide reasons for its failure to purify
waste water, and the agriculture department had to explain its negligence in limiting
the amount of fertilizers used in the area.
the entity to be blamed.

The final layer would involve identifying

Bovens and 't Hart (1996, 13-14) argued that the case could

only be considered a proper policy failure when a successful claim was made stating
that the situation was serious and avoidable.

In practice, the blaming process might

include inquiries on the possibilities and reasons for ignorance of the problem by the
decision-maker, the correctness of the policy instrument chosen, and also the
likelihood of implementation fault.

In the algae example, the implementation gap

due to an absence of sufficient personnel on law enforcement might be a possible
reason.

“Failure” is seen as artifacts, as it is not inherent in the policy itself (Bovens and 't
Hart 1996, 21), but a judgment about the event (Hyatt 1988, 31-33).

It should be

identified as a political act instead of recognition on fact (Edelman 1988, 31).
Policy failure might not necessarily become a political crisis automatically.
However, it can be a political process for actors to name and to blame on
(Brandstrom and Kuipers 2003, 280).
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Policymakers and government will be in great problem once an incident attracts the
attention of actors who are willing and able to politicize it (Brandstrom and Kuipers
2003, 281).

From a crisis management perspective, by examining the pattern of

politicization, Brandstrom and Kuipers’s (2003, 282) study suggested how actors use
framing mechanisms to allocate or refract blame.

Framing and blaming
Based on the two case studies of navy failure in Sweden, and the Dutch and the
Srebrenica massacre, Brandstrom and Kuipers (2003, 302) developed a “decision
tree” (Figure 3.1) for constructing blame by framing political crises, proposing three
dimensions of blame-casting. The first level is “constructing severity”, which refers
to the consideration of whether an event has violated core public values (Brandstrom
and Kuipers 2003, 209) enough to draw public attention and political debates. For
example, issues related to officials’ conflict of interest or corruption can be regarded
as violating core public values.

The crisis status is a vital factor, as the public is

forgetful, and public attention on a specific event is not long-lasting.
issue has to “catch on” as soon as possible.

Therefore, an

Otherwise, public interest on the crisis

may divest quickly and shift to another “hottest” topic of the moment (Brandstrom
and Kuipers 2003, 291, Kingdon 1995, 104).

The second level is the discovery stage known as the “agency dimension”. Crisis
can be an ad hoc individual event or may be a symptom of bigger systematic fault
behind the scene.

In the politicization process, actors may try to broaden the time

frame of the event and go back in time to search for the “powerful underlining causes”
(Brandstrom and Kuipers 2003, 295), as the saying goes: Going back in time means
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going up the hierarchy23. By travelling back in time, the horizon of investigation
would be broadened, leading to possible discovery of the involvement of more
people or even higher ranking officials.

Obviously, systematic failure shocks the

current institution more seriously than an individual fault.

Therefore, from the

government’s perspective, it is politically safer to position a case as an “ad hoc”
failure at technical and subordinate level.

However, once the case has been

identified as a systematic failure, policy, institution, and top level officials will be
involved (Brandstrom and Kuipers 2003, 295).

The final stage, “responsibility dimension”, follows directly from the agency
dimension. The core question in this dimension is: Should blame be concentrated or
dispersed?

If defenders argue that the problem is due to systematic failure, they are

trying to frame the blame to the chain system of complexity with many actors
interplaying.

This is a case of dispersed blame: A conclusion of bearing collective

account means no one is accountable, and sanction is avoided (D. Thompson 1980).
On the contrary, if an event is framed as a failure of single actors, scapegoating will
be the most likely outcome ( (Brandstrom and Kuipers 2003, 298).

The decision tree model provides fruitful analyses on frames and blame from a
highly politicized and interactive perspective.

However, by starting with “The

problem occurs” (see Figure 3.1), the model seems to limit the crisis management of
policy failure to a “blame game” (Hood 2002) between wrongdoer (government) and
its opponents.

While studying a failed policy is essential in this field, scholars are

more interested in the process of failing of a policy.

As Bovens and 't Hart (1996, 4)

argued, a policy that seems to be good in the beginning may fail later – if there is an
23

See Bovens and 't Hart’s Understanding Policy Fiascoes.
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implementation gap between the policy content and the execution.

2.3.2

Crisis Aftermath: Learning and Policy Change

Learning the lesson after a crisis is a common expectation for people.

There is no

doubt that a government should learn from a crisis, correct anything that went wrong,
and prevent similar crises from happening in the future (Boin, 't Hart and Stern, et al.
2005, 116).

According to the authors, the key to crisis learning is the “capability to

learn appropriate lessons and implement the lessons learned”. However, in reality,
different instructional barriers can make this difficult to achieve.

Learning and change are two closely-linked concepts in crisis aftermath studies, as
scholars see crisis as an opportunity for policy and instructional change.

On the

positive side, crisis makes unthinkable and politically undesirable changes possible,
as institutions and systems, which tend to be stable under normal situation, find their
constraints loosened during crises, especially in highly politicized ones.

Moreover,

crisis is a time for alternatives – a time for the non-functioning old methods to give
way to new changes, arrangements, and innovations.

It should be noted that the

political condition for change should affect all levels of the government, from its top
leaders to street-level bureaucrats (Boin, 't Hart and Stern, et al. 2005, 122).
However, as pointed out by Boin, 't Hart, Stern, et al. (2005, 122) and Stern (1997,
69), there can also be change without learning.

The extent to which change is happening is also of concern, and can be dealt with
through two approaches, namely, the conservative approach and the reformist
approach.

The conservative approach focuses on maintaining the core element of
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status quo by introducing incremental changes to the current institution.

On the

other hand, the reformist approach tends to redesign the current institution in order to
respond to entirely new environment in the aftermath.

The crisis mood is puffed-up

in order to legitimate the new system as a kind of crisis resolution.

Boin, 't Hart,

Stern, et al. (2005, 128) claimed that incumbent leaders are more likely to be
conservative, as they would like to maintain their vested interest.

Crisis as ‘policy window’
Crises are often conceptualized as a window of opportunity24 that creates political
space for new policy proposals.

In his multi-stream model, Kingdon proposed three

streams: Problems, policies, and politics25, which combine to shape political agendas,
and the “policy window”, which serves as an opportunity of coupling in order to
produce policy outcome.

Kingdon (1995, 165) defined “policy window” as “an

opportunity for advocates of proposals to push their pet solution or to push attention
to their special problems”, and he further illustrated the idea by applying it on
different crises and disasters. For example, a collision of a commercial airliner with
a private aircraft over San Diego became a policy window (i.e., political opportunity)
to impose controls over private planes (Kingdon 1995, 175), and the collapse of the
Penn Central Railroad provided a window to regulate the financial condition of
24

For the term “policy window” and other related interpretations, see Kingdon (1995, 165); John
Keeler. "Opening the Window for Reform: Mandates, Crises, and Extraordinary Policy-Making."
Comparative Political Studies, 25, no. 4, [January 1993]: 433-486. For studies mentioning the
possibility of crisis bringing a policy window, see Stern, 69-86; Boin “The New World of Crises and
Crisis Management”, 367-377.; Boin, 't Hart, et al., 115-136; Sander Dekker and Dan Hansen.
"Learning under Pressure; The Effects of Politicization on Organization Learning in Public
Bureaucracies." Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 14, no. 2 [2004]: 219.; Arjen
Boin and Paul 't Hart. "Institutional Crises and Reforms in Policy Sector." In Government Institutions:
Effects, Changes, and Normative Foundations, by Hendrik Wagenaar, [Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic
Publishers, 2000]: 9-31.
25
Problem stream concerns problem framing and identification, policy stream concerns the
presentation of feasible and commonly accepted solutions, and political stream concerns the level of
support from the people and different political actors in the government (i.e., “national mood”). For
details, please see Kingdon (1995).
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railroad companies (Kingdon 1995, 174).

Keeler (1993) also saw crisis as a policy window, albeit in a different way than
Kingdon (1995), Dekker and Hansen (2004).

Rather than viewing politics stream

as being ready before the opportunity came, Keeler (1993, 437) suggested the
crisis-mandate mechanism, stating that the severity of crisis might alter the results of
elections, which in turn could directly or indirectly affect the existence of window of
reform.

Using Kingdon’s typology, crisis as policy window (problem window

(Kingdon 1995, 173) initiated from the problems stream) may also affect the
“national mood”26 (Kingdon 1995, 146) in reverse through elections by producing
impressive mandate for opposition parties (Keeler 1993, 440).

2.3.3

Summary

This section introduced two angles from which to view the relationship between
crisis and public policy.

People who view policy failure as governance crisis will

agree with the argument of “reform-induced crisis”, whereas policy scientists who
consider crisis as a window of opportunity for changes will support the idea of
“crisis-induced reform”.

In fact, these two statements are not mutually exclusive

and are open to interpretation.

In Boin, 't Hart, Stern, et al.’s (2005, 134) words, the

study of crisis and public policy “remains an open question whether crises trigger
systemic change or whether they forestall such change and to what extent these
process can be channeled by good crisis governance”.

This statement contains a

very important component in the current research: Process.
26

Unlike the current field

Kingdon (1995, 146) defined “national mood” as “the notion that a rather large number of people
out in the country are thinking along certain common lines, that this national mood changes from one
time to another in discernible ways, and that these changes in mood or climate have important impacts
on policy agendas and policy outcomes”.
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of policy study, there is a lot of unknown in crisis management process and
consequences, and a research gap exists in the current literature, which has mostly
focused on analyzing crisis as a window for policy change and as an aftermath
learning opportunity.

The next section will briefly discuss the importance of media in crisis management.
Crisis communication is an inevitable element of an effective crisis management.

It

also severs as theoretical foundation to the “forces” which directs the development
process of crises and will be discussed in the State-society Interactive Framework.

2.4

Media and the Politics of Crises

The active role of the media in monitoring the government has long been discussed
in literature, as Cater’s (1959, 7) classical study called it the “fourth branch of
government”.

Cook (1998, 3) concurred, adding that the media is not only part of

politics, but also part of the government.

Jamieson and Waldman (2003, 95) further

described the power of the press to “both cover events and, in choosing what to
report and how to report it, shape their outcomes”.

Baumgartner, Jones, and Leech (1997, 349-350) suggested that since only the most
newsworthy story can stay on the headlines, and “old stories must make way for new
stories”, government officials would attempt an “imitation of media attention” by
choosing the most promising issue on the media and paying attention to it.

As a “problem” when identified, a crisis always draws the attention of various media
as it happens.

The significance of the role of the media in crisis management had
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been identified as early as in 1920s, as Lippmann (1922, 362) mentioned that the
media is “in charge with the duty of translating the whole public life of mankind”.
This is especially the case in recent years, as the media is moving from a top-down
watchdog telling the audience what they should know towards magnifying the
conservations within the society (Deuze 2005, 455, Salleh 2008, 242), leading to the
increase in complexity of crisis management as a process as the mass media becomes
a battlefield for different actors to create and direct frames in controversies “pictures inside the heads” (Lippmann 1922, 30), that could direct public opinion and,
to a certain extent, construct crises.

2.4.1

Crisis Communication: the Mediation and ‘Mediatization’ of Crises

Political communication, in its broadest sense, refers to the interrelationship between
politicians and the journalists.

Specifically, “journalists needed politicians for news

about government and for information about what took place in the policy process;
politicians needed journalists for news about society and for media exposure” (de
Beus 2011, 19).

Mazzoleni and Schulz distinguished the commonly used

“mediation” from “mediatization”, as the former simply describes the transmission
of message by the mass media, while the latter suggests that political institutions are
now more dependent and influenced by the mass media (Brants and Voltmer 2011, 5,
Mazzoleni and Schulz 1999, 247).

Brants and Voltmer (2011) further suggested

that as contemporary political communication can be seen as the changes taking
place in the two dimensions of mediatization and de-centralization. As a horizontal
dimension, mediatization describes the closely-related but competitive relationship
between politicians (political institution) and journalists (the mass media), while the
vertical dimension of de-centralization addresses the interaction between the public
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and the politicians and journalists on the one hand, and the public as the ultimate
audience of these messages on the other (Brants and Voltmer 2011, 3).

‘Spin doctor’
‘Spin doctor’ refers to those communication professionals who are employed by
politicians in order to “generate publicity, boost their images and manage the news”
(de Vreese and Elenbaas 2011, 75). Spin doctors become exceptionally important
during a crisis situation as they use the power of language to manipulate media
coverage in order to protect their boss – the politicians - from negative publicity, as
the politicians themselves prefer not to be associated directly with a crisis or a
scandal (Brandstrom and Kuipers 2003, 299).

Spin doctors can definitely play

important roles in mediatization, as they are experts in framing media coverage in a
direction that favors the politician they serve.

One of the tactics that is always

applicable is scapegoating, which can transfer and reduce the blame towards the real
power-holder.

Crisis communication
By definition, crisis communication supports crisis management through reducing
uncertainty about response, public perception, resolution, blame, and consequences
(Palttala and Vos 2012, 39).

It should cover the whole crisis period starting from

the pre-crisis perpetration to the crisis aftermath, and should be stakeholder-oriented
(Palttala and Vos 2012, 41).

Miller and Goidel (2009, 267) argued the media is

performing better than the government in communicating and satisfying the growing
hunger for information in the public during a disaster, as the media is supposed to
work under professional norms and procedures.
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In summary, communication is crucial to crisis management. People are eager for
information and directions, especially in natural disasters.

However, from a

political perspective, crisis communication should be more than message
transmission.

It should be an important component of political communication,

which, with an emphasis on mediatization, reflects the using of media to serve
political agenda.

Nevertheless, crisis communication maintains its uniqueness in

delivering emergent information, which is not always as ‘mediatized’ as political
communication.

In the coming section, the local Hong Kong studies on governance and crisis will be
presented.

It would provide directions to what kinds of crisis studies in Hong Kong

should be enriched.

It would be closely related to the justification on case selection,

the research themes and focuses of the entire thesis.

2.5

Studying the Governance of Hong Kong

Crisis management studies in Hong Kong were insufficient (C.-k. Lo 2007).
Alternatively, some studies focus on the “governance” of Hong Kong would be to
some extent relevant.

Regarding political research in Hong Kong, Lau, Wun, and

Shum (1999) identified four major areas of study, namely, 1) political system and
institutions; 2) organization and process; 3) external relations (including with
Mainland China); and, 4) regime transition.

In a later work, P. Cheung (2005, 35)

suggested six major research themes in the field of political science in Hong Kong,
including: 1) Political and administrative institutions; 2) state-society relations; 3)
political participation and democratization; 4) public administration and public
policy; 5) Hong Kong’s governance since 1997 and the implementation of the ‘One
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Country, Two Systems’ policy; and, 6) China’s reform and open door policy, and
mentioned that “governance problems” is a prospective area for future study (P.
Cheung 2005, 41).

This, to some extent, reflects the potential of conducting

governance crises and crisis management research in the Hong Kong context.

As previously mentioned, studies on crises and governance crises can be found in a
wide variety fields besides crisis management, and studies in the Hong Kong context
is no exception.

In fact, scholars from various fields have addressed the “challenges”

faced by the political and administrative institutions of Hong Kong before and after
the handover. For example, Burns (2004) discussed the relationship between Hong
Kong civil service and governance, while Scott (2005, 2009) and Cheung and Lee
(2001) are works on public sector reform in Hong Kong.

An institutional study of

Hong Kong by A. Cheung (2008b, 126-128) found that the institutional erosion after
1997 is a result of state-society disconnection, and, from a policymaking perspective,
Scott (2007, 29) suggested the policy arena of the post-1997 Hong Kong has largely
been “one of failure and paralysis”.

A. Cheung (2007) explained this with the

mismatch of outdated (colonial) policy system and current political environment.
Finally, Chiu and Wong (2012) touched upon critical sociopolitical issues in Hong
Kong such as on state intervention27 and the development of democracy28 in Hong
Kong, which, to some extent, suggested that the governance of Hong Kong is now in
crisis.

Obviously, the challenge that stands out in recent years is the unprecedented political
27

Ma Ngok suggested that Hong Kong is now entering a corporatist regime that “the
business-dominated and corporatist nature of the regime had led to a new legitimacy crisis for Hong
Kong.” (Ma, Eclectic corporatism and state interventions in post-colonial Hong Kong 2012, 88)
28
In the line with Ma (2012), Ku argued that “the context for governance and citizenship has become
much more complicated in present-day politics” (Ku 2012, 145).
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context under the “One Country, Two Systems” principle after the handover, which
has made the governance of Hong Kong SAR under Beijing influence a hot topic for
investigation.

An example is Y.-c.Wong’s (2004) study that highlighted the major

events and political and legal changes that shed light on the practice of “One Country,
Two Systems” and Hong Kong's relationship with international players.

M. Chan

(2008) is a collection of work that illustrated the major dynamics faced by Hong
Kong in different aspects, one of which is a study by A. Cheung (2008a), suggesting
that Hong Kong is paying a lot of effort in attempting to find a role under “China’s
overall trajectory towards affluent and strong nationhood”.

Finally, So (2011)

attempted to illustrate the swing between “One-country” and “Two-systems” in Hong
Kong polity due to different crises from a crisis-transformation perspective.

The studies mentioned in the previous paragraph reflect the uniqueness of
investigating the political environment in Hong Kong after 1997.

In fact, the

government was faced with a number of crises of different natures during the first
one and a half decade of Hong Kong SAR.

In studying these crises, scholars mostly

view them as political issues for case studies instead of conducting crisis
management research.

For example, A. Cheung (2005a) focused on crises and the

institutional system of Hong Kong, while some researchers considered those crises
evidence of poor governance under a non-democratic political system (Y.-c. Wong
1998, 492).

In any case, it will be helpful to review the different crises studies in

Hong Kong.

2.5.1

Issue-based Research on Crises in Hong Kong

Crisis related studies in Hong Kong are mostly issue-based.
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Huque and Lee’s (2000)

work had chosen the crises of Retirement of an Immigration Chief, Bird Flu and the
Opening of Hong Kong International Airport as case studies which happened during
the period of handover of sovereignty of Hong Kong to China.

They provided

insights and suggestions to manage crises in the provision of public service.
Especially, they have pointed out the changing political system would lead to an
adversarial relationship between the government and the legislature (Huque and Lee
2000, 118) in which turn out to be true after 15 years of HKSAR establishment.

After the handover, more studies had mentioned the SARS (Severe Acute
Respiratory Syndrome) outbreak in 2003 as an example of crisis (A. Cheung 2005b,
Lee and Chan 2009, Powers and Xiao 2008, Baehr 2006).

The outbreak of SARS

from March to June 2003 was a serious public health issue, as almost 300 people
died in Hong Kong as a result of the disease.

Three investigation reports29 were

published after SARS was controlled, but none of them paid serious attention from
the crisis management perspective.

Despite the fact that the Hong Kong

Government has learnt important lessons on prevention, communication, leadership,
and accountability, SARS was considered one of the direct causes of the 1 July
2003-500,000 people Demonstration, a critical event in post-handover Hong Kong,
and an example of a public health crisis-turned governance-related political crisis.

Considering the shocking effect of the Demonstration, there is no surprise that it has
become the main focus of a huge amount of scholarly work, from J. Cheng (2007),
who provided a general account on different aspects that contributed to the

29

After the SARS outbreak, three major investigation reports were conducted by the SARS Expert
Committee appointed by the government, the Legislative Council and the Hospital Authority
respectively. The reports provided detailed and comprehensive account and analysis on each
response taken by the government and the Hospital Authority. See chapter 4.3.
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Demonstration, to Chan and Chan (2007, 78) and So (2008, 239), who respectively
described the Demonstration as a watershed of Hong Kong civil society development
and an even that “raised Hong Kong social movement to a new height”.

With reference to the SARS crisis, K. Lee (2009) developed a framework to study
crisis communication of the HKSAR Government, and argued that the poor
performance of the government has led to a loss of public trust, as it has failed in:

1) Demonstrating effectiveness of government authorities in prevention
/containment;
2) Improving its communication management;
3) Minimizing media scrutiny;
4) Reassuring the public in its ability to take preventive measures in the
future;
5) Demonstrating strong leadership;
6) Demonstrating strong commitment to public good;
7) Showing flexibility and good communication between government
agencies; and,
8) Minimizing the effects of external crisis environment on government
decisions (K. Lee 2009, 74-76).

Although K. Lee’s study has provided ample results on political communication (4
viewpoints out of the 8 above), a comprehensive evaluation of government
performance in crisis management is still lacking.

Apart from the SARS crisis, the Hong Kong SAR Government has seen a series of
social and political crises affecting its governance in its 15 years of existence, which
in turn has become the focus of studies on either ad-hoc incidents or political crises
that rooted in the unique “One Country, Two Systems” polity of Hong Kong.

An

example is Wong and Kwan (2002), who evaluated the learning process of the
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HKSAR Government in the three waves of “Bird Flu”30 and addressed the potential
threats from other food scares. Their conclusion was that the “poor co-ordination
and inefficiency … damaged the Hong Kong Government’s creditability” (Wong and
Kwan 2002, 1).

On the other hand, in studying the institutional or political system of Hong Kong, Lui
and Chiu (2007) pointed out that the present governance crises could not be
explained simply in terms of rapid civil society development. Rather, through a
political-economy perspective, they discovered that the main reason is a failure to
build a new state-business alliance.

In addition, A. Cheung (2005a, 146) accounted

for the many failures of the government and relevant departments and agencies by
the lack of contingency planning and a clear command and coordination structure,
especially in-between departments, which he considered the major loopholes of the
government on crisis management.

There are also studies associating the rising number of crises in recent years with the
gradual increase in political influence from Beijing.

For example, Y.-c. Wong (2006)

argued that the Article 23 legislation, which led to the 2003 Demonstration, was a
strategy adopted by the Beijing government to change the fundamentals of Hong
Kong polity gradually – a strategy that he called “Leninist integration”.

So and

Chan (2002, 363), on the other hand, described five major crises in Hong Kong SAR
in areas of democracy, constitution, governability, development, and legitimacy that
has shifted the Hong Kong polity towards soft authoritarian developmentalism31.
30

The avian flu (also known as “Bird Flu”) was caused by the H5N1 virus from chicken, and was
first found to infect human in 1997, leading to the mass slaughter of chicken in Hong Kong.
Outbreaks occurred again in 2001 and 2002.
31
The idea of soft authoritarian developmentalism refers to Beijing’s strategic concerns on
maintaining “an executive-led government that facilitated the state’s capacity to embark onto the
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Scholars on crisis management in Hong Kong have been studying governance and
the performance of the government as a whole, while treating crisis study as simply
one of the elements of studying governance.

That is, they have paid a lot of

attention on the overall loopholes of the government (institutions) without carefully
investigating and discussing the actions and responses taken.

Considering the

importance of government responses in crisis management, it is justified to conduct
crisis management research on state-society interactions in post-1997 Hong Kong.

2.5.2

Studies on Civil Society and Social Movement in Hong Kong

According to Chan and Chan (2007, 81-82), civil society has its autonomy, and can
be taken as a third sector to provide services to the public, as it is not free from the
influence of the government, and it has played an active role in government policy
process (Chan and Chan 2007, 81-82).

These features are closely related to the

government’s crisis management in two senses: First, civil society aims to fill the
loopholes left by the government during crisis (mainly in disaster) by providing
immediate and appropriate services to the public, and, second, to make its opinions
matter in the policy process, civil society works to communicate and interact with the
government.

In short, since civil society tends to involve in government

policymaking process, it could impact on government crisis management.

Some of the social issues that draw the attention of the civil society may become
potential crisis for government. For example, historical heritage conservation cases
(Chan and Chan 2007, 90-91) are related to civil society development.

From the

development track, and to lay the foundation of soft-authoritarianism” (So and Chan, 2002: 382),
resulting in a weakened role of key players in the civil society by self-constraint.
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government’s perspective, it can be a potential crisis if the cases were being poorly
tackled.

The 2003 Demonstration is a prime example of the reaction of civil society on the
government’s intention to tighten freedom (Y.-c. Wong 1998, 493), and its effect on
the government’s decisions and actions (Chan and Chan 2007).

Although the

“transformation of a single anti-government rally into a continuous pro-democracy
movement was not a matter of chance” (Chan and Chan 2007, 114), it, along with the
development of the new and important channel of mobilization that is the internet
(So 2008, Ma 2009, 59), at least provide the political opportunities for the
pan-democrats to form a close-alliance with social forces outside the formal
institution (Chan and Lee 2007), and help facilitate the transformation of social
movement.

Obviously, civil society should have a role on crisis management from

the very beginning of framing the crisis and until the end.

2.6

Conclusion: Avenues for Crisis Management Research in Hong Kong

Through a review of current literature, the various definitions on the concepts of
crisis are presented and definitions from different schools are evaluated.

Even

though the common perception for crisis is always negative, different people have
different standards for good and bad.

Thus, accepting crisis as a situation that

demands (government) responses is a more reliable alternative.
theoretical limitations of current typologies on crisis are discussed.

Further, the
Defining crisis

typology is essential for conducting academic research on the topic, as different types
of crisis may have different features and patterns, and a clear typology is helpful in
determining the possible outcomes for different kinds of crisis.
84

The theoretical limitations on current theories for crisis studies are also explained
through a discussion of top-down and bottom-up approaches in crisis management.
The top-down approach mainly focuses on the managerial issues on crisis, while the
bottom-up approach views crisis as a political process that exerts political pressure
on government.

In fact, these two approaches are neither mutually exclusive nor

directly compatible, so, a new research framework is developed for the current study
using them as foundation and reference.

Besides studying conventional crisis studies, the current research also devotes
attention to research on related topics, such as political scandal and policy failure.
This serves two purposes: First, discovering similarities in related topics could be
helpful in defining, refining, developing, and expanding the field of crisis
management; and, second, by organizing and gathering thoughts and ideas from
studies on related topics, this thesis attempts to put different kinds of (potential)
governance crisis on the same platform for analysis.

For example, incorporating

ideas from media and communication studies on the state-society interactive
framework in crisis management is helpful for the development of a more
comprehensive argument.

Lastly, a review on crisis studies in Hong Kong recognizes a lack of theory-based
academic research in the Hong Kong context, as most crisis theories and models are
based on Western democratic society, and may not be applicable to a non-democratic
regime with a relatively high level of liberty like Hong Kong.

The unique

socio-political background in post-1997 Hong Kong makes the discussion on
state-society interactions valuable in explaining crisis and crisis governance.
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By

using Hong Kong examples, the linkage among government, different political actors
and the civil society, that is, the politicization in crisis management, is investigated.

In the next two chapters, analytical frameworks of this thesis will be introduced.
Frist, the two contemporary crisis management approaches, namely, the Leadership
Approach and the Politicization Approach will be introduced in Chapter Three.
Second, in Chapter Four, the State-society Interactive Framework, a useful
contribution developed in this research, will be illustrated.
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CHAPTER THREE: ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK PART I –
CONTEMPORARY CRISIS MANAGEMENT APPROACHES

Analytical framework is best described as the backbone of a research.

The current

study applies the Leadership Approach and the Politicization Approach as the pillars
for the research framework, details of both are explained in the first part of this
chapter.

This is followed by deliberations on the theoretical discussion on the two

approaches and to gives elementary analysis on their potential weaknesses in
applying to Hong Kong – a limited democracy.

The discussion here also forms the

theoretical bases of the useful contribution of the current work - the State-society
Interactive Framework which will be presented in the next chapter.

Analytical Framework: Selection of Two Crisis Management Approaches
The analytical framework for the current research is constructed on two crisis
management approaches currently available, namely, Leadership Approach and
Political Approach. The Leadership Approach is based on Boin, 't Hart, Stern, et
al.’s (2005) “Crisis management in political systems: Five leadership challenges”,
while the components for the Political Approach are generated from Brandstrom and
Kuipers’s (2003) arguments on selective politicization of policy failure.

As briefly

discussed in the literature review, the first approach can be classified as the top-down
managerial oriented approach, and the second one as bottom-up political oriented
approach.

Both approaches are based on the western democratic system, in which governments
are accountable to their people through periodic election, and the people generally
enjoys a high level of liberty in many aspects, such as freedom of speech, freedom of
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press, and freedom of assembly.
complex.

However, the political system in Hong Kong is

As a partial democracy, Hong Kong’s executive branch is led by the

Chief Executive, who is elected by an Election Committee with 1,200 members.
More importantly, most of the committee members are indirectly selected by the
Beijing government through a “coterie”, or “small-circle”, election system. On the
other hand, the Legislative Council of Hong Kong consists of two constituencies,
namely, the Geographical Constituency and the Functional Constituency.

Even

though both constituencies have an equal number of seats in the LegCo, only the GC
adopts direct election under a proportional representative system. Most of the
constituencies (“sectors”) in the FC are won by members elected through the
“small-circle” election under strong Beijing influence.

Owing to the special features in the Hong Kong political system, there may be some
problems in applying the two approaches to study crisis management in Hong Kong.
Regarding the applicability of western crisis management theories in the Hong Kong
context, three sub-questions are raised in this thesis: First, how does a
non-democratically elected executive branch execute crisis management when it
cannot be held accountable by the general public?

Second, how does the

semi-democratic legislature perform its check-and-balance role on the executive
branch during crises?

Third, with a high level of liberty, how do other stakeholders,

such as the opposition parties and mass media, contribute to the crisis framing
process?

3.1

Boin, 't Hart, Stern, et al.’s Five Tasks Leadership Approach

The Five Tasks Leadership Approach (Leadership Approach) suggested by Boin, 't
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Hart, Stern, et al. (2005, hereafter BHS 2005) can be interpreted as “how crisis
leadership contributes to defending, destroying, or renovating” the established
political and organizational orders.

As mentioned in the previous chapter, there are

five crucial tasks to complete when dealing with a crisis: Sense-making,
decision-making, meaning-making, terminating, and learning (BHS 2005, 10).

3.1.1

Sense-making

BHS (2005, 18) defined sense-making as “grasping crises as they unfold”. Using
the 911 Incident as an example, the authors illustrated the importance of early
recognition of a crisis.

However, decision-makers always overlook available

signals before the threat, which, according to BHS (2005, 28), could be due to
psychological reasons that are beyond the scope of the current research, or
organizational limitations, which best reflect the barriers to crisis recognition.
Specifically, organizations are set up to perform tasks under normal situation, and are
not designed for crisis (BHS 2005, 20).

Further, their performances are measured

by whether they have achieved the goals assigned to them, and thus, they may
choose to ignore or have no interest in problems that are out of their mandates (BHS
2005, 21).

Also, the size and complexity of modern organization makes it difficult

for messages from frontline officials to reach the top levels, even if those are signals
of a crisis, and with the adoption of the rational-scientific approach, some routine
crises are taken as acceptable risk, thus, potential threats are possibly ignored.
Recall that crisis is a name given by people. Therefore, crisis status would not be
granted without the recognition of a large amount of people, and as a result people
may pay no heed to it.
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3.1.2

Decision-Making

In general, leaders are not the sole decision-maker in a crisis - they manage the crisis
with the assistance of their crisis teams.

It is impossible for the leaders to control

the whole crisis response process on their own, and thus a certain degree of
delegation and decentralization is important.

In reality, a small group is usually

formed to coordinate the crisis response effort, which was recognized as a
disadvantage by BHS (2005, 45) due to the presence of group dynamics such as
newness and conformity, excessive cordiality and conformity, and centrifugally and
politicking.

In this regard, coordination within the crisis management network is

important.

However, as BHS (2005, 64) stated, “an effective crisis response cannot

be forced; it is to large extent the result of a naturally evolving process.

It cannot be

managed in linear, step-by-step and comprehensive fashion from a single crisis
center”.

3.1.3

Meaning-Making

Meaning-making in crisis management is about political communication. Unlike
the Politicization Approach that will be detailed later, crisis communication in the
Leadership Approach is an attempt to reduce the political uncertainty caused by the
crisis (BHS 2005, 69).

It is mainly a top-down process, as it creates a “persuasive

story line that explains what happened, why it had to be in that way, what its
repercussions are, how it can be resolved, who can be relied upon to do so, and who
is to blame” (BHS 2005, 69-70).

Under the high pressure exerted by the mass

media as the fault-finder, the government is obliged to release information.

BHS05

(76-77) described three factors that are particularly important in government crisis
communication: The degree of preparedness, the degree of coordination of outgoing
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information, and the degree of professionalization.

Crisis communication is a battle

of credibility for leaders, and the three meaning-making strategies of framing,
ritualization, and masking ('t Hart 1993) are usually adopted, as detailed in the
literature review.

3.1.4

Terminating

Terminating a crisis is an implication that the time to assign accountability has
arrived. There are two dimensions to crisis closure, namely operational closure and
political closure.

BHS (2005, 97) described the key challenges facing the two types

of closure, specifically, “to make an accurate and balanced assessment of the need to
keep the crisis response infrastructure in place” for operational closure, and “to
recognize when the breakdown of symbolic order has been restored” for political
closure, in which “leaders must also assess the political expediency of crisis
termination.

When a crisis reaches the stage of assigning accountability, the

government would try to avoid the blame game, though usually without success.

In

this situation, government officials will defend themselves by claiming that “they
made no mistake”.

3.1.5

Learning

Although crisis can be an opportunity for reforms (Boin and 't Hart 2000), in reality
reform does not always follow, unless government performance deficit is discovered
during the crisis, and the old routine has proven to be unfeasible in crisis. However,
learning after crisis does not necessarily lead to changes, as changes can be a gesture
of responsibility, a forceful action, or merely a public relations tactic, in which case
the government is making changes just to please the public, rather than having learnt
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a lesson.

In some cases, the change process cannot be seen, as the enabling factors

are aborted or subverted (BHS 2005, 122). This is in fact learning without change.

3.2

Brandstrom and Kuipers’s Pattern of Politicization Approach

Crisis, as an abnormal situation, does not only affect the government, but also other
political actors and the general public. During a crisis, different actors compete for
the chance to “name” the failure, and the event becomes politicized when “influential
actors in the political arena succeed in framing them as blameworthy violations of
crucial public values” (Brandstrom and Kuipers 2003, 208).

The politicization

process is important to crisis management, as it can transform a normal incident into
a governance crisis.

As raised by Brandstrom and Kuipers (2003, 282), the major

question to ask in the politicization process is “how do actors use framing strategies
to (re)allocate blame for politicized incidents?” Obviously, political outcomes do
not necessarily reflect the real performance of the government in certain crises
(Brandstrom and Kuipers 2003, 280), as the identification of failure is not the
recognition of a fact (Edelman 1977), but a man-made process.

Figure 3.1 is an illustration of Brandstrom and Kuipers’s (2003, 290) three
perspectives of framing and blaming in the Pattern of Politicization Approach:
1) Depicting the events as a violation of core public values (constructing
severity);
2) Depicting the events as an operational incident or a symptom of
endemic problems (constructing agency); and,
3) Allocating accountability and blame for the occurrence and/or
“mismanagement” of crisis (constructing responsibility).
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3.2.1

Constructing Severity

Based on political crisis and policy failure, the Politicization Approach was
introduced to assign responsibility and blame.

At the heart of the Politicization

Process is the difference between an incident and a crisis, which is undoubtedly a
matter of framing.

Thus, as a first step, the violation of core public values serves as

the watershed to distinguish a crisis from accidents or incidents. Specifically, when
political actors frame an incident as a violation of public core values, the event
becomes a crisis, and vice versa. The timing is important in this situation, as
Kingdon (1995, 104) argued that people tend to forget an incident in a short time if
there were no further decision. Political actors are easily attracted by hot topics.
Therefore, the more serious the event is, the more likely they will get involved into
the coupling process.

For example, as Brandstrom and Kuipers (2003) argued in

their Sweden and the Netherlands examples, credibility and integrity should be core
values for all governments.

If those values were violated, the issue would probably

become politicized and gain the status of a crisis.

3.2.2

Constructing Agency

In constructing the status of a crisis, political actors would try to find out the reasons
behind.

A crisis can either be a stand-alone, ad hoc disturbance in a system, or a

symptom of a much larger systematic failure (Brandstrom and Kuipers 2003, 295).
Political actors would try to frame a crisis as systematic failure instead of an
accidental fault, so that a severe blame can be imposed.

In order to make such a

claim, it requires backward investigation over a broader time frame and upward
investigation to senior-level officials.

Specifically, going back in time is to discover

the fundamental reasons behind, while going up the hierarchy of decision-making is
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to query the entire governance system (Bovens and 't Hart 1996).

3.2.3

Constructing Responsibility

Regardless of the reasons behind and the level of seriousness, the most important
question in the final stage of the framing and blaming process would be: Who should
be punished?

In this respect, a crisis can be divided into either actor failure or

network failure (Brandstrom and Kuipers 2003, 302).

As discussed in the

construction of agency in the previous section, if a crisis were framed as an
accidental event, it is being narrowed down to an occasional wrongdoing of an
individual, which is the slightest level of blame, and the result would be an actor
failure, meaning scapegoating.

On the other hand, the crisis would be an

organization mishap if it were framed as a network failure, and the blame would be
endured collectively.

However, the system would not be hurt if the crisis were

framed as an operational or technical fault that happened sporadically.

The blame would be tough if the crisis were found to be a symptom of a much larger
systematic failure.

If it were being framed as an actor failure at this stage, the

decision-maker will bear the blame.

However, if it were framed as a network

failure, the whole institution would be responsible, as it implies an overall failure of
the system.

This is the most serious blame that could be framed, as the government

is found to be violating public core values in a systematic manner.

In this situation,

the collapse of the current government may be a possible outcome.

In applying the Politicization Approach, Brandstrom and Kuipers (2003) selected a
military incident in Sweden and the Netherlands respectively for illustration.
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The

current study attempts to testify this approach by applying it on crises with different
natures.

Specifically, since Hong Kong is a semi-democratic system, as opposed to

the parliamentary system in Sweden and the Netherlands, the validity of the
Politicization Approach in various crisis natures and political systems can be
testified.

Figure 3.1 Constructing Blame by Framing Political Crises
(Brandstrom and Kuipers 2003, 302)

3.3

Theoretical Void in Crisis Management Approaches

The limitations discussed in this section will demonstrate the theoretical gap in the
field of crisis management.

These limitation would become the foundation of
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constructing the State-society Interactive Framework which would be introduced in
the next chapter .

3.3.1

Absence of Multi-crisis Analysis

As discussed in the literature review, the field of crisis managements is currently
diverged.

In general, approaches and models in this field could be divided into

managerial and political ones.

Some models are developed for specific types of

crises, and thus, their applicability on other crises cases is doubtful.

Of the more

famous studies, J. Thompson’s (2000) work on political scandal has become popular,
especially after the Clinton sex scandal in the United States in 1998, and Bovens and
't Hart’s (1996, 20) study on policy failure (they used “policy fiasco” as more serious
failure) discussed the “crisis-like predicament” for unsuccessful policymaking.
More importantly, major political crises are usually not due to sole reasons, but a
consequence of a basket of crisis events that has led to severe public dissatisfaction.
Thus, multi-crisis analysis is important as a connection between different areas of
crisis management.

3.3.2

Severity: the Prerequisite

Most current crisis management theories and models, including the Leadership and
Political Approaches, put their focus on positive cases, that is, serious crises leading
to chaos and instability to the state and society, since their strength is in post crises
assessment, but not in explaining why a crisis happened or was being “manipulated”.
Thus, one of the major tasks for the State-society Interactive Framework is to study
how different actors intensify or distort the crisis.

To do this, both significant cases

and latent crisis have to be involved, so that questions on why and how crises
emerged could be solved.

In addition, it is of interest to study, especially in
96

man-made crises, why some crises could be successfully politicized and could exert
sufficient political pressure on the government change, and why others could not.

Referring to the case studies which will be discussed in the later chapters, the
Anti-High Speed Railway incident is a latent crisis, in which the perpetually
eye-catching denotations and rallies could not lead to any change in the decision of
the government.

This is evidence that current crisis management approaches are

not completely applicable to latent crises, which is one of the major limitations in
this field.

However, even though the severity dimension is important, it should not

be treated as a threshold, as further discussion on non-crisis cases would be limited.

3.3.3

Analyzing Crises: Process versus Aftermath

Another significant attempt of the State-society Interactive Framework introduced in
this research is to strengthen the explanatory power of the two theories, although the
Politicization Approach seems to be able to better explain political outcomes (i.e.,
blame construction) than the Leadership Approach.

Even though crisis

management has been considered by scholars as a process of development, current
theories and approaches have not considered this point seriously, as most of them
view crisis management as the study of aftermath.

Severity is always used as a

threshold to eliminate latent crises, which should not happen if crisis were viewed as
a process.

Instead, the severity of crises could be a possible outcome of crisis

strengthening process, as would be detailed in the next chapter.

The useful contribution of this thesis is to illustrate why only certain crises could
lead to government change.

In order to achieve this, crisis should be viewed as a

process but not an aftermath, since not every one of them could gain its crisis status
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from the very beginning.

The SARS incident and the Basic Law Article 23

controversy, for example, did not gain a crisis status until the incident unfolded and
became serious.

The Anti-High Speed Railway movement could not even reach

such level of severity.

Thus, the State-society Interactive Framework, which will be

introduced in the next chapter, should be constructed so that it has the strength to
explain the process of crisis politics, and at the same time, coincide with the “crisis
as development” principle in crisis management theories.
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CHAPTER FOUR: ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK PART II –
THE STATE-SOCIETY INTERACTIVE FRAMEWORK32

In view of the fragmented political structure with limited democracy in
post-handover Hong Kong, in which there is a lack of effective check-and-balance
mechanism through regular elections of the executive branch, and the comparatively
liberal and pro-active civil society, especially the development of crisis-provoking
politics in the city since the 1 July 2003 Demonstration, the State-society Interactive
Framework is presented as an useful theoretical contribution of this thesis. With an
emphasis on the out-of-institution channels of interaction between the government
and other non-state actors during crises, the State-society Interactive Framework is
able to fill the gap where the Leadership Approach and the Politicization Approach of
crisis management are found to be inadequate – in non-democratic regimes such as
Hong Kong.

Interview data has contributed vastly to the development of the State-society
Interactive Framework.

Interviews with the respondents (see Appendix II) have

provided ample information and first-hand observations for understanding the
interactions between state and society during crises, as the interviewees have not
only shared their personal experiences on the two crises, but also their opinions on
crisis politics of Hong Kong.

This section provides a summary of their views to

facilitate the introduction of the State-society Interactive Framework.

The

State-society

Interactive

Framework

32

is

a

development-oriented

and

Another version of this chapter was published in the Journal of Contingencies and Crisis
Management with the title of “Crisis Politics in Authoritarian Regimes: How Crises Catalyse Changes
under the State-society Interactive Framework” Volume 21, Issue 4, 200-210. (H.-y. Chan 2013).
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multi-dimensional crisis management framework consisting of four key elements,
including the Crisis Development Ladder, the Crisis Strengthening and Weakening
Forces and the most important Catalytic Effect of Crisis, each of which is detailed in
the following.

4.1 Crisis Development Ladder
Crises can be private (corporate) or public (Rosenthal and Kouzmin 1993). Public
crisis, regardless of their nature, poses a challenge to the government, as they are
occasions that demand instant actions and responses (Kimenyi and Mwabu 2007).
Specifically, the term “governance crisis” refers to a crisis that may possibly lead to
government change - a “change” that is not merely a remedial measure, but a major
and observable transformation of (or an attempt to transform) policy, government
personnel and/or government structure/system.

For instance, initiating an

impeachment is a strong enough trigger to establish the governance crisis status.
However, the advancement of a crisis to a governance crisis is not a necessity, as it
depends on the case itself and the related “Strengthening Forces”, such as
politicization.

Further, the gaining of the governance crisis status could be

immediate or at the latter stages of crisis development.

When the first aircraft

crashed into the North Tower of the World Trade Centre in the 911 Incident, it was
apparently taken as a crisis of air transportation.

However, soon after the second

plane crashed into the South Tower, the US government realized that it was a terrorist
attack, and the governance crisis status was achieved.

The term “governance crisis” adopted in this Interactive Framework, in some cases,
is different from the general usage which can be found in newspapers and other
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related studies.

In mass media, reporters and commentators always describe the

poor performance of government or government wrongdoings, such as policy failure
and political scandal, as some sort of “governance crisis” (in Chinese: 管治危機;
Guan zhi wei ji).

In this case, governance crisis is used as an expression without

accurate definition (please refer to Chapter 1.2.7 – Figure 1.3 for analysis on the
usage of “Governance crisis” by newspaper). However, the “governance crisis”
illustrated in the Crisis Development Ladder is specific to a necessary condition that
leads to government change (i.e., the third level).

Governance crisis in the

Interactive Framework can be treated as a warning that the Crisis Strengthening
Forces are dominating as compared to the Weakening Forces. At the same time, an
opportunity for government change is foreseeable, subject to the presence of
Catalytic Effect.

Governance crisis might in part represent that the government has lost control of, or
that the root of the crisis is an attempt to challenge, the status quo. The status of
governance crisis could be granted, in the case of an internal crisis, when most
people are pointing their fingers at the government, and its legitimacy is in doubt (as
in the case of political scandal or policy failure), and in the case of an external crisis,
when the country is facing a serious threat from an external source (e.g., terrorist
attack or natural disaster). The Crisis Development Ladder (Figure 4.1) can be used
to explain the development process from “crisis” to “governance crisis” and further
on to “change”. Under the State-society Interactive Framework, a major change
will be accomplished if the Crisis Strengthening Forces (detailed in the next section)
are strong enough.

Governance crisis would not indubitably lead to change, but would probably open a
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window of opportunity for change, especially for policy change in democratic
systems, as described by Kingdon (1995).

In contrast, the presence of “governance

crisis” is particularly important in authoritarian regimes.

In a democratic system,

“changes” such as the stepping-down of a cabinet member or the withdrawal of
controversial policy bills so as to avoid negative (electoral) consequences is often
observed. However, in a non-democratic system, there is no direct relationship
between the performance of the government and change. Most of the time, it is
almost impossible for the government to make major concessions actively without
“upgrading” a crisis to a governance crisis, such as in the cases of the 1 July 2003
Demonstration and the Siege of Wukan Village in Lufeng, China in 2011 33. The
demonstration and siege rang the alarm on the legitimacy of the governments, and
major changes were introduced as a result. Specifically, the demonstration has led
to the stepping-down of three principal officials and the withdrawal of the legislation
of Article 23 of the Basic Law regarding national security in Hong Kong (J. Cheng
2005). Concessions in the form of the dismissal of two local officials and the
redistribution of land confiscated by the local government were observed in the Siege
of Wukan Village, Lufeng.

4.2

Crisis Strengthening and Weakening Forces

In the political context, the framing of a crisis is an interaction between two “forces”,
hereby named the “Strengthening Forces” and “Weakening Forces” (Figure 4.1).
These two forces push a crisis from one step to another on the Crisis Development
Ladder, and may lead to different consequences, such as a resolution or a significant
33

The Siege of Wukan was a series of anti-corruption protests in Wukan Village in Guangdong,
China. Beginning in September 2011, the event escalated to a crisis in December 2011 with the
ejection of officials by villagers. Please refer to BBC News reports available at:
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-china-16192541 for details.
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government change.

One of the strengths of the State-society Interactive

Framework is its ability to explain how crises unfold at different levels.
Specifically, why some crises can eventually lead to government change whereas
some are forgotten shortly, and how crises that do not have a clear ending may be the
symptoms of another serious crisis.

4.2.1 Crisis Strengthening Forces
There are three major sources for the Strengthening Forces, which would result in the
intensification of a crisis.

First, the nature of the crisis itself may worsen the

situation, especially in the case of a natural disaster or disease.

It could be also

associated with man-made factors, such as the poor efforts of government in carrying
out rescue operations.

Second, it can be the deliberation of stakeholders, such as

the politicization of an issue or problem by opposition parties and the “mediatisation”
(Mazzoleni and Schulz 1999) by the mass media. As mentioned in the literature
review, the relationship between the media and politics is close (Davis 1994, Kahan
1999), as it was described as the “fourth branch of government” (Cater 1959) that
wields political power far beyond that of an observer. The role of the media on
crisis management is significant, as it has transformed from a watchdog telling the
audience what they should know to fostering communication within the society
(Deuze 2005). Third, direct responses of the people either by voting or collective
actions, such as mass demonstration, may lead to governance crisis in many
non-democratic societies. The Arab Spring34 is a prime example. The second and
third sources are also referred to as the bottom-up approach in crisis management.
34

The Arab Spring refers to a chain of revolutionary demonstrations, protests, and wars that happened
in the Arab world since late 2010. It began with the Mohamed Bouazizi's (a Tunisian street vendor)
self-immolation in protest of police corruption and ill-treatment, which led to mass demonstration that
overthrew then-Tunisian President Ben Ali’s regime in January 2011.

103

4.2.2 Crisis Weakening Forces
The Weakening Forces refer to the crisis management measures taken by the
government.

As mentioned, there are two types of top-down approach in crisis

management, namely, managerial oriented and political oriented. The managerial
oriented aspect focuses on the steps and solutions taken to solve the problem, while
the political oriented aspect is sometimes described as a gesture of public relations
initiated by “spin doctors”35.

Regardless of their nature, these two approaches

represent actions taken by the government in restoring the situation from crisis back
to normal.

Moreover, the ruling and pro-government parties, particularly in one-party states,
may try to uphold the popularity and legitimacy of the government by various means,
such as defending the decisions of the government in the congress, or influencing
news coverage with the aid of pro-government mass media. The ultimate goal for
those Weakening Forces is to achieve an operational (and also political) termination
of the crisis (Boin, 't Hart and Stern, et al. 2005, 97).

In each crisis, there can be multiple sources of Strengthening Forces and Weakening
Forces.

Also, the same source can provide both Strengthening and Weakening

Forces on different occasions depending on its nature. As A. Lee (2008) suggested,
the internet can be seen as a Weakening Force during the outbreak of SARS, as it
provided timely information and warnings to the public. However, people could
also challenge and monitor the crisis management performance of the HKSAR
35

Spin doctor’ refers to those communication professionals who are employed by politicians in order
to “generate publicity, boost their images and manage the news” (de Vreese and Elenbaas 2011, 75).
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government through the internet, which proved to be a significant Strengthening
Force in turning SARS into a governance crisis eventually.

The power of the

internet should not be underestimated, as online forums have played a significant role
in the organization of social movements, such as mass demonstrations (So 2008).

As mentioned previously, crisis passes from one level to another as a result of the
interaction between forces. A stronger Strengthening Force may intensify a crisis
into a governance crisis, or even lead to major governmental change eventually.

A

significant Weakening Force, on the other hand, may sometimes lead to the
termination of a crisis.

However, compared to an operational termination, a

political termination is always more difficult to achieve, especially when public
dissatisfaction is deep.

Specifically, an intensive Weakening Force does not

necessarily mean the complete drop-out of the crisis status, as people would not
completely forget the pain brought by a crisis.

Instead, a pool of public

dissatisfaction would be generated until a critical point is reached. This is known as
the Catalytic Effect of Crisis.
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Crisis Weakening Force:

Government
Change

●

Effective crisis management of the government

●

Operational elimination of the crisis (e.g. crisis
under control)

●

Pro-government parties or organizations
support (e.g. positive mass media coverage)

The Catalyser

Governance
Crisis

Crisis Strengthening Force:
●

Ineffective crisis management of the government

●

Opposition parties or organizations manipulation
(e.g. organize collective actions)

Crisis

●

The crisis itself becomes more serious

●

Negative mass media coverage (e.g. blame and
critique)

Figure 4.1 The State-Society Interactive Framework

4.3 Generating the Forces I: Effective Crisis Management
The government, with no doubt, is the key actor in crisis management, as illustrated
in the Leadership Approach. The effective crisis management effort performed by
the government is an important source of Crisis Weakening Forces, although such
effort is sometimes unobservable.

From the theoretical perspective, Boin (2009,

370) suggested that there are three types of challenges during a crisis.

First, there

are political administrative challenges as government agencies prepare to deal with
the sudden adversity.

Second, crises test the fabric of society – its citizens and

institutions must demonstrate resilience if a society is to “bounce back” after a crisis
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and re-establish some sense of normality.

Third, crises and disasters pose

challenges for policy-makers, therefore deep thinking is required.

Boin’s (2009)

ideas provide a framework on which challenges faced by government during a crisis
can be examined.

Failure in tackling these three challenges by a government would

definitely affect the effectiveness of crisis management.

Regarding crisis management effectiveness, Kimenyi and Mwabu (2007, 14-15)
suggested three standard policy actions during a crisis.

The first is shock therapy, a

type of treatment for emergency case that is either cure or kill with no intermediate
outcome. The second is a radical action or policy, which changes the course of
action to an almost opposite direction. While achieving the intended outcomes, a
radical policy often creates many other problems.
instrumentalism or gradualism.

The final action is

Characterized by marginal changes in existing

policy, it is, to an extent, the opposite of radicalism.

The above-mentioned

measures are not mutually exclusive and “an appropriate response in a crisis situation
is one that addresses the urgency of the moment, while at the same time searching for
a better and long-term solution” (Kimenyi and Mwabu 2007, 16).

In addition, their

effectiveness would directly alter the “power” of the forces.

It should be noted that government crisis management measure is also associated
with the people’s expectation, and could potentially generate Crisis Strengthening
Forces in contrast.

As Boin et al. (2005, 1) stated, during crises, citizens look to

their leaders – the government officials and administrators. People expect these
policy makers to avert the threat, or at least minimize the damage of the crisis at hand.
The officials should lead their people out of the crisis, and they must explain what
went wrong and convince the people that similar incidents will not happen again.
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Policy making in times of crisis is even more complicated because the demand for
action is very high.

Policy makers are expected to act fast when dealing with the

crisis, and the public demand for results exerts political pressure (Kimenyi and
Mwabu 2007, 13), which are linked to the “interactions” between forces emphasized
in the current State-society Interactive Framework.

4.4 Generating the Forces II: Government’s Public Relations Tactics
As discussed in the literature review, through “spin doctors” in a government, three
types of symbolic “crisis handling devices”: Framing, ritualization, and masking, as
suggested by ‘t Hart (1993), are used as government’s public relations tactics during
crises.

Framing refers to the creation of an “official story” that favours the

government. Ritualization can be standardized measures that are symbolic to let the
people become aware of the “efforts made” by the government during crises.
Masking refers to the external communication strategies of crisis stakeholders, and is
different from denial, which is related to their personal beliefs and perceptions. The
effectiveness of the above-mentioned strategies, especially masking, are, to a large
extent, related to the influential power the government exerts on mass media,
especially the pro-government ones.

From the observation of the practitioners, the interviews carried out in this study had
collected first-hand information on how the government applied public relations
tactics (by influencing the media) as a kind of crisis weakening measure, which is in
the same vein with the theories.

“When there is a crisis or scandal, the government would directly contact
our senior management or chief editor… as they have maintained a close
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relationship for years.

The chief editor even makes contact with the

Press Secretary of CE daily… [When crisis occurred], some government
senior officials would call us and request the editor to ‘play the
government’s angle’… For example, they would say ‘under great social
pressure, [someone from the Pro-establishment camp] is really brave to
express their support for the government [on national education], which
is opposite to the majority of public opinion’”. (Respondent O)

Respondent N considered this a “spinning” of the journalists during crises.

In

operation, according to Respondent O’s personal experience, the boss decided that
some other news was more important, and that the scandal news should be moved to
inner pages, in order to “play it small” (put it lightly). However, the “playing it
small” strategy is not applicable to some extraordinary controversies.

“We may

simply choose to ignore the government’s angle, as we cannot handle it [considering
the great public dissatisfaction]” (Respondent O).

In general, it could be deduced from the responses of the interviewees that the mass
media could provide both Crisis Strengthening and Weakening Forces, depending on
their political preference.

Specifically, Respondent O’s interpretation is in line with

Lee and Chan’s (2006) argument of the media’s political parallelism under energized
public opinion36. Moreover, with reference to Lau (2012, 67), political spinning is
“adding flower to the embroider” (in Chinese: 錦上添花; jin shang tian hua) rather
than “sending charcoal during a snowfall” (in Chinese: 雪中送炭; xue zhong song
tan), meaning that it is difficult for the mass media to lend a hand to the government
during severe political crises.

In fact, no mass media would want to bear such a

heavy political burden when the government is under heavy attack.

36

These

Based on a content analysis of newspaper coverage of 1 July 2003 Demonstration, Lee and Chan
(2006, 72) found out that “in the state of energized public opinion, political parallelism in the mass
media diminishes and the discourses of political and social issues among the media tend to converge”.
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observations also imply a swopping of the above-discussed Crisis Strengthening and
Weakening Forces (brought by the mass media) that was seen in the 2003
Demonstration Incident (Please refer to Chapter Nine).

4.5

Generating the Forces III: The Power of the Media

As discussed above, due to the institutional barriers of Hong Kong as a regime
without full democracy, formal institutional channels of crisis politics, such as
motion of no-confidence and impeachment, are almost unavailable. Thus, the role
of the opposition parties in the crisis politics of these regimes is minimal as
compared to democratic states that have an effective check-and-balance mechanism.
Therefore, non-state actors need to make use of some out-of-institution channels to
push forward their criticism on the government’s poor crisis management.

In this

regard, the media, including traditional mass media and new media such as the
internet, plays an extraordinary role.

Theoretically, the media provides a platform

to generate Crisis Strengthening (and sometimes Weakening) Forces. However, in
reality, negative (or positive) discourses appearing in the media do not generate those
Forces directly.

Rather, the key for creating real forces to influence the crisis

politics is collective action. While this does not imply that media coverage does not
bear any political influence, in real cases, such as the case studies discussed in this
thesis, the Crisis Strengthening Forces generated by the collective action could be
enough to escalate a crisis towards the next level on the Crisis Development Ladder.

4.5.1 Traditional Mass Media
The traditional mass media plays a significant role in crisis politics, as newspapers,
television and radio news are still the major sources of information in daily life.
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Regardless of the form of presentation, be it print media or broadcast through
electronic devices, tradition mass media influences crisis politics through agenda
setting. For instance, the headline on Page A1 of a newspaper is limited, and the
decision on the material to be put there would be crucial, especially when there are
scandals or crises. Newspaper is certainly more influential than television and radio
news, in a sense that the former would carry more information with deeper analyses
due to the coverage. Also, personal refection and commentaries commonly found
in newspapers would not be possible in television news, and even though they are
possible in radio programs (e.g., phone-in program), the depth is limited due to
schedule constraints.

Newspapers can include extra pages for big news, but a day is

always 24 hours for the television and radio.

The influential role of the mass media in crisis politics is agreed by almost all
interviewees, regardless of their background. Respondent D, who was a journalist
before joining the polity, has coined a term called “mediaucracy” – a combination of
the words “media” and “bureaucracy” - to describe the strong political power of mass
media resembling that of the bureaucrats.

Respondents E and L, both from

Pro-establishment parties, agreed with this view, and further suggested that the mass
media’s role is very significant, and are now acting like opposition parties.

In some

extreme cases, political parties even have to follow the public opinion.

In fact,

mass media interacts with public opinion in various ways, such as taking an active
role in agenda setting by reflecting public opinion from the civil society (Respondent
F). As Respondent D added, the mass media, both actively and passively, interacts
with public opinion, which, to a large extent, reflects and leads the public opinion.
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Every one of the five respondents who is a current or former journalist has had
experience of working in more than one mass media companies. Some even have
worked in companies with totally opposite political orientations. As they revealed,
different companies report crisis politics in a different way, which is highly
dependent on the company’s background, or in the words of Respondent K, the
political preference of the boss.

However, their opinions regarding whether the

mass media has a clear political agenda of its own were diverged, especially when
the political influence of mass media reaches the highest point during crises, or more
specifically, in political scandals.

“Mass media sometimes do not have an obvious political agenda [on
news reporting], but ‘is provided with’ some political dirt [regarding CE
candidate Henry Tang’s unauthorized construction scandal]…In fact, at
the same time, we were unable to have balanced coverage on CY
Leung’s scandal due to resource constraints.” (Respondent H)

Respondent H added that, technically, there is a pushing process in exploiting
government scandals, although it may or may not mean that a particular mass media
company has a very clear political agenda.

Nevertheless, Respondent K, currently a

reporter working in the political news section of a well-known Pan-democrat media,
had a different interpretation.

“My chief editor has a very strong political agenda… For example, we
were asked to explore possible political dirt in the new cabinet... in an
attempt to attack the popularity of the new chief executive CY Leung, as
he lacks legitimacy.” (Respondent K)

The mass media not only takes on a reporting role, but also assists by strongly
pushing forward an issue with the aid of the headline.
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Respondent K further

mentioned that the chief editor believed that the media should take on an educating
role (on civil education), and therefore, some related messages would be presented
through the newspaper in order to convince the general public.

As Respondent H

mentioned, the reporting angle of certain media companies could be driven by their
political agenda, since they know their reports would make a difference on the real
politics, or at least, as Respondent E reported, make the government tired from
responding to critiques from the mass media.

In regard to the State-society Interactive Framework, mass media, regardless of their
mode, would contribute to the Crisis Strengthening and Weakening Forces by asking
the following questions when there is a crisis.

1)

What is the “hottest” topic at the moment?

As crisis status is granted by the people, it would be important to identify the most
eye-catching issue. The mechanism employed is simple – the more newspaper
coverage there is, the more salient the issue becomes. The cooling down of the
issue or event might be an indication of effective crisis management by the
government.

When the crisis no longer poses a threat to the daily lives of the

people, it would soon be forgotten and the people will turn their attention to other
important matters.

2)

Where are the fingers pointing at?

In a crisis, the assignment of blame is a commonly-agreed procedure both in the
leadership approach and politicisation approach.
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The first step is to identify the

‘culprits’ (Lee and Chan, 2011).

If energized public opinion exists37 (Lee and Chan,

2006, i.e., public opinion that is strong and unique), there would be a deterioration of
media’s political parallelism, and the culprits would easily be identified.

3)

What are the people asking for? (Solution versus Request)

Boin, 't Hart and Stern, et al. (2005) pointed out that the state-society interaction in a
crisis could be an endless process unless there is an operational and political
termination.

As a crisis unfolds, the action of the government would lead to

reactions from different actors in the society whom demand further responses from
the government.

During the action and reaction cycle, Crisis Strengthening and

Weakening Forces would push the crisis through different stages.

The gap of

expectation between the solution of the government and request of the public is an
important factor in determining the Strengthening and Weakening Forces.

The mass media, to a large extent, reflects the public opinion, especially when people
are unhappy with the government during crisis.

Although pro-government mass

media exists in every society (as will be discussed in Chapter Eleven), energized
public opinion can still be a warning for the government.

However, the existence of

media coverage is not enough, as civil society champions the interaction and
communication between different actors. Thus, the recent rapid development of
new media on the internet has provided a synergy effect in generating Crisis
Strengthening Forces.

37

Lee and Chan (2006) define energized public opinion as a dramatic incident that receives serious
debate in the general public. If public opinion was found to be strong, the divergence of political
preference of different mass media on may temporarily be reduced.
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4.5.2

The Internet: The New Media

The internet does not directly produce Crisis Strengthening and Weakening Forces,
but it provides a platform for stimulating the Forces.

Compared to the civil society,

the government’s early usage of internet was conservative, and was difficult to be
identified as “Forces”.

Electronic brochures (Coleman and Blumler 2009) could be

taken as a good description of traditional one-way e-communication between
government and public.

Owing to early technological constraints, the internet was

merely a “tool of government”, as described by Margetts (2009). Governments
have dominated the communication process by distributing information, notifying
the public, and gathering feedback via the internet.

E-petition, submission of

comments through the internet, and online consultations were common moves by the
government to respond to the rapid development of the internet.

Nevertheless, the

initiative of such gesture can be understood as the government’s attempt to influence
social behaviour and shapes the outside world (Margetts 2009), in the sense that the
government is still the one who set the agenda, and the internet merely serves as a
means to facilitate the overall policymaking process.

In this regard, government

begins to learn the power of internet on influencing public opinion.

However the

government may oversee the potentially huge political effect of internet.

The former Premier of China, Wen Jiabao, was one of the pioneers in
non-democratic regimes to broadcast through the television, as he regularly hosted
dialogues with users of the internet.

After screening, some questions and comments

from the people were picked, and Premier Wen would answer them on television.
Similar mechanisms were observed in Hong Kong.

People are being informed and

consulted, but their ideas are not taken into account seriously. However, as people’s
expectation increase, they are no longer satisfied with such kind of standardized
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political participation through the internet.

The development of the internet is in

line with civil society development in Hong Kong. As suggested by Coleman and
Blumler (2009, 114), people are no longer satisfied with merely participating in the
policy process as co-decision-makers.

Instead, they want to influence those who

have a power to make policy decisions.

Heller (2003, cited in Coleman and

Blumler 2009, 115) referred to this kind of top-down e-participation as something
that makes people feel involved, although there is no evidence to suggest that online
consultation would lead to output of policy decision.

Coleman and Blumler (2009,

115) concluded that it “can be read as a strategy for disciplining civic energy within
the constraining techno-political sphere of managed cyberspace”.

As illustrated above, the internet has gradually become an alternative political stage.
Compared to the conventional ideas of polity, the internet platform is fairer to its
participant, as the differences between resources are not a top priority.

Instead,

spreading ideas and information through the internet can be rather handy and cheap.
Users of social networking sites, such as Facebook or Twitter, can “market”
themselves and their opinions at no cost.

Moreover, people may respond to them

instantly, which may lead to a snowballing effect – a huge number of people may
discuss or even readily react to a particular issue in a short period of time. The
political influence (as Crisis Strengthening Forces) of the internet is far beyond an
“electronic brochure” distributed by the government online.

In operation, stimulating Crisis Strengthening Forces from the internet platform
consists of two major steps. First, when people became aware of an issue and
discuss about it, they have initiated the formation process of “Forces”.

In Hong

Kong, the Hong Kong Golden Forum (HKGF, HKGolden.com) and the Hong Kong
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Discussion Forum (HKDF, discussion.com.hk) are two popular online discussion
forums in Hong Kong.

According to Alexa38, a web information company, the

Hong Kong Discussion Forum (HKDF) was the thirteenth most popular website in
Hong Kong, while The Hong Kong Golden Forum (HKGF) was at the
twenty-seventh place.

Apart from these two online forums, Facebook also placed

second in the Alexa site ranking, and serves as a major platform for e-participation.
The “event”, “page”, and “group” functions are always used for expressing
agreement or disagreement on different social and political issues.

4.6 Generating the Forces IV: Collective Action
The intensive and rapid discussion on different media should be followed by the
second step – a transformation from online to offline participation, in which
internet-organized social movements are turned into real political pressure.

One of

the main goals of social movements is to gain publicity and public exposure through
the mass media, which is powerful in constructing political messages (Wicks 2010).
Therefore, one of the aims of social movements would be to get reported by the mass
media.

In this connection, some traditional political icons, such as political parties,

pressure groups, and the like will join hands with those activists to attract more
people to participate, which in turn will exert more pressure on the policy makers.
When the social movement is large enough to become a potential governance crisis,
it forms a policy window for government to make the policy change as discussed in
the State-society Interactive Framework.

Comparatively speaking, the internet provides a platform for the exchange of ideas,
38

For the full ranking list of top 500 sites in Hong Kong, please visit:
http://www.alexa.com/topsites/countries;0/HK
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and is free from the control faced when using traditional means.

It provides the

sufficient condition for developing a bottom-up e-participation, contributing to the
mobilization power of the internet.

In the beginning, people merely share their

point of view toward a specific social or policy issue.

However, as time goes by,

they may organize themselves for collective action.

This transformation from

online participation to offline participation (Man 2010) constitutes a new form of
social movement – the internet-organized social movement, as well as a
post-modernist mode of social movement (So 2008, 241).

This kind of new social

movement has certain characteristics making it different from the traditional one.
First, it significantly reduces the cost of mobilization.

With the aid of the internet,

the organizers can now create an event page through Facebook or online forum.
They can spread the details of the planned protest through e-mail. People will then
be able to meet each other at the designated time and venue.

The idea of

cyberactivism suggested by McCaughey and Ayers (2003) is a demonstration of the
influence of the internet in collective action.

In a sense, the internet has regulated

the political control, and provides an opportunity for collective social movement.

However, internet-organized social movements also have its weakness.

Most

importantly, such movements have a loose organization (So 2008, 241) compared to
traditional social movements led by interest groups, pressure groups, or political
parties with well-known leaders.

The parties mobilize people to take part in the

social movement through their membership network, which could be considered a
top-down approach in mobilization.

As mentioned, the traditional means of

mobilization no longer dominate the process.

Social movement in the internet era

tends to be disassociated, non-hierarchical, and have a high feasibility network (So
2008, Coleman and Blumler 2009, Bennett 2003) that everyone can host.
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Details of

a planned collective action can be spread shortly through the internet even though
participants may have no idea about who is hosting the event.

It is common for

participants in an internet-organized collective action to have no idea about any other
detail, such as specific goal or exact protest activities, apart from showing up on time.
The major goal of internet-organized social movement is to provide sufficient
political pressure, and to gain public exposure in order to influence the government
decision-making.

Such a kind of a social movement shares some similarities with

traditional social movements once it is transformed from online participation to
offline participation.

On the other hand, such a new mode of social movement has

some fundamental loopholes, specifically, in its influencing power due to its
internet-organized nature.

From

the

perspective

of

the

State-society

Interactive

Framework,

the

internet-organized social movement has its own pros and cons regarding to the above
mentioned two features.

First, the internet is good at gathering a large group of

people in a short period of time, as it provides instant information and real time
communication.

The rapid information flow would help in developing the Crisis

Strengthening Forces, as mass incidents that happen suddenly always pose great
challenges to the government.

However, in contrast, internet-organized social

movements are poorly organized, and it is difficult to find a coordinator or a leader.
Thus, such movements would turn out to be rather short-lived.

Unlike those

conventional social movements led by political parties, it is difficult for an
internet-organized social movement to maintain a large number of participants or
supporters over a long period time due to the lack of systematic organization.
Nonetheless, online participation would act as a warning to the government – the
prelude of potential crisis. Thus, this thesis will discuss the role of the internet in
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altering the development of crisis politics, and how it interacts with the real politics
offline in the case study of the Anti-high speed railway movement.

4.6.1

How are People Being Mobilized? From Social Issue to Crisis

Besides understanding the role of mass media in crisis politics, the grey area between
a social issue and a crisis is also an important issue worth studying.
not happen in a sudden.

Most crises do

As mentioned previously, 't Hart and Boin (2001, 32)

categorized crises based on their speed of development and termination, i.e.,
fast-burning and slow-burning crises.

In this regard, a logical expression would be,

some crises are developed and intensified from a social issue or problem.

The interview data would be helpful in understanding the process of the
intensification a social issue or problem, as it was widely discussed by the
respondents, especially by those who are social activists and members of political
parties.

For example, Respondent C suggested that, under the current Hong Kong

political environment, the political influence of a social issue is hard to sustain,
especially if those issues were separated from the mainstream public opinion.
Usually, people are more concerned with ad-hoc issues that are highly relevant to
their daily lives instead of political arguments, such as political conflicts related to
institutional reforms (Respondent M).

“Exposing an ‘issue’ is very important but difficult… Unlike many
foreign countries, Hong Kong people prefer a separation between politics
and livelihood issues… They want ‘de-partization’ (downplaying the
party identity in an issue)”. (Respondent C)

120

In dealing with different social issues, political parties and social activists would
want to push forward their political agenda to attract public concerns. However, the
driving forces are diverged among different non-state actors.

As shared by

Respondent M, a Pan-democrat social activist:

“Social activists, political parties, and the mass media sometimes share a
same target but achieve it with diverged strategies… they seldom
complement with each other.” (Respondent M)

“I would say they are simply ‘out of sync’ - social activists, general
public, and political parties, they are disconnected… In some cases, there
would be immature cooperation between them.” (Respondent C)

According to Respondent M, political parties in Hong Kong are mostly
election-oriented.

They are concerned with a lot of different issues, but do not have

a clear political vision and mission. Therefore, some social activists would refrain
from cooperating with political parties, so as to avoid the possibility of being
“milked” 39 for vote.

Nevertheless, some social activists recognize the role of

parties as a source for resources:

“We need support from political parties…. We don’t really care how they
are going to milk the story as long as they are helping us.” (Respondent
J)

The relationship between social activists and political parties is complicated in
projecting a social issue.

The process and rationale of making an issue “big” was

39

“Milking the story” was a term mentioned by Respondent D. It is to describe how do the political
parties’ making use of an issue to gain publicity for election without significantly contributed into it.
In Hong Kong, it is often called as “hijacking” (qi jie) or “water plumbing” (chou shui) in Chinese.
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systematically addressed by Respondent G, a Pan-democrat District Councilor and an
social activist.

“It is not my intention to ‘make things big’…. However, if I follow
formal government procedures… the success rate [of moving the
government to take note on particular social issues] is almost zero
without the aid of the three parties [i.e., social activists, political parties
and the mass media]… If we don’t ‘make the case a crisis’, it is
impossible to achieve this point.” (Respondent G)

As Respondent G observed, the government will be frightened if discussions on the
issue were loud, as it would need to seriously consider how to respond to the public.
Respondent F, from a Pro-establishment party, also shared similar views with his
counterparts.

“Framing an issue into a crisis is useful in influencing government
decision-making... [The oppositions] will try to use social conflicts to
link up a social issue…in order to intensify the public dissatisfaction.”
(Respondent F)

There are different strategies to make an issue loud.

With reference to the case

study on the 1 July 2003 Demonstration, protesting may be a way to visualize
political pressure.

Unfortunately, as some respondents believed, it might be the

only possible way under the current Hong Kong political context.

However, as

Respondents C, G, and I observed, the political influence of protest in Hong Kong is
diminishing, meaning that more participants might be needed in order to significantly
politicize an issue through protest or demonstration.
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In summary, politicization is an integrative process, in which social activists,
political parties and mass media all play an irreplaceable role.

By investigating the

interactions among them, important clues can be concluded, which is helpful in
accessing the Crisis Strengthening and Weakening Forces in the State-society
Interactive Framework.

Some might agree with Lau’s (2012, 7) view that part of

the governance crises in post-1997 Hong Kong are framed or facilitated by the
oppositions in response to the non-democratic political system.

However, most of

the respondents in the current study, regardless of their political orientation, thought
that crises are not created by the public or the public trouble-makers.

Rather, the

politicization of an issue into a crisis is a strategy to press the government, given that
the Hong Kong has yet to implement universal suffrage, and the government is, to a
large extent, not responsible to the public.

4.7 The Catalytic Effect of Crisis
Another major finding from the interviews contributes to the formulation of a major
component of the Interactive Framework: the Catalytic Effect of Crisis.
Respondent C was the first interviewee to mention the word “catalyse”, saying that
catalyser is a critical event that would seriously attack the status quo when there is
severe public dissatisfaction.

The catalyser might not be directly related to a

specific crisis, but is a combination of different issues.

“You cannot know whether this issue will become ‘big’, but you need to
try until you succeed… You need to wait for a critical point to build it up
[into a social crisis].” (Respondent C)
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Similar to the usage of disease-as-war languages by some scholars in studying health
crises (Baehr 2006, 42; Sontag 1999), for the Pan-democrats, catalyser is a critical
moment that leads to significant changes, be it a great step in pushing forward an
issue or a fissure of government in the battle of crisis politics.
situation, the Pro-establishments used the word “bottom line”.

To express a similar
As part of a loose

alliance40 with the government, their reactions could be used to assess the presence
of the Catalytic Effect of Crisis.

“If the bottom line were reached… using NGOs or “satellite
organizations” [instead of the party itself], voicing out and imposing
political pressure on the government would be a feasible alternative.”
(Respondent E)

There is a Chinese saying - “look on with folded arms” (in Chinese: 袖手旁觀; xiu
shou pang guan).

If the catalytic effect appears, the cooperative partnership

between the Pro-establishment parties and the government would be suspended.

As

Respondent F said, if the public opinion were too strong, the Pro-establishment camp
would become hesitant on whether they should still side with the government.

In

general, the Pro-establishments would support the government through different
means (e.g., distributing leaflets or explaining for the government publicly) when
there are controversies.

However, due to the political reality, especially on election

concerns, this support is not a guarantee.

“For sure we should ‘sustain the right and blame the wrong’ (in Chinese:
是 其 是 ， 非 其 非 ; shi qi shi, fei qi fei)… we should remind the
government on their wrongdoings [when the political pressure is huge].”
(Respondent L)
40

Respondent E, from a Pro-establishment party, commented themselves as “Three-Not” – not a real
political party, not a loyal alliance, and not merely a pressure group.
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The identification and assessment of Catalytic Effect of Crisis is of vital importance
in the State-society Interactive Framework.

However, although “boiling water”

could be a metaphor for the catalytic effect, it is difficult to determine the exact point
of its occurrence, that is, the critical and irreversible point when public
dissatisfaction explodes, in an objective way.

An alternate method that could be

derived from the interviews is by observing the actions and reactions of the
Pro-establishment camp (i.e., political parties and mass media).

If catalytic effect is

activated, the Pro-establishment camp would probably withdraw their support for the
government and side with the mainstream public opinion due to different political
calculations.

How the catalytic effect works in the Interactive Framework
In the State-society Interactive Framework, the catalytic effect frames and upgrades a
governance crisis (provided that the most salient issue can always get immediate
response from the government) to government change.

As such, crisis can act as a

catalyser for reforms (Resodihardjo 2006, 203), social unrests and changes (Powers
and Gong 2008).

Public dissatisfaction accumulates due to different kinds of

government failure and grievances, until a level where any issue related to
government wrongdoing may easily become a catalyst for serious governance crisis.
Although the catalytic effect of crisis shares some characteristics with Kingdon’s
(1995, 165) and Keeler’s (1993) policy window, as both of them represent an
opportunity for change, they should be clearly differentiated. First, the catalyser
may not serve any particular public agenda, but is a trigger point that ignites different
sources of public dissatisfaction - a huge demonstration with a million participants
could be a catalyser, but the action (i.e., demonstration) itself might not be directly
associated with a particular social problem. Second, as compared to the policy
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entrepreneur in Kingdon’s (1995) model that does the coupling, in most cases,
different actors within the civil society would initiate the bottom-up crisis
management process.

They can be leaders of opposition parties, social activists, or

owners of major mass media companies.

The Catalytic Effect of Crisis is salient in directing government decision-making in
non-democratic regimes, as it can be a means to influence government decisions
normally unachievable through formal channels in the institution. There are two
levels of change that can be brought by the catalytic effect: The elementary level, in
which the government is willing to make a major change in the current policy
towards the issue(s) that caused the crisis, and the advanced level, where the
legitimacy of the government, a particular leader or even the whole regime is being
challenged. The concessions made by the provincial government on land sold after
the Siege of Wukan Village in Lufeng, China would fall in the former level whereas
the self-immolation Mohamed Bouazizi (a Tunisian street vendor) in protest of police
corruption and ill-treatment followed by the mass demonstration that overthrow
then-Tunisian President Ben Ali’s regime in Tunisia would fall in the latter.

Referring to Figure 4.1, the catalytic effect is represented by a dotted line, as it is not
necessarily present in every crisis.

It shares some features with Kingdon’s (1995)

policy window, as it is an opportunity that can appear and disappear suddenly. The
catalytic effect can to a large extent explain why some crises could “float” in the air
for a certain period of time, gained certain level of mass media coverage and
attention, but finally faded away.

In line with 't Hart and Boin’s (2001) typology on crisis development and termination
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patterns, the catalytic effect is relevant to the four types of crisis with varying speeds
of development and termination. Fast-burning implies that a crisis ends almost as
soon as it began, for instance, acute and decisive cases such as a plane hijack or
hostage-taking.

In this regard, using the 911 Incident as an example, the catalytic

effect was activated almost immediately, resulting in the War on the Taliban regime
in Afghanistan. A slow-burning crisis may take years to reach the status of crisis
and years to resolve.

For example, the spread of AIDS over the years is an

on-going crisis that would fade off in the future with breakthroughs in science and
medicine. Cathartic crises describes cases in which tensions are built up slowly
until a critical point (i.e., the occurrence of the catalytic effect), at which something
may snap or some parties decide to force a break through.

Long-shadow crisis can

be an incident that suddenly occurs and raises critical issues of a much wider scope
and significance. Sometimes, it can become a trigger point for a political crisis,
playing the same role as the catalytic effect.

Before moving on to the case studies, the research method and design for the current
study will be illustrated in the next chapter.

Specifically, discussion on, and

justification for, the research methods used (i.e., documentary and archival study,
in-depth interviews and media discourse analysis) and the research design of using
two case studies (i.e., the 1 July 2003 Demonstration and the Anti-High Speed
Railway Incident) will be briefly introduced and explained.
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CHAPTER FIVE: RESEARCH METHOD AND DESIGN

5.1

Research Methods

In describing social science research, King, Keohane, and Verba’s (1994, 4-5)
claimed that there is no fundamental difference between qualitative and quantitative
methods, as “both quantitative and qualitative research can be systematic and
scientific”, and suggested that, in general, qualitative research does not rely on
numerical measurement, as it “has tended to focus on one or a small number of cases,
to use intensive interviews or depth analysis of historical materials, to be discursive
in method, and to be concerned with a rounded or comprehensive account of some
event or unit”.

Qualitative analysis can be used to understand a process (Marshall

and Rossman 1999), and is in fact applied in numerous studies related to particular
events, decisions, and issues.

Examples include Kingdon’s (1995) influential

streams model in policymaking and Brandstrom and Kuipers’s (2003) studies on
political crises.

However, that is not to say that qualitative research is better than quantitative
research, or vice versa.

Instead, choosing amongst different research methods is a

matter of appropriateness, and is dependent on the research topic (Babbie 2007, 286).
Qualitative field research, as Babbie (2007, 287) pointed out, “is especially
appropriate to the study of those attitudes and behaviors best understood with their
natural setting, as opposed to the somewhat artificial settings of experiments and
surveys”.

Lofland and Lofland (1995, 101-113) considered field research a suitable

method for studying relationships (behavior appropriate to pairs or set of roles), and
therefore, an appropriate method for the study of state-society relationship.
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The current research is conducted mainly through qualitative methods supplemented
with quantitative data from newspaper discourse analyses.

The newspaper

discourse analysis intends to provide a multi-dimensional perspective on
understanding the crises events chosen as case studies in this research, with reference
to Lee and Chan’s (2011) study on the 1 July 2003 Demonstration, and serves to
testify the validity of the proposed State-society Interactive Framework.

As

different sources may lead to different interpretation of the data, this study also aims
to map a comprehensive picture of crises by integrating both research methods in
order to provide a foundation for the theoretical arguments.

5.1.1 Source of Data I: Documentation and Archival Records
In general, there are six major sources of evidence for conducting case study research,
including: 1) Documentation; 2) Archival records; 3) Interviews; 4) Direct
observations; 5) Participant-observation; and, 6) Physical artifacts (Yin 1994, 80).
Specifically, documentation and archival records41 share similar strengths on stable,
unobtrusive, exact, and broad coverage, and are thus united into the same category
for this study.

Hong Kong government is renowned for its transparency, and

government documents, including reports from different departments and committees,
press releases, and gazettes are available online.

Also, the Legislative Council

online archive provides helpful sources of data, such as minutes of meetings, draft
and amendments of the bills, and reports by the special committees.

41

Yin (1994: 81-83) defined “documentation” as data from letters, memoranda, agendas,
announcement, minutes, reports, administrative documents, and newspaper clippings, and “archival
records” as data from service records, organization records, maps, charts, and second-hand survey
data. Following this definition, some data in the current research may fall into both categories
concurrently, such as the investigation report by the Hospital Authority on the SARS incident was a
report (i.e., documentation) with organization charts and service records (i.e., archival records).
Thus, documentation and archival records are united into one category for easy understanding.
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Information and data related to the case studies in this study come from four sources
of documents and archival records: First, press releases from the Hong Kong SAR
Government, including transcripts of announcements and press conference from
specific government officials or bureaus, are very important source of data,
especially in Antony Leung’s Car-Gate Scandal.

Second, minutes and papers from

LegCo meetings provide valuable information, as the monitoring role of lawmakers,
to a large extent, forces the government to provide more details and materials on
specific issues.

Without the fruitful data from the LegCo, pattern-matching would

be difficult, if not impossible. Third, the setting up of investigation committees and
panels is a foreseeable consequence in the aftermath of crises, and their investigation
reports, such as the three SARS reports written by the HKSAR government, LegCo,
and Hospital Authority respectively, are valuable reference material.

Finally, a good

method of ensuring the validity of the data would be crosschecking with newspaper
coverage, since the role of the mass media is particularly important in the early
stages, when incidents are published and the politicization process starts (Brandstrom
and Kuipers 2003, 282).

Therefore, besides using data from the government,

articles and reports from different newspapers would be utilized to provide a better
understanding of the issues.

In this study, articles from one local English newspaper - South China Morning Post
(SCMP) and four local Chinese newspapers - Ming Pao, Oriental Daily, Wenweipo
and Apple Daily, are used as reference.

Past editions of these newspapers can be

found on Wise News, an online newspaper search engine available from the
electronic library of Lingnan University.

In addition, specific pieces of articles

from other newspapers will be cited if necessary.
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As mentioned in the literature review, mass media tend to “mediatize” a crisis in
three steps: Framing the issue, identifying the culprits, and addressing blames. This
is an unavoidable process in the political context of crisis management.
Considering the large numbers of media outlets in Hong Kong, it may be impractical
to analyze all media discourses for a crisis (Lee and Chan 2011, 67).

In their study

of media discourse on the 1 July 2003 Demonstration, Lee and Chan (2011) chose to
focus on newspapers, claiming that their reports are more valid as they “contain
richer and more detailed contents than television and radio newscasts, which are
much shorter in duration and thus provide fewer materials for analysis.”

C.-c. Lee

(2000) suggested that the local Chinese newspapers in Hong Kong can be divided
into several categories.

The first one is the elite-oriented newspapers, which

emphasize a sense of professionalism, and the traditions of objectivity and neutrality.
This is represented by Ming Pao in Lee and Chan’s (2011) study.

The authors

selected Wenweipo as the representative for the next category: Pro-Beijing
newspapers directly under the control of Chinese Communist Government.

The

final category contains several of the most popular newspapers in Hong Kong.
With their large number of readers, their approaches in reporting news could reflect
market reality, and to a large extent, represent their readers’ perceptions.

For this

category, Lee and Chan (2011) chose Oriental Daily, a pro-Beijing media due to the
background of its top management42, and Apple Daily, which is well-known for its
firm support of the Pan-Democrats, as well as the democratization of Hong Kong.

5.1.2 Source of Data II: Interviews
Field research is good for studying dynamic or rapidly changing situations (Singleton
42

The Oriental Daily is owned by the Ma family in Hong Kong, Ma Ching-kwan, the former
chairman of the company, was a member of Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference.
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and Straits 2005, 308), which are major characteristics of a crisis.

In this research,

apart from the documentation and archival records mentioned in the previous section,
data is collected through in-depth interviews with social activists, political party
members, and journalists. The advantage of using multiple sources of evidence is
that the validity and reliability of the case studies could be enhanced (Yin 1994, 90).
It should be made clearly at this point. The data collected from the interviews were
mainly used for the construction of the State-society Interactive Framework.

With a

view to gather as much data as possible, and to prevent any potential sensitivity
issues of the respondents, the interview questions (see Appendix III) mainly focus on
the overall crisis politics in Hong Kong.

The justification is that some of the

interviewees were employees of media companies or political parties, they may not
be in a good position to disclose the exact details and name of the persons who
involved in a particular crisis event.

Thus, asking them for their observations on

general crisis politics operates in Hong Kong would be more beneficial to current
study on theory construction. However, in certain possible circumstances, some
interviewees were feeling free to share their information which was relevant to my
case studies. The data collected may act as supplemental evidence to enrich the
research findings, and to verify documentary materials for the case studies.

Interviewees were selected on purpose based on snowball sampling.

In total, 17

respondents have been interviewed (please refer to Appendix II). Except the first
two pilot interviews (i.e., Respondents A and B), which provided insights and
directions for this research, all other interviews were recorded.

Following

Solinger’s (2006, 159) suggestions, the interviewer responsible for the in-depth
interviews should have a very clear understanding on the literature and documentary
materials, so that the respondents could gain awareness of the interviewer’s
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knowledge and preparation on the issue, which would facilitate the conversation
(Solinger 2006, 163).

The interviews continued until no significant findings could

be drawn from the new respondents.

To minimize the potential threats of selection bias and to ensure that they come from
different backgrounds and status, the profiles of the interviewees were pre-screened
according to three major requirements (Please see Appendix II for profiles of the
respondents).

First, social activists with and without political affiliation are both

included, on the assumption that there are strategic differences between the two, as
those who are members of political parties are either engaged in or aiming to enter
formal governmental institutions, such as District Council or Legislative Council,
and those with no party affiliation are mostly fighting for their interest outside the
institution (through demonstration), or acting as pressure groups to influence political
parties (through lobbying).

In this regard, two District Councillors, and one former

and one current member of the LegCo, one of whom is also currently a District
Councillor (that is, three District Councillors in total) were interviewed.

Second, to reflect the differences in roles and level of engagement in
decision-making in political parties, interviewees were selected from different
positions (level) within political parties, including those in leadership positions
(Chairperson or Vice-chairperson), and committee members or frontiers, such as
convener of regional committee or supervisor in the party’s district office.

Finally, interviewees from different political backgrounds were invited.

Among the

17 respondents, 10 are affiliated with a political party, with a ratio of 50:50 between
Pan-democrat and Pro-establishment.

In addition, four respondents are current or
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former journalists from the three largest news groups in Hong Kong.

It should be

noted that some of the respondents may have multiple identities. For example, a
former lawmaker can be currently a commentator and journalist.

Interviewing

respondents with a wide variety of experience is helpful for viewing an issue from
different angles and forming a comprehensive picture on crises, and these
respondents contributed hugely by suggesting alternate crisis management
perspectives.

Considering the fact that most of the respondents are elites with a relatively high
social status (e.g., LegCo member or well-known politicians), the interview
questions were drafted, and rundowns planned, based on the works of political
scientists who are experts in conducting elite interview such as Aberbach and
Rockman (2002), Berry (2002) and Leech (2002).

Following their advice on

question order, the usage of prompts, coding methods and issues on validity and
reliability in elite interviewing, a semi-structured interview was planned, with a basic
set of interview questions as listed in Appendix III.

5.1.3

Source of Data III: Media Discourse Analysis

Media discourse analysis is an important method useful in assessing the severity of
crises.

Altheide (2002) discussed the relationship between news and the

construction of crisis on the dimension of framing and creating fear, and suggested
six elements that need to be considered when conducting discourse analysis on news:

1)
2)
3)

A comprehensive information base that is readily accessible;
A rationale for comparative searching over time;
Enumerating shifts and trends;
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4)

Examining denotative and connotative shifts;

5)
6)

Combining words into meaningful patterns and themes; and,
Expanding patterns into other mass media and popular culture.

Media discourse analysis is also useful as an alternate source of data for assessing the
Strengthening Forces and Weakening Forces as suggested in the State-society
Interactive Framework.

In selecting among different possible methods, their ability

in analysing the interaction between the state and society, and also between the
Strengthening and Weakening Forces, are considered.

Obviously, the political

outcomes do not necessarily reflect the real performance of the government in certain
crises, as the identification of failure is not the recognition of a fact but a man-made
(i.e. mediatization) process (Edelman 1988). The three elements below should be
identified to apply the State-society Interactive Framework.

1)
2)
3)

Crisis management and its effectiveness: The action of the state
Politicization of a crisis: Reaction of the society to the crisis and to
the state
The existence (or not) of the Catalytic Effect of Crisis

It may be impractical to analyse all media discourses as there are large numbers of
media outlets all over the world.

One of the possible methods would be the media

discourse analysis that Lee and Chan (2011) conducted on the 1 July 2003
Demonstration in Hong Kong. The authors claimed this method to be more valid,
as they “contain richer and more detailed contents than television and radio
newscasts, which are much shorter in duration and thus provide less material for
analysis” (Lee and Chan 2011, 67).

In their study, Lee and Chan selected four local

newspapers (i.e. Apple Daily, Oriental Daily, Wenweipo and Ming Pao) according to
the categories they belonged to, as well as their political preferences as discussed.
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The first step of the analysis was a search of relevant newspaper articles through the
electronic news archive available from universities or public libraries.

By setting a

specific time frame, all news reports, editorials and commentaries bearing the
“keywords” were chosen for the analysis. The different newspapers chosen should
roughly represent the political domain in the society.

A crisis is divided into different time frames for conducting the newspaper discourse
analysis.

The results generated from different periods of time are compared with

reference to the three questions mentioned in Chapter Four (Section 4.4.1) to identify
the relationship between the Strengthening and Weakening Forces and the movement
between different crisis development levels (i.e., crisis, governance crisis, and
change), with special attention devoted to the presence (or not) of the catalytic effect.
Based on the results from newspaper discourse analysis on the case studies as
presented in the next chapter, the State-society Interactive Framework is applied to
analyze the two crisis events – the 1 July 2003 Demonstration and the Anti-High
Speed Railway Incident respectively.

5.2

Research Outline

As indicated in Table 5.1, the current research is conducted in four stages. Stage
One is literature review, which aims to review the most up-to-date research in the
field of crisis management, examine theoretical discussion by different scholars, and
identify major analytical approaches for case studies. Moreover, as the focus of this
research is on the crisis management of Hong Kong SAR Government, local studies
on governance and crises are also revisited to illustrate the prospect of conducting
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crisis studies in Hong Kong.

Two parts of case studies, namely the 1 July 2003 Demonstration and Anti-High
Speed Railway Incident, are addressed in Stage Two.

With reference to the

documentary and archival studies and data from interviews, the pattern-matching
strategy is adopted to identify the research gap and justify for the need for
introducing a new approach.

Stage Three details the development of the Framework, from identifying the
limitation of current theories in explaining the Hong Kong cases, to constructing the
Framework with reference to original data drawn from the interviews.

In the final stage, the case studies are analyzed again using the new State-society
Interactive Framework, with results from newspaper discourse analyses serving as
evidence to testify and enhance its validity.

Apart from making theoretical

innovation, the interview data also provides insights for understanding the crisis
provoking politics in Hong Kong.
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Stage 1:

Stage 2:

Literature Review

Case Study

Aims:
- Review crisis management literature,
models, approaches, etc.
- Identify major analytical approaches
for conducting case studies
- Illustrate the prospect of crisis studies
in Hong Kong
- Identify room for further theoretical

Aims:
- Apply the analytical approaches to
Hong Kong cases
- Identify their strengths and weaknesses
from case studies
- Pattern-matching
- Identify the gap and the need for a new
approach

development
Research activities / sources of data:
- Literature review on crisis
management
- Literature review on HK studies

Research activities / sources of data:
- Archival studies
- Newspapers analysis
- Interviews (supplementary)

Stage 3:
Constructing the new approach

Stage 4:
Applying the new approach

Aims:
- Analyse the research findings
- Introduce the State-society Interactive

Aims:
- Operationalize the State-society
Interactive Framework

Framework
- Comprehend the details of the
approach
- Discuss the major theoretical
contributions to the field

- Testify the applicability of the
State-society Interactive Framework on
case studies
- Identify limitations and suggest
avenues for future research

Research activities / sources of data:
- Model building
- Interviews (major)

Research activities / sources of data:
- Archival and Documentary studies
- Newspapers discourse analysis

Table 5.1 Four stages of this research

5.3 Research Design: Case Study
Case study is one of the most popular research strategies used in social science
research. As stated by Yin (1994, 1), “case studies are the preferred strategy when
‘how’ and ‘why’ questions are being posed, when the investigator has little control
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over events, and when focus is on a contemporary phenomenon within some real-life
context.” Consider the current study, in which the major research question is: “How
much can the current crisis management theories, which are developed based on the
western democratic system, illustrate the crisis politics in Hong Kong, where full
democracy is absent?

Why can (or can’t) they?”, and the focus of investigation is

on contemporary crises in the real-life context.

According to Yin (1994), case study

would be the best choice.

George and Bennett (2005, 19-21) identified four major strengths of using the case
study method.

First, high levels of conceptual validity can be achieved while

identifying and measuring the indicators that best represent the theoretical concepts.
Second, this method has great advantages in the “heuristic identification of new
variables and hypotheses through the study of deviant or outlier cases and in the
course of field work” (George and Bennett 2005, 20). Third, the development
process of causal mechanisms in individual case can be examined comprehensively.
Fourth, case study is able to model and assess complex causal relations, such as
complex interactions effects.

This is highly relevant to the State-society Interactive

Framework, which describes the interactions between different stakeholders during
crises in Post-1997 Hong Kong.

5.3.1

Case Study and Theory Development

Theory development is an essential step in designing a case study (Yin 1994, 27), as
it provides a “sufficient blueprint” (Yin 1994, 28) for study. Sometimes, theory
development can be difficult when existing works provide rich theoretical framework.
However, for some other topics, the existing knowledge base may be insufficient, as
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the current literature provides no or little conceptual framework (Ibid).

The

condition for crisis management study in the current research is located in the middle
of these two extremes, and thus, is rather complicated.

As discussed in the

literature review, current crisis management theories were developed mainly based
on the western democratic system.

Therefore, the applicability of these theories to a

limited democracy, as in the case of Hong Kong, is questionable.

In this situation,

the case studies adopted in this research can serve as a basis for enriching the theory
of crisis management through “analytical generalization”, defined by Yin (1994, 31)
as a method “in which a previously developed theory is used as a template with
which to compare the empirical results of the case study”.

Eisenhardt (1989, 548) praised the strengths of theories developed from case study
research, such as “novelty, testability, and empirical validity, which arise from the
intimate linkage with empirical evidence”, and mentioned that case selection is an
extremely important task for a successful and influential case study, as “strong
studies are those which present interesting or frame-breaking theories which meet the
tests of good theory or concept development and are grounded in convincing
evidence” (Eisenhardt 1989, 549).

5.3.2

Pattern-Matching: Developing a New Approach

The pattern-matching strategy is adopted in this study to develop the State-society
Interactive Framework.

Pattern-matching is a logic that compares an

empirically-based pattern with a predicted one (Yin 1994, 106).

Referring to

Trochim’s (Trochim 1989, 355) basic pattern-matching model in Figure 5.1,
pattern-matching basically involves the specification of a theoretical pattern, the
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researching of an observed pattern, and an effort to match these two.

Figure 5.1 The basic pattern-matching model (Trochim 1989, 356)

If the observation realm and the theoretical realm were matched, the validity of the
study would be enhanced, providing a stronger basis for theoretical influence
Trochim’s (1989, 355).

In contrast, if the results acquired do not match the

theoretic patterns, the variable becomes nonequivalent.

This implies that the initial

theory proposition is to be questioned (Yin 1994, 107).

The current study also

utilizes pattern-matching process by applying the current crisis management
approaches (i.e. Leadership and Politicization Approaches) into the case studies, and
the results are unsatisfactory, as deviation exists between the observed realm and
theoretical realm (as detailed in Chapter Six).
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Therefore, based on the theory

development and pattern-matching strategies as discussed, the State-society
Interactive Framework is developed with the aim to connect the missing links in
current literature.

5.4

Case Selection

Four crisis cases leading to two major crisis events - the 1 July 2003 Demonstration
and the Anti-High Speed Railway Incident in late 2009 - are selected for case study.
As suggested by scholars and commentators, the 2003 Demonstration is a result of a
number of government failures and crises that had happened before the rally (J.
Cheng 2005, A. Cheung 2005a, 2005b, Wong and Wan 2005).

The conventional

crisis management approaches were mostly event-based, meaning each case study
focused on one single crisis event.

However, since the State-society Interactive

Framework emphasizes on the development of crisis provoking politics, a
comprehensive study on crises with different natures that might have led to a single
crisis event is conducted in the current study.

Specifically, when studying the

historic crisis event of the 500,000-people demonstration on 1 July 2003, the
following incidents could not be ignored: 1) Antony Leung’s car gate scandal; 2) the
SARS crisis; and, 3) the controversy on the legislation of Article 23 of the Basic Law
regarding the National Security Ordinance.

The 2003 Demonstration and Anti-High Speed Railway Incident are chosen for two
reasons.

First, these cases are helpful in explaining the proposed “Catalytic Effect

of Crisis”, as the 2003 Demonstration was stated by many as a result of the many
different crises that threatened the poor governance of then - CE Tung Chee-hwa’s
administration, and, while the Anti-High Speed Railway Incident was a single and
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unique incident with clear goals and objectives, there should be opportunities or
timing for creating a critical moment for a complex crisis or single crisis. Second,
Article 23 of the Basic Law and the construction of the High Speed Railway were
related to legislation and government policy respectively. The withdrawal of the
legislation of Article 23 was undoubtedly the consequence of the half-a-million
people protest.

However, from a civil society development perspective, the

Anti-High Speed Railway movement was a successful and well-organized social
movement, despite the fact that no government concession was observed.

As

discussed in the literature review, the role of social activists in governance crisis is
often neglected in conventional crisis management studies.

Case Study Arrangement for
Leadership and Politicization
Approach

Case Study Arrangement for
State-society Interactive Framework

1.

Antony Leung’s Car Gate Scandal

2.

SARS Outbreak

3.

Article 23 Controversy: The
triggering event of the 1 July
Demonstration 2003

1.

1 July 2003 Demonstration

4.

Anti-High Speed Railway Incident

2.

Anti-High Speed Railway Incident

Table 5.2 Case Selection

As outlined in Table 5.2, three incidents were identified as precursors to the 1 July
2003 Demonstration.

In the following chapters, the Leadership Approach and

Politicization Approach are first applied to the three incidents, in addition to the
Anti-High Speed Railway Incident, to analyze the strengths and weaknesses of both
approaches in illustrating the crisis politics in Hong Kong. The pattern-matching
strategy is adopted with two main focuses:

First, to determine whether both

approaches work well in explaining different types of crises, including political
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scandal, man-facilitated crisis on disease, and policy failure, and second, to
investigate whether there are cases in which existing theories are violated or are
inapplicable.

This is followed by an analysis on the four events using the

State-society Interactive Framework to provide a comprehensive account of the
social crisis which will be appeared in Chapter Nine.
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CASE STUDY PART I: 1 JULY 2003 DEMONSTRATION
1 July 2003 was a remarkable day in Hong Kong history.

Half-a-million people

marched onto the streets, peacefully protesting the poor governance of then-CE Tung
Chee-hwa’s administration since 1997. The implication of this rally is far-reaching
and long-lasting - it was said to be the watershed of Hong Kong civil society
development (Chan and Chan 2007), since after this demonstration, the entire
political atmosphere of Hong Kong has changed dramatically, especially for the
Hong Kong – CPG relationship, as the Hong Kong crisis has become an important
issue in the eyes of Beijing (J. Cheng 2005).

Underlying cause – Economic Depression since the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis
The poor economic environment after the handover was an underlying cause of the
2003 Protest which can be dated back to the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis.

In fact,

during the first six years of HKSAR, Hong Kong economy had experienced three
“plightful waves” (Ng and Ip 2005, 381).

The currency attacks in Hong Kong

during the Asian Financial Crisis were named as the single most important economic
event in Post-1997 Hong Kong (F. Lui 2002, 243).

At the same time, stock prices

in Hong Kong Stock Exchange had dropped dramatically for 60% from the peak in
August 1997 to the bottom twelve months later.

The second wave followed the

American led global recession in the wake of the collapse of the “new economy”
bubble and the 9/11 episode in 2001 and the third wave was brought by SARS in
2003.

Under these circumstances, the economy of Hong Kong was in great depression.
could be reflected by the increases in employment rate of Hong Kong.
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It
The

unemployment rate was over 6% in 2002 and hit the peak of 8.8% in July 2003.
“Hong Kong workers became obsessed with employment and job insecurity as the
number of business closures and failures, downsizing and staff cutbacks multiples”
(Ng and Ip 2005, 381).

The public dissatisfaction on the poor economy has been

transformed to political pressure towards the SAR Government.

Except the economic factor, many reasons have been cited to account for the
outbreak of 2003 rally, including, but not limited, to the poor leadership of Tung in
his first term of office (1997-2002), (J. Cheng 2005), the dynamic relationship
between Hong Kong and Beijing (A. Cheung 2005a), the poor crisis management
skills of the government in dealing with various crises since late 2002 (A. Cheung
2005a), and the institutional failure of the newly-implemented Principal Official
Accountability System (POAS) (A. Cheung 2005b, Wong and Wan 2005).

In

addition to discovering the reasons, it is of interest to adopt different crisis
management approaches, as discussed in previous chapters, to analyze this historic
event. As mentioned previously, the aim of the crisis management models is not to
judge whether the government is performing efficiently or not, but to investigate the
action and reaction of different non-state actors, especially on how their
performances affect the outcomes.

In this Case Study Part I, the three events identified as the major reasons leading to
the 1 July 2003 Demonstration – the ultimate governance crisis – are discussed.
First, the Car-Gate Scandal of Antony Leung, then-Financial Secretary, was an
incident that hurt the confidence of the people in the then-newly-introduced POAS
(A. Cheung 2005b), and his resignation was regarded as a direct result of the huge
demonstration.

The controversy related to the legislation of Article 23 of the Basic
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Law regarding national security was another important element leading to the rally,
and was eventually deemed a policy failure as the bill was withdrawn by Tung a
week after the demonstration.

In addition to these two man-made crises, the

outbreak of the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) in early 2003 was a
grave public health incident that took the lives of about 300 Hong Kong people and
caused billions of dollars in economic losses as a result of the travel warning issued
by the World Health Organization.

The next four chapters (Chapters Six to Nine) cover Case Study Part I, with Chapters
Six to Eight being the case study of the three crisis events mentioned.

In each

chapter, news reports of the events are first presented in order to demonstrate the
development of the events.

Next, by applying the Leadership Approach and

Politicization Approach, the comprehensiveness and applicability of these two
western crisis management approaches in Hong Kong context is analyzed, along with
a brief summary concluding the major observations.

After the individual case

studies, a comprehensive analysis of the 2003 Demonstration is given in Chapter
Nine by applying the State-society Interactive Framework.
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CHAPTER SIX: ANTONY LEUNG’S CAR-GATE SCANDAL

6.1

Background

The scandal was first exposed by Apple Daily on 9 March 2003, a few days after the
annual budget speech on 5 March, in which an increase in vehicle first registration
tax was announced. On the headline, Apple Daily disclosed that then-Financial
Secretary Antony Leung had acquired a new Lexus in January 2003, when he was
preparing the budget speech.

Days before the exposure, Apple Daily reporters had

asked the news secretary of the Financial Secretary regarding the car purchase, and
received the following feedback: 1) The Financial Secretary confirmed that he had
bought a Lexus in January; 2) the new car was purchased in expectation of his
new-born baby; and, 3) the tax difference before and after the tax increment was
around $50,000 (Apple Daily, 9 March 2003).

On the same day, Leung made a

short announcement in front of the media, and agreed to donate $100,000, which he
believed was twice the amount of the tax difference, to charity.

“In hindsight, I should have avoided suspicion on conflict of interest, and
should not buy a new car before the potential tax adjustment. However,
I really needed a car and had not meant for tax avoidance.” (Financial
Secretary’s Q&A Transcript, Government Press Release, 9 March 2003)

Leung’s short explanation and his donation proved unsuccessful in curbing the
spread of the scandal, and the public was waiting for then-CE Tung Chee-hwa’s
response.

A day later, on 10 March, Tung made a short statement stating that he

believed that Leung did not have any intention to make personal gain, although the
issue appeared to be a conflict of interest.
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“I believe that he did not do it for personal gain, it is not deliberately
done for gains. I have asked again and again all my colleagues in the
Government when it comes to issues of conflict of interest, we need to be
whiter than white, apply the highest standard of oneself.” (CE’s
Transcript, Government Press Release, 10 March 2003)

On the same day, a car dealer claimed that the real tax difference should be $190,000
instead of the $50,000 claimed by Leung, and Leung increased his charity donation
to $380,000 (double the amount of the new tax difference) accordingly.

After a few days’ investigation, the Chief Executive sent a public letter to Leung
regarding his scandal.

In the letter, Tung admitted that Leung’s car purchase before

the tax increase “would inevitably arouse public suspicion of conflict of interest”
(The Office of the CE, 15 March 2003), and Leung’s action had breached Sections
5.1 and 5.443 of the Code for Principal Officials under the Accountability System.
However, Tung accepted Leung’s explanation that the incident was just an oversight,
and that he had no intention to evade the tax liability. Furthermore, Tung also
disclosed that Leung had made a resignation on 10 March 2003, which Tung did not
accept, but instead reprimanded him with a formal criticism (Perceived Conflict of
Interest in Your Purchase of a Car, The Chief Executive’s Office, 15 March 2003).

According to some local newspapers (Apple Daily, Ming Pao, 16 March 2003), in the
Executive Council (ExCo) meeting on 5 March 2003, Yeoh Eng-kiong,
then-Secretary for Health, Welfare and Food, made a declaration that he had ordered
a car in January, which was confirmed by the government on 18 March 2003.
43

This

Section 5.1 of the Code for Principal Official stated that “Politically appointed officials shall avoid
putting themselves in a position where they might arouse any suspicion of dishonesty, unfairness or
conflict of interest”, while Section 5.4 stated that “Politically appointed officials shall report to the
Chief Executive any private interests that might influence, or appear to influence, their judgment in
the performance of their duties” (Constitutional Affairs Bureau, 2002).
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brought further criticism on Leung, as it implied that his “oversight” was no longer
convincing.

As a result, some Pan-democrat lawmakers asked for Leung’s

resignation.

However, efforts to push Leung out of office were not fruitful.

In the Legislative

Council, there was a move to press the Chief Executive for an independent inquiry in
March, a move to authorize the use of Legislative Council (Powers and Privileges)
Ordinance to investigate Leung’s case in April, and a motion of no confidence on
Leung in May, all of which were defeated by the majority (Please refer to Table 6.1
for the timeline of the scandal). As time elapsed, the scandal was no longer a
headliner, and the pressure on Leung to step-down was apparently relaxed until the 1
July 2003 Demonstration. Soon after the rally, in mid-July, Leung resigned.

Table 6.1 Chronology of Antony Leung’s Car-Gate Scandal
Date
9 March 2003

Events
Apple Daily exposed the scandal.
Antony Leung spoke to the media and offered to donate $100,000,
which he believed was twice the amount of the tax difference, to
charity

10 March 2003

CE Tung Chee-hwa admonished Leung publicly through mass media.
Car dealer made a call to a radio phone-in program to report that Leung
had actually saved $190,000 on tax. Afterward, Leung raised his
donation to 380,000 to charity.

15 March 2003

Leung received a letter from Tung saying that the mistake warranted a
formal criticism but not a resignation.

Leung admitted that he had

offered to resign if necessary on 10 March 2003, but he withdrew his
offer and made a public apology.
16 March 2003

Newspaper reported that Yeoh Eng-kiong, then-Secretary for Health,
Welfare and Food, had declared that he had ordered a car in January in
the ExCo meeting on 5 March 2003 (Budget Day).

17 March 2003

LegCo discussed the issue. Leung was invited to testify.
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18 March 2003

The government confirmed that Yeoh had made a declaration during the
5 March 2003 ExCo meeting.

21 March 2003

A move to press Chief Executive for an independent inquiry into the
controversy was blocked.

9 April 2003

A move to authorize the use of Legislative Council (Powers and
Privileges) Ordinance to investigate Leung’s case was defeated.

7 May 2003

A no-confidence motion on Leung was defeated by the LegCo.

16 July 2003

Leung resigned.

Sources:

Data from local newspapers, HKSAR Government Press Releases, LegCo minutes
and reports

6.2

Leadership Approach Analysis

Sense-Making
Sense-making is to grasp crisis as it unfolds (Boin, 't Hart and Stern, et al. 2005).

In

the Car-Gate scandal, there were two chances for the early recognition of crisis.
First, Leung should bear the sole responsibility of being aware of a potential conflict
of interest. However, he failed to reveal any information about his car purchase
until the incident was exposed as a scandal by a newspaper. Second, Apple Daily
reporters had enquired Leung’s news secretary, Raymond Tam Chi-yuen, about
Leung’s new car purchase a few days before the scandal made the headline.
Therefore, it is important to understand whether Tam and Leung understood the
seriousness and the political sensitivity of the issue.

According to various sources of data, including the explanation made by Leung
himself in the LegCo meeting, Leung did not recognize the possibility of conflict of
interest between his car purchase and the first registration tax increase he proposed in
the budget.

He even claimed that his intention was to absolutely separate his

private life and his public duty (LC Paper No. CB(2)1819/02-03).
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On the other

hand, when Tam reported to Leung about the enquires from mass media, Leung
asked Tam to reply to them as follows: 1) He did buy a new Lexus in January; 2) he
bought the car for his new-born baby; and, 3) there was a $50,000 tax difference
(Apple Daily, 9 March 2003).

On 9 March 2003, Apple Daily made the scandal a

headliner, and the Car-Gate scandal officially became a crisis and “made a sense”.

Decision-Making
The decision-making body of this scandal was precise and clear: Leung, Tung, and
Tung’s cabinet. The decision-making process was relative simple for a political
scandal, with two main concerns as follows: First, the relationship between Leung’s
car purchase and his decision to increase the vehicle first registration tax.

As a

senior financial official, Leung was responsible for the fiscal policy of Hong Kong,
and should foresee the financial policies of the city.

Apart from the potential

conflict of interest, the extent to which he had violated the Code for Principal
Official under the Accountability System was also questioned by the public.
Besides, the level of “punishment” imposed by Tung was a concern.

According to

the POAS, political appointees are directly accountable to the Chief Executive, and
the supervisor-subordinate relationship was clear and well-perceived by the general
public. Therefore, any decision made by Tung regarding Leung could be regarded
as an important crisis management decision, as Leung had already admitted that his
actions were inappropriate in this case.

Meaning-Making
Political communication was crucial to the management of this crisis.

Nevertheless,

under the Leadership Approach, the decision on what information was to be released
to the media was mainly a top-down process.
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In this case, creditability was

important (Boin, 't Hart and Stern, et al. 2005), as this is the core value for senior
government officials who are politically appointed.

On studying the responses from

Leung and Tung, some important “meaning” can be discovered.
claimed that his aim was not to evade tax.

First, Leung

This response can be deliberated as

follows: 1) He was willing to “compensate” for the tax difference (by making a
donation of $100,000, and later $380,000, to charity).

He made the decision

instantly, and he asked his news secretary, Raymond Tam, to emphasize the increase
in the amount of money he was willing to donate, and to remind the mass media to
take note of this (LC Paper No. CB(2)1819/02-03). 2) He bought the new car for
his family.

He further emphasized that it was strictly bought for his new-born baby,

and with no intention of profit-making or tax evasion. This statement was the major
focus of Leung’s explanation, and was brought up in almost every occasion until
Leung resigned, either by Leung himself (Apple Daily 9 March 2003; Financial
Secretary’s Q&A Transcript, Government Press Release, 9 March 2003; LC Paper
No. CB(2)1819/02-03), or by Tung (CE’s Transcript, Government Press Release, 10
March 2003; Perceived Conflict of Interest in Your Purchase of a Car, The Chief
Executive’s Office, 15 March 2003).

The responses by Leung and Tung can be seen as an attempt to “frame” the scandal,
one of the three meaning-making strategies proposed by Boin, 't Hart, Stern, et al.’s
(2005).

In this case, Leung tried his best to frame his wrongdoings as an “oversight”

(Perceived Conflict of Interest in Your Purchase of a Car, The Chief Executive’s
Office, 15 March 2003), stating reasons such as carelessness, political insensitivity,
and no intention to evade tax.
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Terminating
Regarding the termination of a political scandal, political closure, despite the
uncertainty in its effect, usually draws the most attention.

In this case, there were

two major junctures that could be identified as (intended) political closure.

The

“formal criticism” (Perceived Conflict of Interest in Your Purchase of a Car, The
Chief Executive’s Office, 15 March 2003) made by Tung on Leung after the
investigation, and Leung’s public apology (The Financial Secretary’s Statement on
the Purchase of a New Car, 15 March 2003) could be the first intended political
closure aimed at resolving the crisis.

However, the criticism was not well-received

by the public, especially after Yeoh Eng-kiong declaration was exposed one day later
(i.e. 16 March). The second political closure could be after the defeat in LegCo of
the three moves related to this scandal, namely, the move to press Chief Executive
for an independent inquiry into the controversy (on 21 March), the move to authorize
the use of Legislative Council (Powers and Privileges) Ordinance to investigate the
case (on 9 April), and a motion of no-confidence on Leung (on 7 May).

The defeat

of these three moves could also be regarded as an operational closure, as there was
no way to blame Leung within the political arena.

In fact, the ICAC was carrying

out an investigation of the case at that time, but the Judiciary decided not to press
charges on Leung.

The final closure of the crisis came as Leung eventually had

resigned in July.

Learning
According to convention wisdom, people should learn a lesson from previous
mistake. However, the learning process of leaders could be internal and might not
be observable.

Since Leung explained his wrongdoings as an “oversight”, the

principal government officials should have learnt to be more careful and be more
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politically sensitive.
However, although the “Twelve-month Report on Implementation of the
Accountability System for Principal Officials” (Constitutional Affairs Bureau 2003),
did mention “The Car Purchase Incident” and make a point on the issue of conflict of
interest, it seemed to be defending, rather than discovering problems related to, the
POAS.

As stated in the Report, the Principal Official (i.e., Leung) was “prepared to

bear the political responsibility and apologized to the public” (Constitutional Affairs
Bureau 2003).

He had “acted in a manner which is consistent with their role as

politically-appointed officials” (Constitutional Affairs Bureau 2003).

Also, “the

Code for Principal Officials under the Accountability System has been accepted by
the public as the basis for measuring the behavior and conduct of Principal Officials
against public expectations.

The Code serves as a useful yardstick for all concerned”

(Constitutional Affairs Bureau 2003).

Considering this, from an institutional

perspective, the government seemed to have learnt nothing from this crisis.

However, from the public perspective, the Leung’s case has “sensitized the public to
conflict of interest issues and to unethical practices beyond traditional concerns with
bribery and embezzlement and the abuse of public office” (Scott and Leung 2012, 43)
in which to some extent has drawn the public attention onto the integrity issue of
public officials.

In fact, a number of former and current government officials has

been involved into different scandal that related to conflict of interest such as Leung
Chin-man, a former Director of Housing, accepted a post-public appointment to a
development company with which he had been accused as receiving potential
“delayed benefit” in 2008.

The increase of public awareness on integrity issue can

be regarded as another form of post-crisis learning process.
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6.3

Politicization Approach Analysis

Constructing Severity
In constructing severity, the major concern is whether the core values of the public
had been violated (Brandstrom and Kuipers 2003).

In the Car-Gate scandal, Leung,

as a senior government official and a political appointee under the POAS, was faced
with two serious allegations related to core public values: Conflict of interest and the
integrity of a principal official. This could explain why the case soon became the
hottest topic in town through reports by mass media and inquiries from lawmakers.

Constructing Agency
Recall that a crisis can be framed either a stand-alone, ad hoc disturbance in a system,
or a symptom of a much larger systematic failure (Brandstrom and Kuipers 2003).
How the crisis is framed would affect the direction of movement onto the next
dimension (i.e., responsibility dimension).

Although it is difficult to make a

judgment, Leung’s case was apparently an ad hoc incident, especially since no
similar incidents were seen afterwards.

However, “going back to the history”

(Brandstrom and Kuipers 2003) showed that the case was more likely to be a
“symptom”, as LegCo reports on the scandal showed that the discussion on
reviewing the vehicle first registration tax was already in progress since July 2001,
long before Leung became the FS (IN16/02-03, LegCo Secretariat 2003).

Constructing Responsibility
In this dimension, a crisis can be framed as either an actor failure or a network failure.
At first sight, the Car-Gate scandal seemed to be the failure of an individual
policy-maker – Leung himself. However, as C.-y.Cheung (2005) argued, Leung
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and Tung seemed to interpret the Code 44 differently in the very beginning.
Specifically, Leung’s immediate resignation indicated that he believed his failure was
serious enough to warrant the consideration of ministerial dismissal.

However,

Tung’s public letter45 indicated that he thought a formal criticism was enough, and
expected only a public apology, rather than resignation, from Leung.

It was not

until after the 2003 Demonstration that Tung changed his mind and accepted Leung’s
resignation on 16 July 2003.

As a result of this, A. Cheung (2005a) argued that the

POAS fell short of the requirements to take accountability seriously, and there was a
grey area between actor failure and network failure, as they were not mutually
exclusive.

6.4

Summary

There were both strengths and weaknesses in applying the Leadership Approach and
Politicization Approach on the Car-Gate Scandal.

Using the Leadership Approach,

due to the nature of Car-Gate as a political scandal, sense-making and
decision-making were clear and could be easily identified. The headline of the 9
March 2003 edition of Apple Daily was the prelude of Leung’s scandal, and the
decision-making body was rather small and concentrated, probably consisting of
Leung, Tung, a few members in Tung’s cabinet, and their subordinates in a
supporting role.

The meaning-making and terminating processes, in contrast, were

relatively diverted.

Leung’s explanation of an “oversight” was not readily accepted

by the public in the meaning-making stage, and his survival in the motion of
no-confidence could not even be guaranteed if there were universal suffrage in the

44

Code for Principal Official under the Accountability System (Constitutional Affairs Bureau, 2002)
“Perceived Conflict of Interest in Your Purchase of a Car” (The Chief Executive’s Office, 15 March
2003)
45
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LegCo, as the public tended not to accept his explanation and apology (C.-y. Cheung
2005). Moreover, the terminating process, either operational or political, should be
questioned, as the resignation of Leung (16 July 2003) came far later than the time
his scandal was being made a sense.

Instead, his resignation was generally

perceived as a direct result of the 1 July 2003 Demonstration.

Finally, in the

learning process, from the institutional perspective, the HKSAR Government seemed
to refuse to admit that Leung’s case was a failure of POAS.

Instead, the

Twelve-month Report of POAS 46 claimed that Leung was upholding political
responsibility under the POAS by resigning. Although it may be regarded political
“spin doctoring”, no significant reform was being made after the scandal.

Under the Politicization Approach, constructing severity was easily done.

The case

had been recognized as an issue of conflict of interest, and was related to the
integrity of a government official from the beginning. However, there were great
difficulties when constructing agency and responsibility, as it was hard to distinguish
whether the case was an incident or a symptom, an actor failure or a network failure.
As mentioned, when applied to real case examples, those dimensions of
Politicization Approach were not as straight forward as the two sides of a coin.

It

deserves further discussion in the research findings and discussion chapter.

In the next chapter, another important event that almost happened in the same time
with the Car-gate Scandal – the outbreak of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome
(SARS) will be discussed.

It was said to be one of the critical health crises

happened after the establishment of Hong Kong SAR.

46

“Twelve-month Report on Implementation of the Accountability System for Principal Officials”
(Constitutional Affairs Bureau 2003)
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CHAPTER SEVEN: THE SEVERE ACUTE RESPIRATORY
SYNDROME (SARS) EPIDEMIC

7.1

Background

The Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) was a centennial disease that
threatened the world.

According to the World Health Organization (WHO), SARS

killed 774 people around the world, with 299, or nearly 40%, of them Hong Kong
citizens.

Table 7.1 Summary of probable SARS cases with onset of illness
(1 November 2002 to 31 July 2003)
Areas

No. of
cases

No. of
deaths

Onset date (First
probable case)

Onset date (Last
probable case)

Mainland China

5327

349

16 Nov 2002

3 Jun 2003

Hong Kong SAR

1755

299

15 Feb 2003

31 May 2003

World total

8096

774

Source:

World Health Organization (Updated 21 April 2004)
http://www.who.int/csr/sars/country/table2004_04_21/en/index.html

The SARS outbreak was a serious public health threat to Hong Kong, as the disease
was entirely new to the medical arena, even without a formal name (simply called
Atypical Pneumonia from late 2002 to early 2003) at the very beginning, was
fast-spreading, and had a high fatality ratio47. The SARS epidemic originated in the
Guangdong Province, and caught the attention of the mass media in Hong Kong in
February 2003.

The outbreak reached Hong Kong in late February 2003, and

continued until mid-June, when World Health Organization declared Hong Kong as

47

According to the WHO (2004), the fatality ratio of SARS in HKSAR was 17%, even higher than
that in Mainland China (7%). Also, Hong Kong’s ratio was the highest in the world (along with
Canada), except for those areas with a small number of cases (<10).
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SARS-free.

Table 6.2 shows a brief chronology of the SARS Epidemic in Hong

Kong for easy reference.

After the SARS outbreak, three major investigation reports were conducted by the
SARS Expert Committee appointed by the government (the “Expert Report”), the
Legislative Council (the “LegCo Report”), and the Hospital Authority (the “HA
Report”) respectively 48 .

The reports provided a detailed and comprehensive

account and analysis on each response taken by the government, especially the
different medical decisions made by the Hospital Authority.

It is not the aim of the current research to provide an alternate report on the SARS
outbreak, nor to provide a professional account from a medical perspective.

Instead,

it is to test the applicability of the two crisis management approaches in explaining
such a large-scale social crisis.

Since the following analyses are based on crisis

management theories, a sub-field under political science, details related to
professional judgments and medical decision made may not be included.

The

medical aspect of SARS could be found in the investigation report published by the
Hospital Authority.

Table 7.2 Chronology of the SARS Epidemic in Hong Kong
Date
23 January 2003

Events
Health authority in Guangdong Province of Mainland China
provided an expert investigation report on cases of atypical
pneumonia in the Province.

48

“SARS in Hong Kong : from Experience to Action” by SARS Expert Committee, HKSAR
Government (October, 2003), “Report of the Legislative Council Select Committee to inquire into the
handling of the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome outbreak by the Government and the Hospital
Authority” (July, 2004), and the “Report of the Hospital Authority Review Panel on the SARS
Outbreak” by the Hospital Authority (September, 2003)

160

10 February 2003

Local media began to report the atypical pneumonia outbreak in
Guangdong Province.

11 February 2003

Stand-up media briefed by Director of Health (DH), who also
issued press release on the Guangdong Province outbreak and
health advice, and made a copy to the Mainland health officials.

17 February 2003

A lady was admitted to the private Union Hospital after
returning to Hong Kong from a trip to Guangzhou. She was
later confirmed to be a SARS case in April.

21 February 2003

A professor from Guangzhou and his wife checked into Room
911 of Hotel M in Hong Kong and stayed for one night. He
was later found to be the source of SARS outbreak in Hotel M
and beyond.

22 February 2003

The professor from Guangzhou, who was suspected of severe
Community Atypical Pneumonia infection, was admitted to
Kwong Wah Hospital (KWH).

28 February 2003

A brother-in-law (a Hong Kong resident) of the professor was
admitted to KWH. He was later confirmed to be a SARS case.

4 March 2003

The Guangzhou professor died in KWH. His brother-in-law in
the same hospital was intubated and transferred to intensive care
unit.

12 March 2003

WHO issued global alert on cases of acute respiratory syndrome
in Vietnam, Hong Kong and Guangdong Province in China with
unknown aetiology that appeared to place health workers at
high risk.

15 March 2003

WHO named the illness Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome
(SARS), and listed its main symptoms and signs. WHO also
issued emergency travel advisory, but made no recommendation
to restrict travel to any destination.

25 March 2003

A high-level SARS Steering Committee, chaired by Chief
Executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and
included the relevant Principal Officials, was established to
steer Government response to the SARS epidemic.

29 March 2003

Classes were suspended in schools and childcare centers.

31 March 2003

213 residents of Amoy Gardens, 107 of whom living in Block
E, were admitted with suspected infection. DH ordered an
isolation of the whole of Block E for 10 days. DH also
appealed to residents who had moved out prior to the isolation
order to report to the Department.
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2 April 2003

WHO revised its advice to international travelers, and
recommended postponing all but essential travel to Hong Kong
and Guangdong Province.

19 April 2003

Government implemented a territory-wide cleansing day.

22 April 2003

Classes were resumed for secondary schools students in Form 3
or above.

23 May 2003

WHO lifted the travel advisory on Hong Kong.

28 May 2003

The Government announced the membership of the SARS
Expert Committee, with the task to review the management and
control of SARS outbreak in Hong Kong.

30 May 2003

HA announced membership of its Review Panel.

23 June 2003

WHO removed Hong Kong from the list of areas with local
transmission of SARS, and declared Hong Kong as SARS-free.

September 2003

The Report of the Hospital Authority Review Panel on the
SARS Outbreak was released

2 October 2003

The SARS Expert Report was released

October 2003

LegCo “Select Committee to inquire into the handling of the
Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome outbreak by the
Government and the Hospital Authority” was established under
the Legislative Council (Powers and Privileges) Ordinance.

July 2004

The Report of the Select Committee to inquire into the handling
of the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome outbreak by the
Government and the Hospital Authority was released.

8 July 2004

Yeoh Eng-kiong, then-Secretary for Health, Welfare and Food,
resigned on 8 July 2004 to take political responsibility over the
SARS outbreak.

Source:

“SARS in Hong Kong: from Experience to Action” by SARS Expert Committee,
HKSAR Government (October 2003), “Report of the Legislative Council Select
Committee to inquire into the handling of the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome
outbreak by the Government and the Hospital Authority” (July 2004), and the “Report of
the Hospital Authority Review Panel on the SARS Outbreak” by the Hospital Authority
(September 2003) and local newspapers.

7.2

Leadership Approach Analysis

Sense-Making
The sense-making process in SARS outbreak was blurred.
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In late 2002, there were

rumors about an unknown deadly disease spreading in Guangdong Province, and a
few newspapers reported the panic-buying of certain kinds of medicine or Chinese
herbs in order to prevent the disease, including “Rumors on virus spread Heyuan
people rushes to buy drugs” (Oriental Daily, 4 January 2003), and “Mysterious
pneumonia spreads in Zhongshan, strong infectious pneumonia without cure” (Ming
Pao Daily, 18 January 2003). According to the Expert Report and local newspaper
reports, reports of an “unusual epidemic of fatal pneumonia-like illness in the
Province” received a wide range of headline coverage on 10 February 2003 (Expert
Committee, 2003). Eventually, the crisis made a sense to the government on 10
February 2003:

“Acting on the media reports, the DH (Department of Health) in Hong
Kong telephoned on 10.2.03 health officials in the Municipal Health and
Antiepidemic Station of Guangzhou and the Director General of
Department of Health, Guangdong, but was unable to establish contact. A
letter enquiring about the reported outbreak was subsequently faxed to
both offices. This and follow-up phone calls went unanswered. The
Director of Health eventually approached the Ministry of Health in
Beijing for assistance…In Hong Kong, two key events happened on
11.2.03. First, in the late afternoon, the Director of Health, with the
information from Guangzhou and enquiry results in Hong Kong,
conducted a media briefing. She reassured the community that Hong
Kong had not identified any unusual pattern of influenza-like illness and
respiratory tract infection, including pneumonia, but that DH would be
monitoring the situation closely because of the pneumonia cases in
Guangdong Province. She also reminded the public to take steps to
prevent influenza during its peak season between January and March.
Second, HA head office established a working group to step up
surveillance of cases of pneumonia in public hospitals.” (Expert Report
Sections 3.2, 3.5-3.6, SARS Expert Committee, 2003)

At this stage, DH merely acknowledged that there was an unusual pattern of
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pneumonia infection in Guangzhou, meaning that the government had yet to
recognize the new disease as a (potential) public health crisis affecting Hong Kong.
The Expert Report reported a debate on whether there was a “community outbreak” in
mid-March 2003, since, as of 14 March 2003, Yeoh Eng-kiong, then-Secretary for
Health, Welfare and Food, still refused to admit that there was a community outbreak
of SARS outside of hospitals. The Expert Committee accepted that Yeoh’s discourse
was made due to “an outbreak of a new and unknown disease… The really difficult
challenge in such situations is how to convey messages in a way that is open, honest,
clear and sympathetic, and at the same time not likely to be proved wrong” (Expert
Report Section 4.23, SARS Expert Committee, 2003). Without commenting on the
accuracy of this statement, it was relevant to the frontline staff dilemma on crisis
recognition proposed by Boin, 't Hart, Stern, et al. (2005), as organizations are created
for routine but not crisis.

Finally, a high-level SARS Steering Committee involving

the relevant Principal Officials and chaired by Chief Executive was established on 25
March 2003 to steer Government response to the SARS epidemic (Expert Committee,
2003).

SARS had eventually become a public health crisis that was to be handled by

the top leader of Hong Kong – the Chief Executive.

The sense-making process of SARS epidemic could also be reflected in the alerts and
warnings issued by the WHO. According to the Expert Report, on 12 March 2003,
WHO issued global alert concerning cases of acute respiratory syndrome in Vietnam,
Hong Kong, and Guangdong Province in China.

The unknown aetiology appeared

to put health workers at high risk. On 15 March 2003, WHO named the disease
Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS), and listed its main symptoms and signs.
On the same day, WHO also issued an emergency travel advisory, but made no
recommendation to restrict travel to any specific locality.
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Finally, on 2 April 2003,

WHO revised its advice to international travelers and recommended postponing all
but essential travel to Hong Kong and Guangdong Province (SARS Expert
Committee, 2003).

The official announcements made by WHO were able to reflect

the level of seriousness of the epidemic, and at the same time indicated the outbreak
of the public health crisis of SARS from the local and global perspectives.

Decision-Making
As mentioned in the sense-making process, it was not until 25 March 2003, in the
middle stage of the SARS crisis, that the Chief Executive was formally involved in
the decision-making process.

In contrast, the LegCo Report and Expert Report

directed most doubts towards Yeoh, a political appointee under POAS, and Margret
Chan, then-Director of Health and a civil servant.

As stated in the Expert Report

(2003), the three main components in the public health infrastructure of Hong Kong
are the Health, Welfare and Food Bureau (HWFB), Department of Health, and
Hospital Authority (Figure 7.1).

As one of the departments under HWFB, the Department of Health (DH) is the health
adviser to the government and health advocate of the community, and DH is
responsible for executing health legislation and policy.

The role of DH “is to

safeguard the health of the community through promotive, preventive, curative and
rehabilitative services.” (Expert Report Section 2.18, SARS Expert Committee, 2003).
On the other hand, the Hospital Authority (HA), which reports directly to the
Secretary for Health, Welfare and Food (SHWF), is an independent statutory body
responsible for the provision of all public hospital services in Hong Kong.
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Figure 7.1 Organization Structure of the Health Care Delivery System in the
Public Sector in Hong Kong
(Source: SARS Expert Report, p. 9, SARS Expert Committee, 2003)

Theoretically, the changes in the commanding structure in the handling SARS
outbreak had, to some extent, posed new thoughts and challenges to the Leadership
Approach.

First of all, it should be acknowledged that the Expert Committee’s

concern on “who is leading”49 was absolutely important in the decision-making
process.

As Boin, 't Hart, Stern, et al. (2005) mentioned, the top leaders form small

decision groups to gather information and start coordinating the crisis response efforts.
During the SARS outbreak, certain “small groups” were formed for coordination.
As reported by the LegCo Report, “The HWFB Task Force chaired by DR YEOH was
established on 14 March 2003 to oversee the outbreak control measures taken by DH
and HA and to collate expert advice to facilitate the work of DH and HA” (LegCo
Report Section 14.7, LegCo, 2004). Under the Task Force, the Inter-departmental
Action Coordination Committee (IACC) chaired by the Permanent Secretary for
Health, Welfare and Food, Carrie Yau-Tsang was set up on 24 March 2003 to
49

As the Expert Report stated, “[i]t was not clear who was in overall charge of the outbreak… Within
the Hong Kong system, it is not clear who performs the function of “surgeon general” or “chief
medical officer”. In other words, who is the person responsible for giving professional advice to
SHWF and Government, and providing professional leadership, on public health and healthcare policy
matters?” (Expert Report Section 6 and 6.3, SARS Expert Committee, 2003).

166

coordinate efforts and resources from twenty five governmental departments and
bureaus and to implement SARS-related policy decisions and initiatives at the
operation level (LegCo, 2004). To a certain extent, the formation of the IACC
satisfied the argument of Boin, 't Hart, Stern, et al. (2005) on crisis management
network that a crisis could not be managed in a linear system from a single crisis
center.

In this case, the HWFB could be regarded as the center, while the IACC

formed a crisis management network to coordinate the different departments
concerned.

However, the delegation and decentralization processes during a crisis as suggested
by the Leadership Approach were not completely applicable in this case.
beginning, there was a clear division of labor between the HWFB and DH.

At the very
However,

as Yeoh told the LegCo Select Committee, “HWFB began to take on a more
participatory and direct role in assessing and managing the outbreak when the
number of persons infected continued to increase” (LegCo Report Section 14.8,
LegCo, 2004).

As the disease continued to spread rapidly, both centralization and

decentralization processes could be seen.

The centralization process continued until

the top leader of Hong Kong – the Chief Executive - formally took a leading role in
coordination:

“[A]s the magnitude of the SARS outbreak escalated and the social and
economic impact of the outbreak became more severe, issues which arose
in the decision-making processes required input from public officials
responsible for various policy areas. It was therefore necessary for a
forum of a level higher than that of the HWFB Task Force to be set up to
coordinate the Government’s overall response more effectively. On 25
March 2003, the Chief Executive set up and convened the first meeting
of the Chief Executive’s Steering Committee (CESC) for that purpose.
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The membership of CESC included the relevant Principal Officials”
(LegCo Report Section 14.7, LegCo, 2004).

As LegCo Report added, the “CESC took over the HWFB Task Force’s role as the
overall commanding body in steering the Government’s response to the SARS
epidemic” (LegCo Report Section 14.15, LegCo, 2004).

To conclude, delegation

and decentralization could be found in the commanding structure of the SARS
epidemic.

In real situations, top leaders may not always get involved at the very

beginning, and not until the crisis is severe enough.

In this case, the

decision-making process, to some extent, had interacted with the sense-making
process: The top leader did not handle the case from the first day.

But when the

crisis was being recognized as serious, the top leader would take charge.

Meaning-Making
The government’s intention to reduce public uncertainty caused by SARS was
obvious. The argument related to the definition of “community outbreak” was one
of the key issues being investigated in the Expert Report, as the situation turned very
bad two weeks50 after Yeoh claimed that “there is no pneumonia outbreak in Hong
Kong” (Transcript of Secretary for Health, Welfare and Food, 14 March 2003). The
Expert Committee accepted that the government “was genuinely intended to allay
public panic, but with hindsight, a more prudent phrase could have been used. There
is no evidence to suggest that this debate in any way lowered public alertness to the
public health threat of SARS” (Expert Report Section 4.25, SARS Expert Committee,
2003).

As Boin, 't Hart, Stern, et al. (2005) suggested, meaning-making in crisis

management is about political communication, and crisis communication is a battle of
50

All schools in Hong Kong were suspended on 29 March 2003, and the 10-day isolation of Amoy
Gardens Block E was put into effect on 31 March 2003, as the SARS epidemic became more serious.
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credibility. Obviously, reports in the mass media about Yeoh’s speech on 14 March
2003 “had given the impression that he was trying to downplay the seriousness of the
outbreak and that he had been too reassuring” (Expert Report Section 4.24, SARS
Expert Committee, 2003).

Although Yeoh’s public relations skill was not the target

of this comment, his quote was definitely a failure on crisis communication.

Associated with the media’s fault-finding characteristics as stated in Boin, 't Hart,
Stern, et al. (2005), Betty Tung (Tung Chee Hwa’s wife), who was the president of
Hong Kong Red Cross at that time, visited Lower Ngau Tau Kok Estate during the
SARS outbreak to demonstrate her support to the community.

However, her visit

had eventually led to public criticism due to her improper “appearance”, as she was
“heavily armed” by wearing a full set of protective clothes with mask and goggles.
Through different channels of media, some health workers complained that they were
not that “fully equipped” even when working in isolation wards (Apple Daily, 14
April 2003). Although Mrs. Tung’s incident, apparently a public relations disaster,
was not discussed in any of the three investigation reports, it created a negative
“persuasive story line” (Boin, 't Hart and Stern, et al. 2005, 69) that Hong Kong was
an infected area.

From the crisis communication perspective, Mrs. Tung’s action

affected the public’s confidence on the government.

Terminating
The crisis termination process of SARS was quite dramatic.

After reaching its peak

in early April, the SARS crisis started to step into its aftermath in May.
operational termination of SARS outbreak was clear and easily identified.

The

It started

with the end of the 10-day isolation period of Amoy Gardens Block E on 9 April,
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followed by the reopening of schools starting 22 April 51 , after a one-month
suspension.

More importantly, WHO lifted the travel advisory on Hong Kong on 23

May, and later removed Hong Kong from the list of areas with local transmission of
SARS. Eventually, WHO declared Hong Kong as SARS-free on 23 June 2003 (Expert
Committee, 2003).

However, political termination did not come with the operational termination, as the
political process of assigning responsibility and accountability began near the end of
operational termination.

On 28 May 2003, the government announced the

membership of the SARS Expert Committee responsible for reviewing the
management and control of SARS outbreak in Hong Kong.

Two days later, the

Hospital Authority announced the membership of its Review Panel, and in October
2003, the LegCo Select Committee inquiring the handling of the SARS outbreak by
the Government was established under the Legislative Council (Powers and
Privileges) Ordinance, with its report being released in July 2004.

According to the

report, Yeoh, as a political appointee, was being criticized on the four counts below.

1) Did not show sufficient alertness to the atypical pneumonia (AP)
outbreak in Guangdong in January and early February 2003 (Section
15.8).
2) Regarding to Yeoh’s statement on “no community outbreak” on 14
March 2003, he did not show that he had the communication skills of
a policy secretary as expected by the public. (Section 15.10)
3) Held responsible for failing his monitoring role on Hospital Authority,
as HA did not have a territory-wide contingency plan for public
hospitals to deal with large-scale outbreaks of infectious diseases
(Section 15.12).
4) The Select Committee found Yeoh’s performance not satisfactory in
51

Starting 22 April 2003, classes began to resume in secondary schools for students in Form 3 or
above. By 19 May 2003, classes for all schools resumed (Expert Committee, 2003).
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the handling of the SARS outbreak in the above aspects. (Section
15.13)

Eventually, under such serious critiques and political pressure, Yeoh was forced to
resign on 8 July 2004 to take political responsibility over the SARS outbreak. This
marked the complete termination of the SARS crisis.

Learning
In fact, the learning outcomes of SARS were fruitful, as the three investigation reports
provided recommendations to different actors and departments (especially to Hospital
Authority) on disease prevention and control.

However, the Expert Report paid the

most attention to the learning process, as can be seen from its title: “SARS in Hong
Kong: from Experience to Action”.

The Expert Report consisted of eighteen

chapters in total, with twelve of those categorized as “Lessons and Themes”, and two
of them on “Conclusions and Recommendations”.

In general, the Expert Report

provided advice to the government on: 1) Organization of health and healthcare
system for the control of an outbreak of communicable disease; 2) health protection
functions; 3) coordination within Hong Kong; 4) collaboration within Pearl River
Delta Region and with international community; 5) surveillance; 6) information and
data management; 7) surge capacity; 8) clinical management; 9) hospital infection
control and occupational health; 10) research and training; 11) communications; 12)
engaging the Community; and, 13) the impact and after-effects of SARS on the
community. (SARS Expert Report, SARS Expert Committee, 2003)

One of the significant institutional changes in the Hong Kong health care system after
SARS outbreak was the establishment of the Centre of Health Protection (CHP) in
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June 2004.

The CHP “is a professional arm of the Department of Health for disease

prevention and control” (Centre of Health Protection, 2004) through “establishing a
disease surveillance system, strengthening infection control, enhancing laboratory
diagnostic capacity, conducting risk communication and health promotion, developing
applied research and training programs, and preparing emergency response plans”
(Centre of Health Protection, 2004). The learning effort by the government in the
SARS outbreak was reflected in the crisis management of Swire Flu pandemic in
2009, in which the government received positive comments for its fast responsive
actions, an experience gained from the handling of the SARS outbreak.

7.3

Politicization Approach Analysis

Constructing Severity
The SARS epidemic was definitely a severe public health crisis.

However, its effect

on “core public value” (Brandstrom and Kuipers 2003) was ambiguous.

It is clear

that the SARS epidemic fulfilled the requirements of “hot topic”, that is, as the event
got more serious, more people would be affected and more actors (i.e., senior level
government officials) were likely to get involved in the crisis management process.
Regardless, SARS was an epidemic that killed 299 people in Hong Kong within a few
months.

It was not a crisis that started with core public value violation, but it did

affect people’s lives and the fundamental safety needs of human being (Please refer to
Maslow’s Needs Theory).

If the massive loss of lives due to an epidemic were

considered as a violation of crucial values, the severity dimension of Politicization
Approach would still be substantiated.
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Constructing Agency
The agency dimension of SARS epidemic was complicated.

Obviously, the

handling process of SARS outbreak contained elements of both “incident” and
“symptom”, as the epidemic itself was an incident, while its negative socio-economic
impact was a symptom which led to the 1 July 2003 Demonstration.

The

construction of agency could be multidimensional in this case, as the HA Report
discussed the operational and technical aspects, and the LegCo and Expert Reports
focused on the political, higher-level actors, such as Yeoh, the SHWF, and Tung, the
CE.

In addition, blames could be allocated according to the status of the personnel

involved, as could be observed from the LegCo Report.

Yeoh, as a political

appointee, was asked to bear a different level of responsibility from DH Margret Chan,
a civil servant.

Thus, in real situations, the distinction between incident and

symptom is not necessarily clear-cut. Although the dichotomy method is not always
applicable in real case examples, it provided insights on how blames are being
allocated, especially for actors holding different positions during a crisis.

Constructing Responsibility
The construction of agency directly affects the consideration in responsibility
dimension.

As mentioned, the SARS epidemic contained components of both

incident and symptom, which could provide different outcomes in constructing
responsibility. However, a review of the blame allocation process showed that the
stepping-down of Yeoh was obviously a result of the failure of a policy-maker as
defined by Brandstrom and Kuipers (2003).

However, the LegCo Report also

mentioned that working relationship among relevant parties, including the
government, HA, and other organization concerned should be clearly set out (Section
15.46), which, to some extent, supported the case the epidemic was also a network
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failure.

Considering the large number of recommendations and suggestions for

improvement from the three reports, it was obvious that there were limitations in the
health care system of Hong Kong, which were clearly revealed in the SARS outbreak.
These fruitful recommendations also served as a proof that SARS could be a network
failure.

7.4

Summary

The Leadership Approach was satisfactory in analyzing the SARS epidemic, with all
its five components clearly answered by the three investigation reports.

However,

there are two points that warrants further discussion. First, as mentioned in the
sense-making analysis, the decentralization and delegation processes were, to some
extent, contradicting the “going up” process as argued in the Politicization Approach.
In reality, the top leader would not be there to wait for a crisis, but instead, only step
in when the crisis is serious enough. Second, in the crisis terminating process, it was
observed that political termination happened a long time after the operational
termination.

Apparently, for a natural disaster, there would not be a full-fledged

investigation until after the operational termination. The responsibility-assigning
and blame process could take time, which is the reason for the delay of political
termination.

In the case of SARS outbreak, the political termination (Yeoh’s

resignation) was observed almost a year after the operational termination of SARS.

On the other hand, the outcome of applying the Politicization Approach on the SARS
case is not satisfactory, with the “either/or” phenomenon being the major problem.
In a large-scale crisis, it was nearly impossible to dichotomize the dimensions of
incident versus symptom, and actor versus network failure, due to the complexity and
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involvement of many actors, ranging from senior government officials to front line
health workers. Thus, constructing blame and framing in a natural disaster is an
uneasy task.

Obviously, the Politicization Approach works better in political crises

involving fewer people.

The coming Chapter Eight will illustrate another triggering issue of the 2003 Protest –
the controversy on National Security Ordinance (Basic Law Artic 23) legislation.
Afterward, the State-society Interactive Framework analysis will be presented in
Chapter Nine.
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CHAPTER EIGHT: NATIONAL SECURITY BILL
CONTROVERSY

8.1

Background

According to Article 23 of the Basic Law of Hong Kong, it is the constitutional
responsibility of the Hong Kong SAR Government to “enact laws on its own to
prohibit any act of treason, secession, sedition, subversion against the Central
People's Government, or theft of state secrets, to prohibit foreign political
organizations or bodies from conducting political activities in the Region, and to
prohibit political organizations or bodies of the Region from establishing ties with
foreign political organizations or bodies” (Basic Law of HKSAR, Article 23). The
controversies began when then-Chief Executive Tung Chee-hwa started to spearhead
the legislation process in his second term of office in 2002.

The consultation paper

on proposals to implement Article 23 was released on 24 September 2002. The
proposed legislation prohibited activities including treason, secession and subversion,
sedition, theft of state secrets, and foreign political organizations conducting political
activities in the HKSAR.

According

to

A.

Cheung

(2005b,

37),

the

HKSAR

government

was

“heavy-handedness in Article 23 legislation and the backlash”, and had
underestimated the opposition from the general public while overestimating the
support from pro-Beijing parties in passing the bill.

He further suggested that the

proposed bill had startled the pan-democrats as well as the general public, as they
have been openly asking for the termination of the one-party rule of the Chinese
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Communist Party (CCP), especially after the 1989 Tiananmen Square Incident52.

Then-Secretary of Security, Regina Ip, was responsible for moving the bill.
Debates between supporters (including government officials) and the opposition
were long-lasting and harsh, especially between September 2002 and July 2003, and
public forums, newspaper columns, radio phone-in programs, LegCo meetings, and
government press conferences became battlefields for both camps.

The

dissatisfaction of people towards Article 23 was first shown in the 60,000 people
demonstration53 on 15 December 2002.

To fight back, the pro-government camp

organized an assembly with about 40,000 participants to support the legislation on 22
December 2002.

However, there was doubt that some of the participants were there

because of the free transportation by shuttle bus and the free lunch (Apple Daily, 23
December 2002).

According to the opinion poll conducted by the Chinese

University of Hong Kong in December 2002, 68.6% of respondents opposed to the
legislation, in contrast with the 19% supporting it (Apple Daily, 24 December 2002).
The consultation period for the legislation ended on 24 December 2002.

In January 2003, the government announced some clarifications and amendments to
the legislative proposals regarding the implementation of Article 23, which included
the abolition of the offence of misprision of treason and abolition of the offence of
possession of seditious publications. (Government further clarifies legislative
proposals to implement BL 23, Government Press Release, 28 January 2003)

52

This kind of request may be identified as a kind of subversion against the Central People's
Government, and would be prohibited and even sanctioned after the legislation of Article 23.
53
60,000 was the number provided by the organizer. The number was about 12,000, according to
Hong Kong Police.

177

These further clarifications were believed to be concessions by the government in
response to the strong opposition towards the original proposal (Apple Daily, 29
January 2003), but the government refused to admit this.

Soon afterwards, without

further in-depth consultation, the National Security (Legislative Provisions) Bill was
published in the Hong Kong Gazette on 14 February 2003, and introduced to the
Legislative Council on 26 February 2003. However, the draft bill suffered severe
critique on those sections related to secret hearing54. The bill was scheduled to be
passed in July 2003, resulting in those opposition parties and groups calling for a
protest on 1 July 2003, the HKSAR Establishment Day.

The 1 July protest rally in 2003 was certainly a historic event in Hong Kong (J.
Cheng 2005, Chan and Chan 2007), with half-a-million people marched towards the
government offices in Central in a peaceful manner, in protest of the poor
governance of Tung, especially during the outbreak of SARS. However, it was
clear that the main reason was the people’s antagonism towards Article 23.

Despite

of the rally, Tung’s government still insisted on moving the third reading of the bill
on 9 July 2003, after making further amendments55 on some controversial sections.
However, the passage of the bill was found to be impossible on 6 July, when
Executive Council56 member James Tien, Chairperson of Liberal Party (LP) from
54

“If in the course of any proceedings before the Court of First Instance the Court is satisfied, upon
application by the Secretary for Justice, that the publication of any evidence to be given or any
statement to be made in the course of the proceedings might prejudice national security, the Court may
order that all or any portion of the public shall be excluded during any part of the hearing so as to
avoid such publication” (Section 8D (5), Part 4: Amendments to the Societies Ordinance, National
Security (Legislative Provisions) Bill).
55
“1) Delete the provision regarding a local organization subordinate to a mainland organization
which has been proscribed by the Central Authorities. 2) Introduce "public interest" as a defense for
unlawful disclosure of certain official information, in order to protect and alleviate the concerns of the
public, particularly those of the media. 3) Delete the provision which confers on the police a power to
search without court warrant in the exercise of their emergency investigation powers” (Chief
Executive's transcript on Basic Law Article 23, Press Release, 5 July 2003).
56
Executive Council (ExCo) is the highest decision-making body in HKSAR government chaired by
the Chief Executive.
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the pro-Beijing camp, tendered his resignation to the ExCo and declared that all LP
lawmakers would not support the bill in LegCo. The government postponed the
legislation the next day as there were insufficient votes to support the bill in the
LegCo after the U-turn of Liberal Party.

The National Security (Legislative

Provisions) Bill was eventually withdrawn from the legislative program by the CE on
5 September 2003.

8.2

Leadership Approach Analysis

Sense-Making
The further clarifications57 released in January 2003 on the original proposal could be
perceived as the government’s response to the worries and dissatisfaction of the
public towards the legislation.

It could be seen as the government’s recognition of

the opposition towards the law, but was far from the sense-making of a crisis.
However, the government did not foresee the failure of proceeding with the third
reading on time (i.e., 9 July 2003) until the 1 July 2003 Demonstration. More
accurately, from a policymaking perspective, the policy did not fail until James Tien
resigned from the ExCo and directed his party to oppose to the legislation, which
made the passage of the bill in LegCo impossible.

If this were the case, the real

crisis duration from the government perspective would be short (from 1 July protest
until the resignation of both Regina Ip and Antony Leung on 16 July 2003). As
commented by many scholars, the half-a-million people protest rally was a result of
the many issues that gathered severe public dissatisfaction.

Thus, the sense-making

for the Article 23 case, as a triggering reason for the rally, was difficult to analyze
independently, without considering the whole picture with all other crisis events.
57

See Government further clarifies legislative proposals to implement BL 23, Government Press
Release, 28 January 2003

179

Decision-Making
In this case, Tung was solely accountable for the decision-making process, although
Regina Ip was the principal official responsible for promoting the legislation of
Article 23.

It was because the decision-making power of postponement and

withdrawal of the bill were in the hands of the Chief Executive-in-Council. Tung’s
leading role in this crisis as the top leader of HKSAR Government was as appropriate
as suggested in the Leadership Approach. Under the executive-driven (Li 2007, 32)
tradition, the Chief Executive’s prominent role in policymaking is unquestionable.
Moreover, apparently there was a miscalculation in the level of opposition and
dissatisfaction among the general public in Hong Kong, given that Hong Kong had
just emerged from the SARS outbreak and was in a great economic depression. The
uncertainty and inaccuracy in catching “national mood” (Kingdon 1995) in
policymaking and decision-making might, to some extent, be related to the
non-democratic system in Hong Kong, and could serve as evidence that the
Leadership Approach, as a western-based crisis management theory, might not be
fully applicable to non-democratic systems, such as Hong Kong.

Meaning-Making
Although Regina Ip’s tough image, strong words, and weird examples58 given during
the consultation process received wide criticism, there was no direct relationship
between the policy failure and her political communication skills, as it was obvious
that the nature of this critical and highly controversial law has angered the people, and
they were opposed to those terms and sections inside the bill that would harm their
freedom.

Ip’s public relations skill was just a part of the issue, but certainly not a

58

One of the famous quotes from Regina Ip was a democracy, such as Germany before World War II,
could still elect a devil like Hitler. Ip later apologized for her statement, and promised not to use
Hitler as example (Apple Daily, 31 January 2003).
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sufficient factor that led to such a huge opposition.

This is an example of a case that

even spin doctoring could not help, as it is neither helpful in passing a “disgusting”
policy, nor useful in safeguarding a critical governance crisis.

To some extent, spin

doctoring is not really responding to nor tackling the core issue.

In the Hong Kong

context, it has become a tactic for the government to “wait until” the LegCo pass the
controversial policy, as technically the pro-establishment camp is always controlling
the majority in the legislature.

Terminating
It was easy to identify the operational termination of a policy failure, in this case, the
postponement and withdrawal of the legislation. However, the political termination
process was unclear and could be long lasting.

Of course, the resignation of Ip could

be one of the possible terminating points, as she was the political-appointed principal
official responsible for the whole legislation process.

However, the aftermath

impact of such a “collapse” of the cabinet (i.e., the resignation of Leung, later, Yeoh,
and finally, Tung) would have really harmed governance prestige and public
confidence, and was not covered in this approach.

Furthermore, the issue of Article

23 still exists, as it is the constitutional obligation for HKSAR government to legislate
the Article as stated in the Basic Law. The nature of a policy failure is, to certain
extent, different from a scandal or a disease, as a policy process would never end,
since the government can restart anytime it wants to. The relationship between
crisis nature and crisis management is an important issue to be discussed in latter
chapters.

Learning
Rather than learning, the aftermath of this policy failure could better be described as
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changing of political environment and social atmosphere, which are more significant
than those experiences learnt by the government in this failure. As Chan and Chan
(2007) argued, the 2003 incident was a watershed of Hong Kong civil society
development.

Not only did the government learn a lesson, but the whole society

also learnt a lesson, especially on how to bargain with the government by mobilizing
the masses. Obviously, the top-down perspective of Leadership Approach failed to
address this issue.

If the political environment changes dramatically after a crisis,

the learning efforts of the government would become minimal, given that there would
be new challenges next time.

8.3

Politicization Approach Analysis

Constructing Severity
The severity of this crisis was not simply because the violation of core public values
(i.e., freedom) stemming from Article 23 itself, but also the shock and political
pressure brought by the half-a-million people protest. The shockwave of the protest
even counter-affected the framing role of mass media (Lee and Chan 2009), as
newspapers in Hong Kong were found to be politically indifferent for a period of time
just after the rally, when all of them, even the Pro-Beijing ones, were criticizing the
poor performance of Hong Kong SAR Government and Tung.

In general, the crisis

status was gained not by the nature of the event (Article 23 legislation), but by the
scale of the protest.

Constructing Agency
The agency dimension in this case was quite simple and direct, as it was clearly not a
technical incident involving lower-level actors.
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As mentioned, the Article 23

incident was a highly politicized policy failure directly caused by the top leaders of
the HKSAR Government - the Chief Executive and his cabinet. Also, it should be
related to the overall governing ability of Tung’s administration.

In the

policymaking cycle, the agenda setting process is in the hands of the policy
entrepreneurs (Kingdon 1995), and thus, it is not surprising that all focuses were on
the major policy actors, in this case, Tung and Ip.

Constructing Responsibility
There were both actor failure and network (policy) failure in the Article 23
controversy, as observed from Ip’s resignation and the withdrawal of the bill.
However, there was a saying that Leung and Ip resigned in order to save Tung from
the political pressure of stepping-down, which would have made this a case of
“scapegoating”. Once again, the politicization was challenged for its “either/or”
phenomenon, as it is difficult to make an absolute judgment on the category in each
dimension.

8.4

Summary

A policy failure is entirely different from other types of crisis in view of its man-made
nature.

Although the legislation of Article 23 was the direct reason leading the 1

July 2003 Demonstration, the Leadership Approach has underestimated the
complexity of this governance crisis, which included, but was not limited to, the two
crisis events discussed before.

This crisis is a proof that the Leadership Approach

was not designed for analyzing crises with multiple reasons and backgrounds.

In

general, it is difficult to sense a crisis stemming from a policy failure in advance in
the Hong Kong context, as technically, policies proposed by the government would
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not fail in the LegCo, given that the pro-establishment camp is always in control.
Also, the process of meaning-making is not as useful as the theory suggested, as it is
doubtful whether such a controversial bill could be framed to “look normal” from a
political communication perspective.

One of the possible reasons could be that there

could not be such a controversial policy in western democracies.

The idea of

constitutional obligation is strange in policy formulation, and is, to some extent,
related to the non-democratic system in Hong Kong. National mood is not one of
the major concerns, but the leader perspective is. The deadlock between the state
and the society has created new challenges in studying policy failure as a governance
crisis, as would be further discussed in the coming chapters.

After the discussion on the three cases, the historical event of 1 July 2003 Protest will
be introduced by adopting the State-society Interactive Framework in the coming
chapter.
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CHAPTER NINE: THE 1 JULY 2003 DEMONSTRATION STATE-SOCIETY INTERACTIVE FRAMEWORK ANALYSIS

As discussed in Chapters Six to Chapter Eight, three major events are considered to
have led to the 1 July 2003 Demonstration: The Car-Gate scandal, the outbreak of
SARS, and the controversy on the legislation of Article 23 of the Basic Law.

In

current literature, crises are mostly regarded as an individual event, although scholars
might agree that there are many reasons behind.

In fact, the half-a-million people

protest in July of 2003 was a catalyzer that linked the three events, even though the
events were almost unrelated with one another.

The Car-Gate scandal was

obviously a political scandal related to the misconduct of a high ranking official –
Antony Leung, then-Financial Secretary.

The outbreak of SARS was a natural

disaster-turned man-made crisis due the ineffective crisis management of HKSAR
government.

Finally, the controversy on the legislation of Article 23 of the Basic

Law, believed to be the direct reason for the protest, was definitely a policy failure.

The above mentioned three crisis events were in the same line with C-y. Cheung’s
(2005) illustrations which appeared in the book titled “The July 1 Protest Rally”
edited by J. Cheung (2005).

It can be sure that C.-y. Cheung was not the only

scholar or commentator who had associated those three crisis events with the
demonstration.

In fact, numerous newspaper articles had reported the anonymous

participants’ point of view towards the demonstration.

“In fact, after 1989, I have never tried to take to the streets as I think the
government will turn good. However, the recent Antony’s car scandal,
SARS incident and Mrs. Regina Ip’s remarks [on Article 23] has shown
that governance problem would only be intensified. My hopes have
been dashed.” (HK Economic Times, 2 July 2003)
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The 1 July Demonstration also shocked the Pro-establishment camp.

Oriental

Daily, a Pro-Beijing newspaper, in its editorial on 4 July 2003, blamed the
government badly on their poor crisis management in the above mentioned three
crisis events which directly led to the rally of half-a-million people on the street.
The editorial emphasized that the demonstration happened not only because of the
Article 23 controversy, but it could also be the result of a chain of crises and
wrongdoings which was observed after Tung launched the POAS in 2002.

A few

days later, the Oriental Daily (9 July 2003) interviewed some LegCo members, and
among them some Pan-democrats suggested that Leung and Ip should be “fired”
after the demonstration.

Almost at the same time, Chan Yuen-han, a

Pro-establishment lawmaker, argued that the Article 23 controversy was the catalytic
event of the demonstration.

However, the Leung’s scandal and poor crisis

management of Yeoh’s had also triggered public dissatisfaction towards Tung’s
administration (Apple Daily, 7 July 2003).

Obviously, after the demonstration, major public opinion has pointed their fingers
towards Tung.

As such, the Pro-establishment camps began to blame Tung’s

government intensively.

From the perspective of State-society Interactive

Framework, the “u-turn” of the Pro-establishment camp marked a significant
decrease in Crisis Weakening Forces.

Indeed the demonstration as a catalytic event

escalated the situation into the governance crisis level that the governmental change
would be a reasonable expectation of the general public in order to solve the crisis.

In the next section, the data collected by Lee and Chan (2011) can be a strong
evident to show how Crisis Weakening Forces (i.e. the supporters of the government)
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diminished significantly after the demonstration. The data had provided invaluable
insights for understanding the operations of Crisis Strengthening and Weakening
Forces and the Catalytic Effect of Crisis which were the key components of this
State-society Interactive Framework.

9.1

Results from Newspaper Discourse Analysis

After analyzing the three events with the Leadership Approach and the Politicization
Approach respectively in the above three chapters, newspaper discourse analysis is
now adopted to attempt to capture the Strengthening Forces and the catalytic effect
of the 1 July 2003 Demonstration in a more objective way.

With reference to Lee

and Chan’s (2011, 68) study, the time range of the crisis is divided into three periods
as follows:

1) The pre-protest period: 1 April to 30 June
2) The event period: 1 July to 9 July
3) The post-protest period: 10 July to 22 November

Lee and Chan (2011) first used the Chinese keyword “July 1 protest” to sort out
related articles, which were coded using the coding scheme from their readings of the
materials, focusing only on those articles with very specific “answer” to the
questions they had set.

For example, “who was the culprit of the protest?”

Articles that simply presented different points of view without a clear stand point
were not included.

The search for culprits could be regarded as an assessment of the Strengthening
Forces. As Lee and Chan (2011) argued, the choice of “culprits” is, to some extent,
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a reflection of the wants of the people.

For example, an attack on the political

system may move democratization forward by a step, and laying the blame on the
leader may create sufficient political pressure to press for changes in the government
(e.g., stepping-down of the official). Thus, the strength and concentration of the
Strengthening Forces are important factors in determining the level of a crisis (i.e.,
crisis, governance crisis, or change) in the development process.

Table 9.1 Identification of the culprits – 1 July 2003 Demonstration (percent)
WENWEIPO
Culprits/Period

ORIENTAL DAILY

Pre

7/1

Post

Culprits/Period

Pre

7/1

Post

Hong Kong SARG

9

25

57.1

Hong Kong SARG

42.1

89.4

66.3

CE Tung Chee-hwa

0

4.2

7.1

CE Tung Chee-hwa

10.5

23.4

28.6

Pro-establishments

0

0

0

Pro-establishments

0

0

7.8

Foreign Forces

82

66.7

32.1

Foreign Forces

52.6

0

14.3

The Media

9

20.8

10.7

The Media

0

0

7.8

Central Government

0

0

0

Central Government

0

4.3

7.8

Pan-democrats

0

0

0

Pan-democrats

0

0

0

(11)

(24)

(28)

(19)

(47)

(77)

Articles (N)

Articles (N)

MING PAO

APPLE DAILY

Culprits/Period

Pre

7/1

Post

Culprits/Period

Pre

7/1

Post

Hong Kong SARG

87.5

100

88.2

Hong Kong SARG

85.7

87

79.6

CE Tung Chee-hwa

11.9

2.7

20.9

CE Tung Chee-hwa

28.6

52.2

26.9

Pro-establishments

9.5

0

0

Pro-establishments

15.9

13

7.5

Foreign Forces

4.8

0

1.8

Foreign Forces

0

0

1.1

The Media

2.4

1.4

2.7

The Media

0

0

0

Central Government

0

1.4

3.6

Central Government

4.8

13

5.4

Pan-democrats

0

0

0

Pan-democrats

1.6

0

0

(42)

(73)

(63)

(23)

(93)

Articles (N)
Note:

(110) Articles (N)

Number of articles does not include those without relevant information to the question.

Sum of

percentage can be larger than 100% since one article can be coded under multiple categories.
Source:

(Lee and Chan, Media, Social Mobilization, and Mass Protests in Post-Colonial Hong Kong 2011, 71)

Table 9.1 is a summary of the discourse analysis by Lee and Chan (2011) on the
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major culprit in the 1 July 2003 Demonstration.

It can be seen that the discourses of

Apple Daily and Ming Pao were quite similar, as both identified the “Hong Kong
government” as the major culprit in all three periods, followed by “Chief Executive
Tung Chee-hwa”.

It should be pointed out that, in all three periods, more than 80

percent of their discourses pointed out that the “Hong Kong government” should
bear responsibility for the social crisis.

As for Oriental Daily and Wenweipo, there was a significant increase in the
percentage of discourses identifying “Hong Kong government” and “Tung” as the
top two culprits from the pre-protest period to the event and post-protest periods.
One important point to note is that, before the protest, a majority of their discourses
was putting the blame on “politicians destroying Hong Kong/ foreign forces”, an
option that saw a sharp decrease in the post-protest period to a percentage much
smaller than the “Hong Kong government”.

9.2

Methods to Resolve the Crisis

The solution for resolving a crisis could be closely related to the possibility of a
change in the government, which could be a major policy change, institutional
change, personnel change in high-ranking officials, or even a regime change.

Thus,

a strong catalyzer for a crisis would be the lack of positive response of the
government regarding the clear and strong expectation for change by the public.
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Table 9.2 Methods to resolve the social crisis of 1 July 2003 (percent)
WENWEIPO

ORIENTAL DAILY

Pre

7/1

Post

Pre

7/1

Post

Postpone Article 23

0

0

0

Postpone Article 23

0

39.3

0

Complete Article 23

22.2

24

0

Complete Article 23

11.1

0

0

Revising Article 23

0

12

0

Revising Article 23

22.2

0

0

Gov Respond to Public

0

36

35.5

Gov Respond to Public

66.7

25

42.3

Rebuild Gov Authority

0

0

12.9

Rebuild Gov Authority

0

0

0

Democratic Reform

0

0

19.4

Democratic Reform

0

7.1

9.6

Admin. Reform

0

4

0

Admin. Reform

0

39.3

42.3

Solidarity of HK Ppl.

55.6

24

22.6

Solidarity of HK Ppl.

0

0

7.7

Developing Econ.

44.4

24

22.6

Developing Econ.

0

10.7

0

Tung Stepping Down

0

4

0

Tung Stepping Down

0

25

5.8

Est. Gov Mouthpiece

0

0

12.9

Est. Gov Mouthpiece

0

0

0

Citizens’ Participation

0

0

0

Citizens’ Participation

0

0

1.9

Clear Position of PD

0

0

0

Clear Position of PD

0

0

0

China Intervention

0

4

0

China Intervention

22.2

0

11.5

China Refrains

0

0

0

China Refrains

0

0

3.8

(9)

(25)

(31)

(9)

(28)

(52)

Methods/Period

Articles (N)

Methods/Period

Articles (N)

MING PAO

APPLE DAILY

Postpone Article 23

20

57.1

10.3

Postpone Article 23

45.5

50

0

Complete Article 23

10

0

0

Complete Article 23

0

0

0

Revising Article 23

10

0

0

Revising Article 23

0

0

0

Gov Respond to Public

40

17.1

15.7

Gov Respond to Public

9.1

8.3

0

Rebuild Gov Authority

20

0

0

Rebuild Gov Authority

0

0

0

Democratic Reform

0

14.3

21.8

Democratic Reform

27.3

33.3

0

Admin. Reform

0

11.4

12.8

Admin. Reform

18.2

16.7

0

Solidarity of HK Ppl.

0

0

2.6

Solidarity of HK Ppl.

0

0

0

Developing Econ.

0

14.3

9

Developing Econ.

0

0

0

Tung Stepping Down

0

8.6

7.7

Tung Stepping Down

0

0

0

Est. Gov Mouthpiece

0

0

0

Est. Gov Mouthpiece

0

0

0

Citizens’ Participation

0

0

1.3

Citizens’ Participation

0

0

68.8

Clear Position of PD

0

0

1.3

Clear Position of PD

0

0

31.3

China Intervention

0

0

11.5

China Intervention

0

0

0

China Refrains

0

0

6.4

China Refrains

0

0

0

(10)

(35)

(78)

Articles (N)

(11)

(12)

(16)

Articles (N)
Key:

Solidarity of Hong Kong People (Solidarity of HK Ppl.), Establishing Mouthpiece for Government
(Est. Gov Mouthpiece), China refrains from Intervention (China Refrains), Clear Positioning of
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Pan-democrats (Clear Position of PD)
Note:

Number of articles does not include those without relevant information to the question.

Sum of

percentage can be larger than 100% since one article can be coded under multiple categories.
Source:

(Lee and Chan, Media, Social Mobilization, and Mass Protests in Post-Colonial Hong Kong 2011, 77)

Table 9.2 shows a summary of the discourse analysis by Lee and Chan (2011) on the
possible methods to resolve the social crisis of 1 July 2003.

The discourses of

Apple Daily, Ming Pao, and Oriental Daily quite constantly mentioned “Postponing
Article 23 legislation” as a method, especially during the protest period, while some
mentions of “revising the proposed law” appeared in Wenweipo. Regarding to the
notion of change, a high percentage of discourses in Oriental Daily and Wenweipo
mentioned the need for “Government to respond to the public”, especially after the
protest.

In

the

long

run,

most

newspapers

asked

for

“democratic

reform/development” or an “administrative reform”, with the percentages of these
two categories increasing noticeably during and after the protest.

Also, it is worth

noting that Wenweipo, as a CCP party newspaper, expressed its views on “democratic
development” and the need to “rebuild government authority” after the protest.

9.3

State-society Interactive Framework Analysis

The analysis of newspaper discourse in the previous section indicated that there were
changes in the strengthening and weakening forces in the case of 1 July 2003
Demonstration due to the various external and internal factors.

Originally,

according to Hallin and Macini’s (2004) idea of political parallelism in the media, the
four local newspapers in Hong Kong selected for the analysis could be roughly
divided into those supporting the pan-democrats (i.e., Apple Daily and Ming Pao)
and those that are pro-Beijing (i.e., Oriental Daily and Wenweipo). They represent
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the Strengthening Force and Weakening Force in the State-society Interactive
Framework.

Specifically, pro-government newspapers always side with, and hold a

positive view of, the government, with discourses asking for the “solidarity of Hong
Kong people” and focus on “developing economy”, and a description of the culprits
as “Politicians destroying Hong Kong / foreign forces”.

However, newspapers

supporting the pan-democrats would point their fingers at the “Hong Kong
government” as a whole, or specifically at “Chief Executive Tung Chee-hwa”, and
their strong sense in postponing the legislation of Article 23 of the Basic Law was
definitely a major source of Crisis Strengthening Force.

In the State-society Interactive Framework, the power of the two forces would
change according to different external and internal factors. The crisis management
efforts made by the government in the three events leading to the 1 July protest (i.e.
the Car Gate scandal, the outbreak of SARS and the controversy of the Security
Ordinance) was presented in the previous chapters. Hence, they will be repeated in
details here.

By adopting the State-society Interactive Framework, major

observations are summarized in Figure 9.1 below to explain the huge influence of the
protest to the whole crisis development process in the crisis management perspective.

9.3.1 The Change of Force: U-turn of the Pro-Business Party
One of the critical political impacts brought by the 1st July Protest was the U-turn of
Pro-Business lawmakers. As discussed in Chapter One, the pro-business bloc, since
the colonial era, has been a political conservative that supports the government.
Their support has continued after the handover under the united front strategies
adopted by Beijing (Loh 2010).

However, as Ma (2012) argued, the political
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support from the pro-business bloc is sometimes fragmented as the party politics in
Hong Kong is immature and the pro-business block unable to form a stable and
trustworthy “political alliance” with the government.

Thus, the U-turn of

pro-business bloc in critical issues such as Article 23 became possible under their ad
hoc relations.

Soon after the Protest, a number of pro-business lawmakers suggested to suspend or
to further amend the National Security Ordinance Bill.

For example, David LI, a

lawmaker who is also a banker claimed that Regina Ip’s performance was
unsatisfactory and the government should evaluate the process (Apple Daily, 3 July
2003).

On the other hand, James Tien, chairman of Liberal Party, a pro-business

party, suggested that the government should postpone the legislation to next
legislative year. He further claimed that he had discussed the issue with some
Beijing officials and his idea was acknowledged by them (Wenweipo, 5 July 2003).

Finally, an urgent ExCo meeting was called in 6 July night.

At the same time, the

Liberal Party announced that they supported the deferral of the legislation. After
four hours of ExCo meeting, the government announced that the legislation will be
suspended and James Tien had been resigned from his ExCo membership.

In reality,

without the support of Liberal Party (with 8 votes in the LegCo), passing the bill had
become impossible.

In this case, the pro-business bloc represented by Liberal Party

had performed as a critical minority that alters the government final decision.

The

retreat of Liberal Party has changed the Crisis Weakening Force into Crisis
Strengthening Force as they “chose to stand by the people” (Lee Cheuk-yan, 7 July
2003, Apple Daily).
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Crisis Weakening Force:

Government
Change

●

Pro-government parties support in the LegCo

●

Positive discourses from the Pro-Beijing newspapers

●

The above forces deteriorated shapely during the protest
period (i.e. Liberal Party’s U-turn and the energized
public opinion effect)

The Catalyzer

Crisis Strengthening Force:

Governance
Crisis

●

Legitimacy crisis of the government (i.e. Car Gate)

●

Public dissatisfaction towards the ineffective crisis
management of SARS and the poor economy

●

Opposition parties and organizations called for
demonstration on 1 July to express people’s anger

●

Negative mass media coverage (with clearer and stronger
views asking for government change - on postponing the
Security Ordinance legislation and on Tung’s

Crisis

administration)
●

The half-a-million demonstration protest on 1 July
(Catalytic effect existed)

Figure 9.1 State-society Interactive Framework analysis of 1 July protest

Figure 9.1 summarizes observations from the three events leading to the 2003
Demonstration, and serves to explain the huge influence of the protest to the whole
crisis development process from the crisis management perspective.

Before the

protest, public dissatisfaction was already at a high level due to various reasons, such
as distrust in the Tung administration stemming from the Car-Gate scandal, the
extremely poor economic and social condition brought by SARS, and the threat on
human rights and freedom in connection with the possible legislation of Article 23.
These are all regarded as Strengthening Forces of the crisis.

However, the

relationship between those crises was unclear until the appearance of the catalyzer –
1 July protest.

Thus, the 1 July protest had finally become a social crisis as
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described by Lee and Chan (2011), or a governance crisis under the Crisis
Development Ladders.

Based on the results of newspaper discourses analysis, Chan and Lee (2006, Lee and
Chan 2011) argued that there was an energized public opinion during the protest, and
observed a diminished political parallelism in the media, which, they explained, was
a reflection of public opinion influencing the mass media in the short run, leading to
an amendment in the media’s political orientation. From the perspective of the
State-society Interactive Framework, public opinion was strong enough to cause a
decrease in the weakening force (i.e., coverage by the pro-government newspapers)
for a short time, as some actors chose to take side with the view of the majority of the
people in the final stage.

In this regard, the Crisis Strengthening Forces were united

to exert sufficient pressure on the government.

It is difficult to make a conclusion on whether the Strengthening Forces have led to
the catalytic effect or vice versa, though it seems a stronger Strengthening Force may
lead to the catalytic effect.

Also, the presence of the catalytic effect would enable

the Strengthening Forces to operate in full capacity to possibly force changes in the
government.

Thus, the end of the 2003 Demonstration crisis saw the postponement

of the Article 23 legislation process and the stepping-down of Antony Leung and
Regina Ip.

In the coming chapter, the case study part II – the Anti-High Speed Railway Incident
will be discussed. Compared with the 2003 Protest, the Anti-High Speed Railway
Incident was said to be a latent crisis.

In fact, there were intensive state-society

interactions. However, it failed to reach to the level of governance crisis.
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Thus, it

would be an useful case to investigate how do different crisis management
approaches are going to illustrate the latent crises which were seldom appeared in
current literatures.
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CASE STUDY PART II
CHAPTER TEN: ANTI-HIGH SPEED RAILWAY INCIDENT
10.1

Background

In 2009, the Hong Kong government proposed the construction of a high speed
railway, the 26-km Hong Kong section of the Guangzhou-Shenzhen-Hong Kong
Express Rail Link (commonly known as High Speed Railway or XRL) running from
West Kowloon in Hong Kong to the boundary of Hong Kong and Shenzhen, from
where it will connect to the 16,000-km National High-speed Railway Network (MTR
Corporation, 2010).

The construction of the High Speed Railway began in January

2010, and is targeted for completion in 2015. The total cost of the project was
estimated to be 66.9 billion, and the funding was appropriated by the Legislative
Council on 16 January 2010.

The huge construction cost was one of the major concerns for those who were
against the High Speed Railway.

The Anti-High Speed Railway movement was an

opposition against one of the most controversial urban policies – the XRL, which had
created great dispute before and after its appropriation by the Legislative Council in
2009.

The movement was viewed as another watershed of social movement in

Hong Kong after the 1 July 2003 Demonstration, as, for the first time, a group of
young people, commonly referred to as the “Post-80s” (meaning they were born after
1980), were considered the initiator of a new mode of social movement, which
involved spreading information through the internet and actually taking part in
demonstrations at different localities.

However, the definition of “Post-80s” was

unclear, and the mass media and general public had never paid special attention on
this group of youngsters.
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Phase 1: Anti-Express Railway Appropriation
After the announcement of the government’s request for appropriation of the railway
project, a Facebook group named “Against 66.9 billion Express Railway, calling for
demonstration outside the LegCo on 15/1/2010” was set up, attracting more than
50,000 members.

A pressure group known as the League of Anti-Express Rail Link

was responsible for most of the Facebook groups’ actions.

It was a very different

kind of set up from the traditional social movement, as a “virtual” group was taking
the lead in the very beginning, instead of a political party59.

The League was

“virtual” in that only a spokesperson, instead of any executive, was speaking on its
behalf to the mass media.

It had no formal membership, organization chart, or code

of formation, not even an office mailing address.

Almost all of its announcements

were distributed through Facebook and other web pages, such as “Hong Kong
Discussion Forum” and “Golden Forum” (The Encyclopaedia of Virtual
Communities in Hong Kong, 2010).

The League of Anti-Express Rail Link organized a series of activities through the
internet, among them a demonstration outside the LegCo Building with 1,700
participants.

Later, the League organized the “Five Districts Tapas” to explain their

standpoints to the general public.

The “Five Districts” refers to the five

geographical constituencies of LegCo, as the majority of the LegCo members who
support the bill were from the functional constituencies. The activists also called
for universal suffrage with the Tapas. The first tapa was held on 16 December 2009,
and the second was held on 5-8 January 2010, in which the participants knelt each
time after walking slowly for 26 steps (a reference to the 26km Express Rail Link).

59

Based on information collected during an interview with Respondent C, a Pan-democrat party
leader
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At the same time, university students also organized the “University Student Tapas”
on the campus of six public universities in Hong Kong.

Besides the tapas, activists

also called for a hunger strike from 12-17 January 2010 outside the LegCo Building.
The hunger strike was organized by the “ Post-80s Anti-Express Railway
Youngsters”, who also pled for support through the internet.

Despite these actions,

the bill was eventually passed by the LegCo without any amendment on 16 January
2010 by simple majority.

Phase 2: Against the Removal of Choi Yuen Village
After the appropriation of funding from the LegCo, the focus of the Anti-High Speed
Railway movement turned to protecting Choi Yuen Village, a village that would be
demolished for the construction of the stabling siding for the railway.
two main arguments against the demolishment of Choi Yuen Village.

There were
First, most of

the villagers were seniors who either did not want to move or were incapable of
doing so. Second, the villagers were opposed to the compensation package, as they
found the amount insufficient for them rebuilding a farm of the same size on a new
site.

An online interest group called the Choi Yuen Village Concern Group was set up on
Facebook, gathering around 3,000 members.

As the villagers were mainly old

people, most of the protests were organized by the “Post-80s” through the internet.
Respondent I, a leader of student movement at that time, admitted that although some
of the protesters knew each other personally, they could not confirm whether
everyone who signed up would appear until they actually arrived at the venue,
because all protesters got the protest information online. According to So (2008,
242), the post-modern mode of social movement had assorted some spontaneous and
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creative elements which “turned the protest into a seemingly joyful and even festive
event”.

In the movement to defend Choi Yuen Village, protesters became creative

in their methods of expressing their ideas.

For instance, a community market was

set up to sell featured items such as “Express Rail Link boiled eggs” (the Cantonese
for “boiled eggs” is the same as that for “scram” or “leave”) and a rice cake that
mocked the “functional constituency as good-for-nothing”.

The main strategy of

the protesters was to gain publicity in order to draw the attention of the society to the
group of under-privileged villagers whose rights were neglected.

With the passage

of the appropriation bill in the LegCo, the construction of the High Speed Railway
was impossible to stop, and the demolition of Choi Yuen Village could not be
prevented. Thus, the activists turned to preserving the culture of Choi Yuen Village
by cooperating with the villagers to set up a mini museum nearby with photos and
exhibits related to the rural life, in hope of letting the public know more about Choi
Yuen Village, and helping the villagers fight for more compensation from the
government through protests and various collective actions.

In conclusion, it was surprising that such a large-scale social movement could not
influence the decision of the government, as the appropriation bill was passed by the
LegCo without any amendment and delay, except for the postponement due to the
filibuster tactic adopted by the Pan-democrats in the debating process.

10.2

Leadership Approach Analysis

Sense-Making
It is difficult to determine whether the incident could be defined a crisis from the
government’s perspective.

Unlike the legislation of Article 23, which was definitely
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a policy failure, the LegCo appropriated the funding for the High Speed Railway
without any amendment or significant delay on 16 January 2010. Although it was
hard for the government to deny that they had paid attention and responded to the
Anti-High Speed Railway movement, it was also difficult to measure what the
government had done from a crisis management perspective, except for the
reiteration of their standpoint in order to satisfy the general public in different
occasions60. The objective of the government had been simple and clear – to have
the appropriation bill passed in the LegCo on time, so as to prevent the activists from
ultimately escalating the issue into a (potential) policy failure.

Theoretically,

potential threat would easily be ignored at this stage, since the top leader of the
government would not be involved unless the issue was “big enough”.

The

government announced its intention to construct the High-Speed Railway61 and
requested for appropriation from the LegCo Financial Committee on 20 October
2009.

However, before late November 2009, anti-High Speed Railway activities

were mostly quiet and small-scale, with the joint declaration made by 69 scholars
from Hong Kong universities on 4 November 2009 and the two small-scale
demonstrations (less than 100 participants) outside the Government House on 16
November 2009 and LegCo on 22 November 2009 being more noticeable ones.

Crisis status was entitled by the people (Boin, 't Hart and Stern, et al. 2005). The
3,000-people “Anti-High Speed Railway, Stop appropriation” demonstration on 29
November 2009 was the first large-scale social movement related to the issue.
However, the response of the government afterwards did not “make a sense” for
60

Please refer to the Secretary of Transport and Housing (STH) transcript on Hong Kong Express
Rail Link Forum (30 October 2010), Speech by STH on “Express Rail Link: The Fast Track to Future
Economic Growth” at the luncheon meeting of the Hong Kong Institute of Directors (14 December
2010), and numerous LegCo Q&A sections.
61
See “ExCo approves implementation of high-speed rail link” (Transport and Housing Bureau, 20
October 2010)
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entitling the movement to the crisis status.

The spokesperson for the Transport and

Housing Bureau argued that the project was supported by the general public since it
would bring enormous social and economic, so the government had submitted the
proposal to the LegCo as scheduled (Apple Daily, 30 November 2009).

It appeared

that the continuous protests and demonstrations against the building of the railway
had not “threatened” the government. Although the filibustering of Pan-democrat
lawmakers had delayed the appropriation process twice (18 December 2009 and 8
January 2009), the government was confident from very beginning that there would
be enough votes to pass the appropriation in the LegCo with firm support from
mainly Pro-establishment lawmakers.

Therefore, the movement could only be

defined as a potential crisis, as the government in fact did not admit that it was a
governance crisis.

However, from a societal perspective, the movement had made a sense for a crisis.
There were continuous demonstrations and protests outside the LegCo building and
the Government House, with protesters using different means of demonstration, such
as the ascetic practice by university students and the booths selling goods and food
outside the LegCo and at Choi Yuen Village, which were widely reported by the mass
media.

The 2003 Demonstration was a single event that terminated the Article 23

legislation, while the Anti-High Speed Railway movement was a process in which
the activists tried to force the government into conformity in a way similar to the
2003 incident, that is, by using the so-called “people power”. The slow-burning
nature of the Anti-High Speed Railway movement made it difficult to determine
whether it should be classified as a crisis in the sense-making process.
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Decision-Making
The Hong Kong Section of the Guangzhou-Shenzhen-Hong Kong Express Rail Link
was one of the largest infrastructure projects in Hong Kong after 1997. As an urban
policy, the High Speed Railway went through the policymaking process, in which the
policy entrepreneur (Kingdon 1995) was Eva Cheng, who was completely
responsible for this project as the Secretary for Transport and Housing.

In this

regard, the crisis management term in this incident was small. Although there was
no prior signal that the request for appropriation from the LegCo would fail, Cheng
never wasted any opportunity in lobbying different social groups to support the
project, including the speeches she delivered at Hong Kong Express Rail Link Forum
(30 October 2009), the luncheon meeting of the Hong Kong Institute of Directors (14
December 2010), and the numerous LegCo Q&A sections.

In this case, the major

“battlefield” was the LegCo, and the government’s effort in pushing the bill forward
and its awareness in the need to lobby for support from LegCo members could be
reflected in the large number of administrative papers submitted by the
Subcommittees on Matters Relating to Railways to the LegCo, as listed in Table
10.1.

Table 10.1 Subcommittee on Matters Relating to Railways (Papers) Guangzhou-Shenzhen-Hong Kong Express Rail Link (Hong Kong Section)
LegCo Reference

Title

Date

CB(1)356/09-10(01)

Administration's paper attaching a draft Public

13 November 2009

Works Subcommittee (PWSC) paper on special 16 November 2009

CB(1)361/09-10(01)

ex-gratia payments

17 November 2009

Administration's paper attaching two draft

13 November 2009

PWSC papers on the construction of the

16 November 2009

railway works and non-railway works

17 November 2009

respectively
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CB(1)400/09-10(02)

Administration's paper on Hong Kong Section

13 November 2009

of Guangzhou-Shenzhen-Hong Kong Express
Rail Link (Chinese version only)
CB(1)400/09-10(03)

Administration's paper on Hong Kong Section

13 November 2009

of Guangzhou-Shenzhen-Hong Kong Express
Rail Link (Chinese version only)
CB(1)356/09-10(02)

Administration's paper on the Hong Kong

13 November 2009

Section of Guangzhou-Shenzhen-Hong Kong

16 November 2009

Express Rail Link (supplementary information

17 November 2009

paper)
CB(1)503/09-10(01)

Administration's paper on funding arrangement 16 November 2009
of the Hong Kong Section of the
Guangzhou-Shenzhen-Hong Kong Express
Rail Link: Supplementary information on the
increase in costs of the railway and
non-railway works (Follow-up paper)

CB(1)398/09-10(01)

Administration's paper on Hong Kong Section

16 November 2009

of Guangzhou-Shenzhen-Hong Kong Express
Rail Link (powerpoint presentation materials)
(Chinese version only)
CB(1)503/09-10(03)

Administration's paper on the Hong Kong

16 November 2009

Section of the Guangzhou-Shenzhen-Hong
Kong Express Rail Link: associated traffic
facilities for the West Kowloon Terminus
(Follow-up paper)
CB(1)503/09-10(02)

Administration's paper on the Hong Kong

16 November 2009

Section of the Guangzhou-Shenzhen-Hong
Kong Express Rail Link: patronage forecast,
economic benefit and operational viability
(Follow-up paper)
CB(1)423/09-10(01)

Administration's paper on briefing on the

17 November 2009

planning of the West Kowloon Terminus
(powerpoint presentation materials)
CB(1)423/09-10(03)

Administration's paper on cross-boundary
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17 November 2009

passenger traffic forecast (powerpoint
presentation materials) (Chinese version only)
CB(1)399/09-10(01)

Administration's paper on Hong Kong Section

17 November 2009

of XRL - operational viability
CB(1)423/09-10(02)

Administration's paper on pedestrian linkages

17 November 2009

and road schemes adjacent to West Kowloon
Cultural District (powerpoint presentation
materials)
Source:

Legislative Council, 2012

Compared to another important infrastructure – the Hong Kong-Zhuhai-Macao
Bridge, in which the government submitted only six administration papers to the
LegCo within the entire 2008-2009 legislative year before its funding was
appropriated in May 2009, the large number of papers related to the High Speed
Railway, as listed in Table 10.1, was an indication that the government attempted to
defend the project by providing details on items such as “Supplementary information
on the increase in costs of the railway and non-railway works” (CB(1)503/09-10(01)),
“associated traffic facilities for the West Kowloon Terminus” (CB(1)503/09-10(03)),
“patronage

forecast,

(CB(1)503/09-10(02)),
(CB(1)423/09-10(03)).

economic
and

benefit

“cross-boundary

and

operational

passenger

traffic

viability”
forecast”

It was obvious that the government was trying hard to

explain and answer all enquiries in order to ensure a smooth appropriation request.
To conclude, the decision-making of the government in this incident was to monitor
the issue, so as to make sure that the bill could pass successfully in the LegCo, and at
the same time, prevent any policy failure.

However, the government had

demonstrated its concern on public opinion, which will be detailed in the following
part.
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Meaning-Making
Theoretically, the main function of crisis communication is to reduce public and
political uncertainty (Boin, 't Hart and Stern, et al. 2005). However, in this incident,
the major concern of the government was to make sure that LegCo would pass the
bill smoothly in order to prevent policy failure.

Therefore, the strategy of the

government was to persuade the lawmakers so as to influence the general public to
support the High Speed Railway project.

As suggested by Boin, 't Hart, Stern, et al. (2005), the three factors important to
government crisis communication are the degree of preparedness, the degree of
coordination of outgoing information, and the degree of professionalization.

The

Choi Yuen Tsuen Newsletters, published by the Highways Department, was an
example of the communication effort made by the government in this case. From
June 2009 to November 2010, fifteen issues of newsletter were published 62, with the
aim of providing relevant information to the villagers of Choi Yuen Village, and
informing them of the arrangements made by the government for the affected bodies
(Choi Yuen Tsuen Newsletters, Issue No. 1, 24 June 2009,). Despite the claim that
the newsletter was an informative publication, the persuasion effort made by the
government in the newsletters was obvious, as could be seen from the headline of
Issue No. 1, which suggested that the Choi Yuen Village locality was the best choice
for building the High Speed Railway depot among the other possibilities (Choi Yuen
Tsuen Newsletters, Issue No. 1, 24 June 2009).

In addition, although the publisher

of the newsletters was a civil services department (Highways Department), the

62

Please go to http://www.expressraillink.hk/en/multimedia-gallery/publications-and-publicity.html
for accessing the Choi Yuen Tsuen Newsletters (Chinese version only)
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political orientation was apparent.

Issue No. 2 of the newsletter included a “sharing”

by a District Councillor on how he had helped a villager to communicate with the
government through peaceful means in order to achieve some requests of the
villagers (Choi Yuen Tsuen Newsletters, Issue No. 2, 6 July 2009). The discourses
of “communication achieving win-win situation” could be found in Issues No. 2 to 6
in January 2010, when the LegCo approved the appropriation.

The earlier newsletters could be regarded as a sort of propaganda, especially when
compared to those published after the funding approval (Issues No. 7 to 15).
Starting from Issue No. 7, which was published a few days after the appropriation, no
more interviews, sharing, or persuasive articles (for supporting the project) was
found.

The newsletter had simply become a medium for the government to make

announcements, such as asking the villagers to register for the resettlement scheme
as soon as possible (Choi Yuen Tsuen Newsletters, Issue No. 7, 20 January 2010).
The content of the newsletters had also become straightforward, such as: The option
of “village relocation” would not be considered (Choi Yuen Tsuen Newsletters, Issue
No. 8, 30 January 2010); there was no room for further negotiation with the
government (regarding compensation) (Choi Yuen Tsuen Newsletters, Issue No. 9, 12
February 2010), and no more delay would be allowed for the villages to move out
(Choi Yuen Tsuen Newsletters, Issue No. 13, 17 June 2010).

It can be concluded that the political communication effort made by the government
was aimed at preventing a policy failure as a result of the inappropriate handling of
the incident.

By using different means, such as the lobbying done by Eva Cheng

and corresponding government officials (as mentioned in the sense-making part), and
the newsletter publication, which were unusual for other government projects, the
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government’s meaning-making attempt on smoothing the policymaking (cum
appropriation request) process was noticeable.

Although these preventive

communication strategies could not be directly regarded as real crisis communication,
they should be considered as essential parts of the meaning-making process, which
was closely related to the sense-making process.

Terminating
The termination of a crisis meant the start of the assignment of accountability.
Technically, Eva Cheng, as a political appointee under the Principal Official
Accountability System (POAS), was undoubtedly accountable for political
consequences of the High Speed Railway project.

However, the policy process was

a success, as the bill was passed by the LegCo with no amendment or significant
delay. Thus, there could not be a blame assignment.

The operational closure and political closure assessment were complicated.

The

date on which the LegCo appropriated the funding, 16 January 2010, could be
regarded as an operational closure. However, the conflicts related to the removal of
Choi Yuen Village lasted for almost 10 more months.

The first phase of the

removal was carried out on 4 November 2010, while the second phase was on 19
November 2010 (Choi Yuen Tsuen Newsletter, Issue No. 15, 12 November 2010).
Both phases saw strong resistance from the villagers and social activists, and the land
reclaiming process had not been successful (Oriental Daily, 20 November 2010).

The political closure could not be assessed without mentioning the rise of the new
group of social activists known as the “Post-80s”, who have become the new pillars
for social movements.

Their organizations and networks in the protests related to
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the 2012 National Education controversy were viewed as the legacy of the Anti-High
Speed Railway movement (Respondent C).

Thus, even though the railway issue

was over, the “Post-80s” organizations are still in place and are ready for future
incidents.

As such, political closure could not be measured clearly.

To conclude, crisis termination in the Leadership Approach mainly focuses on the
settlement of a crisis.
severe enough.

Identifying a closure would be difficult if the crisis were not

Moreover, a clear distinction between operational closure and

political closure is not always achievable, and the end of the blaming process does
not automatically mean a complete political closure, as the dissatisfaction of the
public or activists could extend into future actions. Once the blame shifts to the
system (i.e., political institution), the incident itself would no longer be the major
focus, as what the public is actually eager for are reforms and real changes behind
the scene.

Learning
The learning process in this incident was not obvious due to the reality of policy
success - passing of the bill by the LegCo. The old way of doing things, that is,
garnering the support of pro-establishment camp, was proven to be effective.

As

such, there was not a strong incentive for the government to make a genuine change,
except as a public relations tactic.

Characteristics of cyberactivists, defined by

McCaughey and Ayers (2003) as internet users who actively participated in the
online social movement and transformed the virtual movement to a real social
movement by using internet as a channel for organizing, were observed in the
Anti-High Speed Railway movement, and thus, there was a voice asking the
government to respond to this new trend.
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As a result, the government launched a

Facebook page called “Upper Albert Road” (later retitled as “Office of the Chief
Executive”63), though its effectiveness in gathering opinions from social activists of
the new generation (i.e. cyberactivists or the Post-80s) was doubtful.

From a

decision-making perspective, there was no real change in the government
policymaking process, but a rather interactive framework could be seen.

The

learning process, which was not obvious, could be considered a result of the positive
policy outcomes of the High Speed Railway project, as it had proven that the old way
of policymaking was still useful.

10.3

Politicization Approach Analysis

Constructing Severity
The process of framing in the Anti-High Speed Railway incident was diverged.

In

the severity dimension, it was crucial to define whether the incident had violated the
core values of the public.

From the perspective of the social activists and

pan-democrats, the High Speed Railway incident was framed as a malfunction of the
LegCo, with the passage of the appropriation guaranteed due to support from the
Functional Constituency, which was described as a rubber stamp, or a “voting
machine” (Apple Daily, 23 January 2010). Moreover, the FC was also blamed for
being a kind of “business-government collusion”, as most of its members are from
various business sectors (Ming Pao, 20 January 2010). On the other hand, some
newspapers described the activists as merely anti-government, and that in fact, the
majority of the people were supporting the project (Oriental Daily, 23 January 2012).

In reality, the incident could not be classified as a policy failure due to the passage of

63

The page was closed after CY Leung took the office of CE
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the funding request.

At the same time, framing the High Speed Railway project as a

violation or threat to core public values was inappropriate, especially when compared
to the Car-Gate scandal, in which a conflict of interest was observed.

In the whole

policymaking process, the absence of public participation (Ming Pao, 20 January
2010) and overemphasis on the importance of “development” (Ming Pao, 26 January
2010) might be the only reasonable critiques on the government, and was clearly not
strong enough for the incident to be framed as a violation of core public values.
According to the blame constructing model (Brandstrom and Kuipers 2003), the
incident could not proceed to the agency dimension and responsibility dimension
when severity could not be constructed.

10.4

Summary on Leadership and Politicization Approaches Analyses

There were difficulties in applying the Leadership and Politicization Approaches to
analyze the Anti-High Speed Railway movement, as both models emphasize on the
severity of the crisis.

Since the Leadership Approach focuses on what should be

done by the government, and the Politicization Approach focuses on who should be
blamed, the more severe a severe crisis is, the better it would fit into the models.
However, as discussed previously, the Anti-High Speed Railway incident was not
severe enough to attain the status of a crisis, making the results of applying the
models insignificant.

Specifically, the Leadership Approach is government-oriented,

focusing mainly on the leaders in crisis management.

However, the government is

only one side of the story. As can be seen in the Anti-High Speed Railway incident,
state-society interactions are crucial to the development of a crisis.

On the other

hand, the Politicization Approach is a blame-allocating model aimed at studying the
politicization of crisis aftermath, but not the crisis itself.
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Thus, it is not useful in

discussing how a not-so-serious incident would advance to a crisis.

In summary,

when applied to the Anti-High Speed Railway incident, both models performed
unsatisfactorily and their explanatory power is weak.

10.5

State-society Interactive Framework Analysis

Many of the respondents had participated in the Anti-high speed railway movement
with different levels of involvement.

Respondent G, as one of the coordinators

from a Pan-democrat party, was greatly involved since the very beginning.
Respondent G said that the movement could be dated back to late 2008 when the
Choi Yuen Villagers learnt from the government about the high speed railway project.
They were asked to move out within two years.

Respondent G stated that the issue

was neglected until late 2009 since no one knew what high speed railway and Choi
Yuen Village were. Thus, the major role for them was to make the issue public.
They tried to collect signatures through a “street station” (a booth with banners and
leaflets). However, the outcome was insignificant until some of the Post’s 80 began
to expose the issue on the internet.

In contrast, one of the Pan-democrat party leaders (Respondent C) admitted that the
role of the party as a whole was rather supportive throughout the movement as the
party had participated in actions such as mobilization, coordination and liaison
especially at the beginning.

Respondent C observed that the Choi Yuen Villagers

and those young activists who highly concerned about conservation issues were the
initiators of the movement.

In fact it all started with those victims, (i.e. Choi Yuen

Villages) and later on spread over to other stakeholders (i.e. conservation activist)
and finally the so called “Post 80’s” young activist joined.
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From the observations of the respondents, the development of Anti-high speed
railway incident was a slow-burning crisis as it did not catch much public attention
until much effort was made to escalate the issue into the public agenda.

Different

actors and activists were trying to develop sufficient Crisis Strengthening Forces in
order to push forward their wants and demands.

Compare with the 2003 Demonstration, the Anti-high speed railway incident
happened carried a special feature. The rapid and intensive use of internet as a
means of communication among different non-state actors especially by the Post 80s’
was surprising.

Almost all respondents who participated in the movement gave

credits to the mobilization power through internet.

On the other hand, during this

incident, the government had first attempted to make use of the internet in response
to the public demands.

At the beginning of the outbreak of the incident, the

government started to realize the importance of the internet on policy development
and governance.

Instead of merely using internet as a tool for distributing

information through government official website and taking in public opinion and
enquiry though e-mail, the Hong Kong government began to use the internet in a
more creative and “interactive” manner.

For instance, the Transport and Housing Bureau had set up an “online forum”
through Facebook for three hours on 6 February 2010 to collect comments on
different policy issues especially on building the Express Rail Link.

This was a

typical one-way “e-participation” as no “response” could be made on others’ posts,
(i.e. can be done by internet settings), and it was aimed at providing a platform for
the public to express their opinions (Apple Daily, 16 February 2010).
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It was taken

as public relation tactics instead of sincerely listening and consulting the public in an
interactive way as the page was created after the funding bill has been submitted to
the LegCo waiting for appropriation.
of a true heart consultation.

Obviously, it was part of the lobbying instead

At the same time, the government did not respond after

getting comments from its Facebook.

In this regard, on the other way round, it

showed that the government has acknowledged internet as a new media which has
becoming a new battlefield between both parties on different political and social
issues.

It creates the elementary stage for generating the Crisis Strengthening and

Weakening Forces as discussed in Chapter Four.

The Movement: Success or Failure?
Respondent G suggested that the movement was a “fifty percent success” - to some
extent, the emerging of Post 80’s activists, the claiming of more compensation and
the relocating of Choi Yuen Village were regarded as partial success. However, the
appropriation of the funding in LegCo with no delay has made the movement “fifty
percent failure”.

In general, according to Respondent G, it was the result of

collective effort made by institutional channel (political party inside the LegCo), civil
society mobilization and the drive of villagers.

Both Respondent G and J (J is a social activist on railway affairs) suggested that the
fail to stop the high speed railway project was mainly because of the time limitation.
The government officially announced the funding bill for building the high speed
railway in October 2009 while the funding was approved by the LegCo in January
2010. As mentioned, this incident was a slow-burning crisis in which the short time
frame eliminated the further development of crisis politics and manipulation.

The

approval of funding by the LegCo was a significant Crisis Weakening Force as it was
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nearly impossible to “undo” it under current institutional setting.

Respondent J also mentioned that the focus of the event was not that touching upon
the core values of the general public.

In fact, the protests and collective actions

took place during the movement has attracted the public attentions as discussed in the
earlier section. Recapping some of those, the “Five Districts Tapas”, hunger strike
and the surrounding of LegCo building by the activists were all Crisis Strengthening
Forces which successfully drew the public attention onto the incident.

Apparently,

Crisis Strengthening Forces of this issue were multi-dimensional and they could be
reflected by the increasing newspaper coverage as listed in Table 10.3. However, if
went back to the core issue, the bill was approved with no delay.
some respondents admitted it was a partial failure.

That was why

Except the reason of time

limitation which was counterfactual, the newspaper discourse analysis conducted
below would provide a better understanding on the operation of Crisis Strengthening
(and Weakening) Forces.

The Anti-High Speed Railway Incident can be seen as a

latent crisis for the State-society Interactive Framework – a crisis failed to reach the
level of government change.

10.5.1 Results from Newspaper Discourse Analysis
Using a method similar to that of Lee and Chan (2011), “anti-high speed railway”
was chosen as a keyword for searching related articles on Wise News.

It should be

noted that, as mentioned in Lee and Chan (2011), even though this process may not
be able to gather all articles related to Anti-High Speed Railway movement, it is
useful for obtaining a comprehensive set of data without any systematic research bias.
All news reports, editorials, and commentary columns were selected, and the time
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range for the current search was chosen to cover the period of the whole movement,
that is, from the initiation of the project on 20 October 2009 to the passage of the
appropriation bill in LegCo on 27 January 2010.

This period was further divided

into four sub-periods according to the five major events during the movement listed
below:

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

20 Oct 2009 - the HKSARG announced the funding arrangement of the Express
Rail link
18 Dec 2009 - funding application was debated in the Finance Committee of the
Legislative Council for the first time
8 Jan 2010 - funding application was debated in the Finance Committee of the
Legislative Council for the second time
16 Jan 2010 - the LegCo appropriated the funding application
27 Jan 2010 - the construction work started

Period 1 covered the time between events 1 and 2, and Period 2 covered the time
between events 2 and 3, and so on. The analysis was conducted in an inductive
manner, with an aim of determining which groups of people were referred to in
reports of Anti-High Speed Railway incidents on newspapers, regardless of them
being mentioned in a formal news report, or just in editorials, Op-Eds, or
commentaries.

In total, seven categories of activists were recognized:

1) Tai Kok Tsui Residents (TKTR) - As the railway will pass under Tai
Kok Tsui, those residents might be potential victims of possible structural
damages to their homes.
2) Internet Activists (IA) - The cyberactivists who were opposed to the
project and participated actively online and/or offline.
3) Choi Yuen Villagers (CYV) - Choi Yuen Village had to be demolished
and its residents relocated, as its site would become the stabling siding
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for the express railway. This group was the direct victim in this project.
4) Professionals (PFs) – Experts from different sectors, including engineers,
scholars, and architects, who sometimes expressed their opinions
individually or as representatives of their respective professional
associations.
5) Post-80s youngsters (P80) – Young activists who were sometimes
referred to as (post-secondary) students, youngsters, or teenagers.
6) Pan-democrats (PD) - Lawmakers coming from, and members of,
Pan-democratic parties, also called “opposition parties” by
Pro-establishment media.
7) People who were called anti-express railway groups or organization, but
without sufficient information to be identified, would be coded under
Union and others (U&O).

How activists are identified can directly influence the opinion of the public towards
the movement.

According to two opinion polls conducted by the University of

Hong Kong Public Opinion Poll (HKU POP) at the end of 2009 to early 2010,
around 47% of the respondents supported the project during the first poll, increasing
to 50% after one week (Table 10.2).

It was surprising that as the Anti-High Speed

Railway movement gained higher media exposure and the protests outside the LegCo
stepped up in severity and variety, more people began to support the project.
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Table 10.2 HKU Public Opinion Poll on High-Speed Railway appropriation
Question: The government is seeking for LegCo funding of HK$ 66.9 billion, which is
equivalent to HK$10,000 per HK citizen, for the Express Rail Link construction project.
Do you incline to support or oppose the funding, or prefer to suspend it?
1st Survey: 29/12/09-5/1/10

2nd Survey: 11-13/1/2010

Support

47%

50%

Oppose

23%

20%

Suspend

22%

24%

Don't know/ Hard to say

9%

6%

100% (1,018)

100% (1,008)

Answer/Date of survey

Total (N)
Source:

HKU POP SITE releases survey on Express Rail Link in cooperation with Justice & Peace
Commission of the HK Catholic Diocese - Press Release on January 7, 2010, available at:
http://hkupop.hku.hk/english/release/release726.html
HKU POP SITE releases second survey on Express Rail Link in cooperation with Justice & Peace
Commission of the HK Catholic Diocese - Press Release on January 14, 2010, available at:
http://hkupop.hku.hk/english/release/release729.html

Table 9.3 shows the results of the newspaper discourse analysis, and attention should
be devoted to three of the groups:

Tai Kok Tsui Residents (TKTR) and Choi Yuen

Villagers (CYV), who were supposed to be the victims of this project, and the
Post-80s young activists (P80), who were very active in different aspects, including
online and offline participation.

A comparison of data for Periods 1 and 2 with

Periods 3 and 4 shows that in the earlier periods, more newspapers tended to identify
Choi Yuen Villagers or Tai Kok Tsui Residents as the activists, while in the latter
periods, after the public began to pay attention to the movement when the LegCo was
debating the proposal followed by approving the appropriation, less focus was given
to those victims.

Instead, the Post-80s were regarded as the movement activists.

Specifically, the change in Wenweipo was the most significant, as its identification of
Post-80s as activists increased from 0% in Period 1 to more than 90% in Period 3.
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Table 10.3 Identification of the movement activists (percent)
WENWEIPO
Group/Period

ORIENTAL DAILY

P1

P2

P3

P4

TKTR

0

0

0

0

TKTR

IA

0

0

0

0

IA

U&O

100

12.5

0

42.8

CYV

50

25

0

PFs

0

12.5

P80

0

PD
Articles (N)

Group/Period

P1

P2

P3

P4

38.4

11.1

25

0

23

5.5

12.5

3.7

U&O

15.3

22.2

10

30.1

5.7

CYV

53.8

11.1

5

3.7

0

0

PFs

15.3

0

0

0

62.5

92.3

42.8

P80

53.8

61.1

75

67.9

0

62.5

30.7

14.2

PD

0

38.8

22.5

5.6

(2)

(8)

(13)

(35)

Articles (N)

(13)

(18)

(40)

(53)

MING PAO
Group/Period

APPLE DAILY

P1

P2

P3

P4

Group/Period

P1

P2

P3

P4

TKTR

26.6

0

0

0.9

TKTR

31.8

10.5

1.5

0

IA

13.3

6.6

4.7

8.8

IA

4.5

18.4

9.2

4.4

U&O

40

23.3

20.6

15.6

U&O

9

13.1

20

32.8

CYV

20

13.3

0

3.9

CYV

45.4

18.4

10.7

2.9

PFs

20

3.3

3.1

1.9

PFs

9

10.5

3

0

P80

33.3

66.6

73

57.8

P80

50

63.1

61.5

53.7

PD

0

13.3

9.5

19.6

PD

9

15.7

20

8.9

(15)

(30)

(63)

(102) Articles (N)

(22)

(38)

(65)

(67)

Articles (N)
Key:

Tai Kok Tsui Residents (TKTR), Internet Activists (IA), Choi Yuen Villagers (CYV),
Professionals (PFs), Post’s 80 Activists (P80), Pan-democrats (PD)

Note:

Number of articles does not include those without relevant information to the question.

Sum of

percentage can be larger than 100% since one article can be coded under multiple categories.
Source:

Self-collected data from the four local newspapers in Hong Kong through WiseNews

10.5.2 Discussions
From the State-society Interactive Framework analysis (Figure 10.1), the media
exposure failed to form sufficient political pressure towards the government as it
missed the focus.

The Choi Yuen Villagers and Tai Kok Tsui Residents should be

the victims, and thus, their fight for their own interest through different kinds of
Anti-High Speed Railway movement was completely legitimate.
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The results from

Period 1 show that most newspaper articles identified these two groups as the
activists at the very beginning of the movement.

However, in the latter periods,

Post-80s activists were labeled as the new blood of social movement, and hence had
dominated the news reports, as newspapers shifted from reporting the opposition of
victims to reporting the new generation of social movement, with special focus on
the different social movement activities.

Some articles in Wenweipo even argued

that the Post-80s activists were manipulated by opposition parties (Pan-democrats).
The legitimacy of the whole movement had been reduced, as newspapers focused on
reporting their tactics as a new format of social movement, or labeling them as
radical or being manipulated, all of which had no relationship with the controversy
itself.

The final outcome was that support for the railway project had increased

during the movement, and the crisis was significantly weakened.
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Crisis Weakening Force:
●

Government
Change

Majority of the LegCo member (Pro-government)
supported the project firmly

●

Media agenda shifted from the negative side of the
project to the rising of young activist (post 80’s)

●

The public supporting rate on the project was
increasing according to HKU surveys

●

The government officials had made their effort on
persuading different actors by emphasizing the

Governance
Crisis

important of development
●

The issue did not converted into a governance
crisis

Crisis Strengthening Force:
●

Numerous collective actions organized by activists

●

The focus of the mass media was turned from
reporting the victims to the post 80’s

Crisis
●

Focus shifted - from livelihood to political conflicts

●

No catalytic effect existed

Figure 10.1 State-society Interactive Framework analysis on Anti-High Speed
Railway incident

Based on the analyses with both the Leadership and Politicization Approaches and
the newspapers discourse analysis in the previous section, it can be concluded that
the Strengthening Forces in this incident was not strong enough to escalate it to a
governance crisis.

Although the Anti-High Speed Railway movement gained plenty

of media exposures, the media discourse had missed the focus of the incident, and
thus, the Strengthening Force was significantly reduced.

At the same time, the

government had maintained a sufficient level of Crisis Weakening Forces through
various means. First, the government had guaranteed enough votes in the LegCo to
pass the appropriation of funding for the project.

Second, there was an increase in

the rate of support for the project as newspapers shifted from reporting on the project
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itself to focusing on the movement, which, along with the rise of the Post-80s that
had drawn the attention of the public, had diminished the Crisis Strengthening Forces.
Although there were some eye-catching protests outside the LegCo Building and the
Government House, the catalytic effect did not exist.

After the funding had been

approved, the Anti-High Speed Railway issue gradually dropped out from the scenes,
even though some of the activists had changed their battlefield to the conservation of
Choi Yuen Village.

The above four chapters has demonstrated the two parts of case study.

In the next

chapter, discussion and analysis on findings and observations will be presented.

It

is important to under what has yielded by this research in order to contribute to the
theory discussion in crisis management.
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CHAPTER ELEVEN: DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS

11.1

Overview

In the previous chapters, the two conventional crisis management approaches,
namely, the Leadership Approach and the Politicization Approach, were applied to
the analysis of different crises.

In general, the two approaches were applicable to

some, but not all, types of crises.

The Leadership Approach was strong in

analyzing large-scale crises involving a large number of people and a distinctive
crisis management core group, such as natural disasters or diseases (e.g., SARS),
whereas the Politicization Approach was designed to assign blames to specific
government official, such as Antony Leung in the Car-Gate Scandal.

While their contributions should be acknowledged, weaknesses were also observed
in both approaches, as both of them were not explanatory in nature, and failed to
properly address questions such as “why was there a crisis?”

The Leadership

Approach, for example, was an aftermath review of crisis, and while the
Politicization Approach could explain how blames were being assigned after a crisis,
it still failed to explain why a crisis had become so serious that the officials should be
blamed, and further discussion using the Politicization Approach would be unfruitful
if the incident was not serious enough.

It is these limitations that led to the formation of the State-society Interactive
Framework to illustrate the development of a crisis.

As mentioned previously, it is

reasonable to expect that governance crises in Hong Kong, a limited democracy, are
completely different from those under the full democratic context, which western
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scholars have always taken for granted.

The current research has also interviewed

17 respondents to obtain enough data to form a solid empirical basis for constructing
a new crisis management framework.

11.2

The Leadership Approach

11.2.1

Crisis Management as Procedures

The Leadership Approach consists of five elements, namely sense-making,
decision-making, meaning-making, terminating, and learning (Boin, 't Hart and Stern,
et al. 2005), which could be understood as the essential procedures of crisis
management, and are commonly described as steps or patterns in current literature ('t
Hart, Rosenthal and Kouzmin 1993, Boin 2004, Boin, 't Hart and Stern, et al. 2005,
Rosenthal and Kouzmin 1993, 1997).

From a managerial perspective, these steps

and patterns form a crisis management cycle, and are guidelines developed by
scholars for crisis managers, who are most likely government officials.

Discovering

a crisis (as sense-making) is always the most important issue, as crisis management
should start with crisis recognition.

Learning, as an aftermath of crisis, is

necessary for preventing similar crises from happening in the future.

However, the

significance of these five elements may vary between crises.

For example,

sense-making can either be minor or unobservable if the crisis happened too fast or
too strong.
attacks.

Further, hindsight is always perfect, as in the case of the 911 terrorist

No one could have predicted such a tragedy beforehand.

However,

tracing the clues in the aftermath is always easy, as argued in Boin, 't Hart, Stern, et
al. (2005, 23), in the United States, if the information collected by Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) were pieced together with that from the Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA), the authorities could have been alerted before the attack.
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Even though the Leadership Approach is a comprehensive set of procedures covering
most aspects of managing a crisis, its weakness is that it is not explanatory in nature.
Rather than explaining “what would happen if something was done”, it is more
similar to a handbook or guideline on “what should be done”.

In Boin, 't Hart,

Stern, et al.’s (2005) words, the main theme of this approach is to advise those
leaders to avert threat or at least minimize the damage of the crisis, and to explain
what went wrong so as to convince the public that it would not happen again.

It

should be noted that the five stages in the Leadership Approach is comparable to the
stages model (Jones 1984) in public policymaking.

However, a more interesting

topic to political scientists would be the interaction between different actors during a
crisis, as in Kingdon’s (1995) Multi-Stream Model describing agenda setting and its
relations with policy change.

11.2.2

Top-down: Government or Leader-oriented

As an approach and a checklist of “must do” in crisis management designed for the
leaders, the main focus or target audience of the Leadership Approach is the
government officials, and thus, this method could be described as a top-down
approach, which assumes that the government (the leader) is the major actor in crisis
management and should take a prominent role.
other actors are not taken into account.

The problem is that the responses of

Although meaning-making (i.e., crisis

communication) focus on how the public perceive the government’s responses, there
is no interaction between the two, meaning that it should be regarded as a one-way
top-down communication.

225

Crisis communication is a big issue in crisis management, and is a highly sensitive
topic in real politics.

As discussed in the literature review, messages that have gone

through mediation and mediatization (Mazzoleni and Schulz 1999) may be perceived
very differently from the original meaning that the government has intended to
deliver.

This is evidence of the active role of mass media in the transmission of

information in a crisis.

Mazzoleni and Schulz (1999) further argued that the mass

media is more eager to frame (or manipulate) the news story, a view supported by
many of the interview respondents in the current study who are reporters
(Respondents K, N, and O).

Respondent D even used the word “dramatization” to

describe the story-making strategy by the mass media to attract audience, and
accounted for it by the need for the mass media to make profit as privately-owned
organizations.

Thus, it is impossible to ignore the effect of the mass media’s

proactive role, which is one of the weaknesses of the Leadership Approach, as it
could only represent the government leaders’ perspective of crisis management.

11.2.3

The Issue on Severity

The level of seriousness of a crisis plays a significant role in assessing the efficacy of
Leadership Approach.

In general, the more severe the case is, the more powerful

the model becomes, as in the incidents of the Car-Gate Scandal and the SARS
outbreak.

The Car-Gate Scandal had been a serious case since its first day of

exposure, as it was a violation of public value – conflict of interest by a senior
government official.

Om the other hand, the SARS outbreak, though not as serious

as the Car-Gate Scandal at first, became much more critical in mid-March 2003
along with the global alert issued by the WHO.
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The comprehensiveness of the Leadership Approach analysis is dependent on the
severity of the crisis, as when the crisis is “serious enough”, more resources would
be involved and more attention would be drawn.

However, apart from the severe

crises, scholars are also interested in topics in grey areas (e.g., potential crises or
social issues) that finally dropped out from the scene.

In this regard, the Anti-High

Speed Railway incident could serve as an example, as an analysis on it suggested that
the incident was not serious enough, and as such, failed to fit into the Leadership
Approach.

This example shows that the level of severity would be the major

limitation for this approach, as it had decided what should be “managed” as a crisis
theoretically.

Through efforts of prevention – those “minor” steps taken beforehand

to avoid the intensification of an issue into a crisis, topics in grey areas could be
screened out due to its lack of severity, which also answers an important question in
crisis management – why only some issues could become crisis.

11.2.4

Dependence on a Clear Start and a Clear End

Severity, to some extent, is linked to the emphasis of a clear start and cut off of a
crisis.

Sense-making is related to how a crisis started – either by being recognized

or gained a crisis status, whereas both operational and political termination concern
with how a crisis ended.

It is much easier to identify the beginning and the end of a

serious crisis, which usually creates an abnormal condition by distracting the daily
operation of the government and leading to chaos.

Similarly, the end of a crisis can

be determined by whether conditions have “returned to normal”.

Both the Car-Gate

Scandal and SARS outbreak should fall into this category, as their start and end
could be recognized without much difficulty.

However, the starting points of the

Article 23 legislation controversy and the Anti-High Speed Railway movement were
more ambiguous.

Specifically, the Anti-High Speed Railway movement could not
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be considered as a significant governance crisis but a latent crisis, and the assessment
of learning process in the Leadership Approach became meaningless, as the
government believed that its “vote counting” tactics in policymaking was proven to
be functioning properly.

In general, analyses based on sense-making and

terminating are effective for serious crises with clear starts and ends.

In contrast,

starts and ends could not be easily recognized in cases that are potential or
“unsuccessful” governance crises.

11.2.5

The Leadership Approach: Summary

As Boin, 't Hart, Stern et al. (2005, 9) mentioned, the Leadership Approach aims to
“find out what crises ‘do’ to establish political and organizational orders”.
Although the authors criticized the overtly instrumental orientation of those self-help
and how-to books that call for a crisis free environment, the Leadership Approach
still could not escape from the issue of “what should be done”.

The five elements

the authors suggested are still instrument-oriented, and could not solve the question
of “why crisis had happened or was created”.

In summary, the Leadership

Approach is useful for analyzing large-scale crisis with high severity, such as
political scandals and natural disasters. The clear start and clear end brought by the
severity also fit into the comprehensiveness of the Leadership Approach.

However,

as its name suggests, the Approach is mainly government- or leader-oriented, and
therefore, actions and reactions of other actors are either briefly acknowledged or
completely neglected.

This is the limitation of the Leadership Approach.

228

11.3
11.3.1

The Politicization Approach
Path Dependence

The Politicization Approach is based on a blame constructing chart derived by
Brandstrom and Kuipers (2003), which contains three levels, namely, severity
dimension, agency dimension and responsibility dimension (Figure 3.1).

Every

dimension represents a yes or no question, and the answer to the previous question
would directly affect the next dimension (i.e., path dependence).

The tree starts

with “the problem occurs,” and the first level (i.e., severity dimension) is to decide
whether crucial public values are violated or threatened.

If no violation or threats

were found, the crucial values would not be at stake, and the blaming process would
be stopped.

However, the definition of crucial value is confusing.

As stated in

Brandstrom and Kuipers (2003), when a situation is viewed as non-political with no
threats to core values, the events would be eliminated from the blame game.
Based on this mechanism, there exists a threshold to initiate the blaming mechanism
– harm to public values.

Thus, the Car-Gate Scandal was turned into a huge crisis,

as it involved a conflict of interest by a senior government official. On the other
hand, core public values are not clearly defined in the Anti-High Speed Railway
incident, and therefore, the Politicization Approach could not be applied.

Apart from the severity dimension in the beginning, it is also difficult to make a
strong judgment in the agency dimension and responsibility dimension.
Brandstrom and Kuipers (2003) divided the agency dimension into an incident or a
symptom.

In the incident dimension, the case is framed as an operational and a

technical issue focusing on lower-level actors, whereas the symptom dimension
interprets the issue as a strategic and political issue focusing on higher-level actors.
Sometimes a case could be consisted of both components, leaving a grey area
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in-between the incident and symptom dimensions.

For example, in the SARS

outbreak, there were operational issues as stated in the Hospital Authority Report.
At the same time, the SARS outbreak was a political symptom of Tung’s poor
administration. The non-exclusive nature of the dimensions would significantly
weaken the explanatory power of Politicization Approach.

11.3.2

Core Public Value: a Hard and Fast Rule

The vital component in deciding whether a crisis deserves the blame is a violation or
threat to core public values, though it is doubtful that every crisis starts with a
violation of public values.

Generally, it could be expected in all political scandals,

but not in policy failures and natural disasters.

Although the SARS case is widely

accepted as a crisis due to its severity, it did not violate public values.

On the other

hand, the legislation of Article 23 and High Speed Railway incident were truly
political, and the Article 23 incident was a very exceptional case in which a bill was
blamed for its attempt to restrict human rights and freedom.

Alternatively, policy

failure could be a mistake in grasping the national mood64 as Kingdon’s (1995)
stream model suggested.

The definition of severity should be multidimensional, as

death on a large-scale or huge loss of public money are all reasonable possibilities to
start the blame constructing process.

11.3.3

The Aftermath Blame Game

The major contribution of the Politicization Approach is showing how blames are
assigned.

The blame constructing chart mentioned five possible outcomes, namely,

64

As stated in Kingdon (1995, 146), national mood was defined as “the notion that a rather large
number of people out in the country are thinking along certain common lines, that this national mood
changes from one time to another in discernible ways, and that these changes in mood or climate have
important impacts on policy agendas and policy outcomes”.
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crucial values at stake (no blame was being constructed), scapegoat, organizational
mishap, failing policy-maker, and policy/system failure.

In general, this approach

focuses on the post-crisis arrangement (blaming), with little attention paid on the
crisis management efforts being made during the crisis.

In real politics, assigning

accountability to officials after every serious incident is an unavoidable task.

In

fact, the blaming game (Hood 2002) is just part of the crisis management process.
More importantly, blaming always happens in the aftermath.

For example, the

post-SARS outbreak investigations lasted for a year after the disease was under
control, and it was also a year after the end of the crisis that Yeoh Eng-kiong, the
Secretary for Health, Welfare and Food resigned.

The five possible outcomes mentioned in the previous paragraph could be
categorized into three sub-sets – no blame assigned, actor failure (either top-level or
front-line staff), and network failure (either implementation failure or policy/system
failure).

In this regard, two important questions are neglected – how was the blame

constructed?

What would happen after blames had been constructed?

Similar to

the Leadership Approach, the Politicization Approach is also limited in that its
results are always non-self-explanatory.
about any blame.

A not-so-serious crisis would not bring

If someone stepped-down due to accountability, it should be

regarded as a failure of the actor.

In general, the approach is useful in justifying the

outcomes instead of explaining them.

11.3.4

The Politicization Approach: Summary

The Politicization Approach is innovative in the field of crisis management in that it
provides a political account to the construction of post-crisis blame that is distinctive
from the instrumental-oriented theories (Boin, 't Hart and Stern, et al. 2005) that has
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been dominating the field.

The step-by-step model is supposed to be clear and easy

to apprehend, but the non-exclusive feature of three dimensions has weakened the
explanatory power of this approach.

Also, a thing that could be concluded from the

analyses of case studies is that it is difficult to determine whether an incident is an
actor failure or network failure, as most crises are caused by multiple reasons.

In

fact, of the four incidents discussed in the previous chapters, none had a definite
conclusion.

Owing to its step-by-step feature, if an incident failed to pass the severity dimension,
it would not be able to reach the other dimensions, and no blame would be assigned.
In other words, an assumption of this approach, which has also confined its
applicability, is that there has been a serious mistake leading to a severe crisis.
Therefore, this approach was unable to explain the Anti-High Speed Railway
incident, which was only a potential crisis with no violation of or threats to core
public values.

Moreover, even if a crisis is severe, it would still be excluded if it

did not go against public values.

Thus, it is clear that a violation of core public

value is definitely important in distinguishing the severity of a crisis.

However,

most violations of core public values are found in political crises related to the
misconduct of government officials, such as sex scandal and corruption, whereas
crises brought by natural disasters might not be suitable.

From a macro perspective, the Politicization Approach principally focuses on one
particular step – construction of blame in the whole crisis management process,
which is also the most politicized part. However, it is impossible to see the full
picture without studying and analyzing the managerial aspect.

Thus, the

Politicization Approach, though essential, has to be supplemented by other models or
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theories, such as, the Leadership Approach, so that a comprehensive account could
be given.

11.4

Core Strengths of the State-society Interactive Framework

One of the reasons for the existence of a theoretical gap in the current theories is the
emergence of pro-active non-state actors due to the rapid development in information
technology and communications. The State-society Interactive Framework is
developed with filling this theoretical gap in mind, and has the following three
features:

11.4.1

Amalgamation of Top-down and Bottom-up Approaches

Complimentary contribution does not simply mean combining the top-down
(leadership) and bottom-up (politicization) approaches.

Instead, some components

of both approaches have been integrated into the Crisis Strengthening Forces and
Weakening Forces.

In general, the leadership and crisis management efforts made

by the government, including those observable actions as decisions on policy, rescue
efforts in disaster, allocation of resources, communication during crisis, and the
supportive actions performed by pro-government parties and organizations (i.e.,
positive media exposures), are regarded as Crisis Weakening Forces that attempt to
bring the crisis back to normal situation.

On the contrary, blaming and accountability issues are categorized as Crisis
Strengthening Forces.

Crisis is always a political sensitive issue. When the

government is criticized for not doing a good job in crisis management, public
dissatisfaction and hardship in the aftermath (e.g., the extremely poor economy after
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SARS in Hong Kong) would emerge as political pressure, with manipulation of
opposition parties and organizations possibly further worsening the situation. The
public would call for actions, such as independent investigation, assignment of
responsibilities to different officials involved, press for the resignation of particular
key actor(s), or even try to achieve policy change or institutional change from the
government.

In cases of diseases or natural disasters, even the natural environment

could act as a Strengthening Force.

If the crisis worsens to a level that is

uncontrollable, the anger of the people would be further intensified.

The State-society Interactive Framework could be regarded as a comprehensive crisis
management analytical approach.

Although crisis management is conventionally

seen as the responsibility of government, the analytic power of the Leadership
Approach is questionable, as it is similar to a handbook instructing the government
on what should be done when there is a crisis.

On the other hand, with its focus on

the blame and accountability assignment process, the Politicization Approach is more
analytical, though it could not truly reflect the efforts made by the government in
managing the crisis.

To cover for these limitations, the Framework integrates

elements of both approaches, and is able to provide a foundation for full assessment
on crisis politics.

11.4.2

Crisis Politics as Battles: Multi-crisis Effect

The textbook description of crisis as a cycle or in bell-shape is actually a
simplification of a crisis into the beginning, peak, and termination. There is no
doubt that all crises consist of the three mentioned components, but in the real world,
crisis management is neither a cycle nor a bell-shaped distribution.
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The

development process of a crisis is in fact dramatic and sometimes unforeseeable, and
it is possible to have different “waves” of threats in one crisis, especially in the
unpredictable natural disasters.

The Interactive Framework includes a key element called the Crisis Development
Ladder. The ladder consists of three steps, namely, crisis, governance crisis, and
government change. Depending on the power of the Strengthening and Weakening
Forces, an issue would move along the three steps of the ladder, until there is
government change or termination of the crisis.

One of the strengths of the Crisis

Development Ladder is its ability in explaining crisis with multiple reasons, which is
important as a certain low-profile event in one crisis might be a symptom of future
crisis development.

For example, the Car-Gate scandal had nearly died down and

was replaced by other hot issues (the SARS outbreak) before it was brought up again
during the 1 July protest.

However, no one knows at the moment that these two

events would jointly become the symptoms of 2003 demonstration.

The

multi-crisis analysis suggested by the State-society Interactive Framework is also the
first in kind among the crisis management theories.

Moreover, when a suitable situation arrives, such as the existence of catalytic effect
(in this case, the 1 July protest), an event that seems to have disappeared could
instantly be revived and move the whole crisis to the higher step. Compared to the
five elements in the Leadership Approach and the blame constructing chart of the
Politicization Approach, the Crisis Development Ladder of the Interactive
Framework can better reflect the real world situation.
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11.4.3 Catalytic Effect of Crisis: A Window for Government Change
The Catalytic Effect of Crisis is the most distinguishable feature of the Interactive
Framework.

It could be defined as a sudden huge event or issue that creates and

gathers sufficient Strengthening Forces from different arenas to push the crisis to the
final stage of government change.

The catalytic effect is unique in its ability to

answer the major research question in this thesis, that is, why could some crises lead
to change, but others could not.

In the Politicization Approach, the blame constructing chart is an attempt to allocate
blames in the crisis aftermath by asking three yes-no questions directing the issue to
different outcomes, instead of explaining the reasons behind such consequences.
The major difference between the Politicization Approach and the Interactive
Framework is that the latter is able to provide a multi-dimensional analysis on a
crisis, which is helpful in the more complicated political and social environment of
Hong Kong, and also in the real world with rapid globalization due to innovations in
information technology and communication.

In addition, as people become more

educated and better informed, they will no longer completely follow the
arrangements of the government without raising questions when there is a crisis.
Thus, the Interactive Framework is able to respond to the new political and social
environment, in which the civil society is stronger and more influential than before.

11.5

Limitations

Conducting research in crisis management in Hong Kong is a challenging task, given
that there are only a few academic studies focusing on the topic.

As the field of

crisis management is multi-disciplinary in nature, the current study mainly focuses
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on the political and leadership perspectives in crisis management.

Although it is

not the aim of this research to study the performance of the government during the
crises, a lack of professional knowledge in fields such as public health (the SARS
case) or urban planning (the High Speed Railway case) may, to some extent, affect
the depth of the study.

However, the valuable opinions and information from

informants and various sources, including the internet, library and archives, have
been extremely helpful as building blocks for the development of the Interactive
Framework.

The common pitfall for field researches in political science is the lack of
interviewees, especially government officials who are directly in-charge or involved
in the political process.

Thanks to interviews with LegCo members and political

news reporters, who interact closely with the government, and the availability of
government reports, committees’ minutes, and even written version of speeches,
information in the current study could be deemed reliable.

Moreover, key

informants have also provided details and perspectives not covered in documents, but
it is unavoidable that some interviewees had failed to recall their memories on events
that happened almost 10 years ago.

To increase reliability, all information collected

from the interviews is cross-checked with news reports and other sources of
information to ensure exactitude.

As shown in previous chapters, current approaches are met with limitations in their
explanatory capacity on crises in non-democratic regimes, such as those in Hong
Kong. Comparatively speaking, the limitation of the Interactive Framework, which
is developed to reflect the political context in non-democratic regimes, such as Hong
Kong and Mainland China, may be its applicability and validity in explaining the
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situation in an absolute authoritarian state, though it is doubtful that a state without
any state-society interaction exists.

Therefore, although the level of democracy and

freedom may vary in different societies, the State-society Interactive Framework
should, to great extent, be useful in explaining crisis management in different types
of regimes.

11.6
11.6.1

Observations on the Crisis Politics in Hong Kong
Politicization Process with Anonymous Party Identity

The observations of non-state actors also provided an answer to one of research
questions: Why are there so many crises happening after the handover?

As

mentioned in the Introduction, Hong Kong is currently a limited democracy with a
comparatively high level of liberty. That is to say, Hong Kong people enjoy a
relatively high level of freedom and autonomy in different aspects, such as freedom
of speech, publication, and assembly, under a political system that is neither
authoritarian nor democratic. Fifty percent of the seats in the Legislative Council
are elected through direct election, while the rest is elected through small-circle
elections with strong Beijing influence. Moreover, the Chief Executive is elected
by an Election Committee commonly regarded as a rubber stamp of Beijing, and
Hong Kong people could not directly elect the Chief Executive until at least 2017.

Therefore, the political context in Hong Kong is complicated, as the people could
enjoy limited democracy through the existence of opposition parties in the LegCo,
but have no access to the executive power, as the Chief Executive is not directly
elected, and can govern without effective check-and-balance from the LegCo, which
is always controlled by his alliances (i.e. the pro-government camp).
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Thus, to force

a government change, the only thing the people can do is to construct crisis
provoking politics, that is, the use of different kinds of crisis events to create a
window of opportunity for government change, through politicization.

By observation, the crisis politics in Hong Kong is under the politicization process
with anonymous party identity.

This observation was firstly inspired from a

conversation with Respondent G, a Pan-democrat District Councilor who is also
actively involved in social movements:

“If I were to participate in the social movement, I need to be
“de-politicized”… [As the public may think that] you have a party
agenda behind … [The initiative] made by a “pure” non-party social
activist could be eye-catching for the public, but they still need the
support of a political party. However, if you carry the party flag from
the very beginning, you may lose public attention in just thirty seconds…
If you want to succeed, you need to be “de-partized”, and have to use
some “soft tactics” to catch public attention and support… [It is] a
politicization process without evident party identity.” (Respondent G)

What Respondent G mentioned is a dynamic situation. As discussed previously,
most respondents agreed that making an issue loud and “big” (i.e., politicization) is a
common tactic for different non-state actors to push forward their agenda through
social movements.

However, political party members, regardless of their political

orientation, suggested that their attachment with the political party is, to some extent,
embarrassing during the politicization process.

Using Respondent C’s words, Hong

Kong people are in general separating “politics” and “livelihood” (policy) issues, and
they have a relatively negative feeling towards political parties.

Similar

interpretation was also made by Respondent F, a committee member of a
Pro-establishment party.

“Not bearing the name of the party is to prevent from
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being blamed for milking the stories” (Respondent F).

On the other hand,

Respondent M tried to explain this observation by arguing that political parties are
mostly election-oriented and lack clear political ideologies, making people think that
they are milking the stories merely for votes.

Therefore, the current conservation is in contrast with party politicization, which
means having a very clear political party identity when pushing political agenda
towards social issues or problems.

Political parties promoting themselves by

delivering their policy platform clearly with distinctive political ideological
background (e.g., the conservatives and the social democrats) is commonly observed
in democratic countries.
stand”.

Their message is simple – “vote for us if you support our

However, under current political context in Hong Kong, policy change

cannot be achieved through regular elections, leading to the need for crisis provoking
politics. As some respondents mentioned, party politics in Hong Kong is immature
due to the lack of trust from the general public - a view shared by some scholars,
such as Choy (1999, 121), who argued that political parties in Hong Kong are mostly
election-oriented, and has never been too ideological-oriented or politicized. Mass
political mobilization by parties is rarely seen.

Rather, social pressure groups and

individuals have picked up this role, as in the case of the 1 July 2003 protest.

In

general, political parties in Hong Kong are still suffering from low legitimacy after
1997 (Ma 2007, 135).

The soft process in politicization observed in Hong Kong can be accounted for by the
following three unique conditions:

1) A limited democratic system with political parties that are isolated from the
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executive power;
2) An immature party politics due to most people not having trust in political parties,
or thinking that parties are not that influential (Respondents C and M);
3) A crisis provoking politics, making projection of social problems into crises
much feasible in influencing government decision than through formal institution
(e.g., elections and petitions) (Respondent G)

The major goal of the activists is to fight for government change.

In the short term,

it aims to achieve policy breakthrough in some “deep-level social conflicts”,
especially when groups with vested interest are concerned, while in the long term, it
tries to break the deadlock in Hong Kong political reform.
process in Hong Kong has been a tough and slow process.

The democratization
Due to the absence of

universal suffrage, activists, especially the Pan-democrats, have been trying their best
to criticize the low legitimacy of the current Hong Kong SAR Government.

The

legitimacy crisis of the government is nearly always bundled with social crises,
especially when the government is found to be ineffective and inefficient in crisis
management. The poor capability of the government can be the result of both
incompetence of its top leaders and its bias towards certain influential groups (i.e.,
the Pro-Beijing camp and the business sector).

Thus, activists have been working

hard to impel political crises, so as to force possible government change.

In fact, a

majority of the interviewees admitted that their reason for opposing to government
decisions or policies is the nondemocratic political system in Hong Kong.

They are

waiting for a catalyzer (i.e., the Catalytic Effect of Crisis) in order to impose
sufficient political pressure (i.e., the Crisis Strengthening Forces) to accomplish
government change.

Therefore, in the Hong Kong context, crisis is not only an abnormal and
unpredictable situation threatening the government, but also a catalyzer for
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government change. The nondemocratic executive branch in Hong Kong makes it
possible for the government to ignore the real needs of the majority of people.

The

politicization process with anonymous party identity in Hong Kong illustrates how
the non-state actors, who are not involved in the decision-making process, use crisis
as an opportunity to impose sufficient political influence on the government to lead
to a real change for the good of the general public under a system without full
democracy.

11.6.2 The Crisis Politics of Hong Kong under the State-society Interactive
Framework
As a means of politicization, the politicization process with anonymous party identity
is a Crisis Strengthening Force under the State-society Interactive Framework, and
thus, a strategy to achieve government change.

To accomplish this, non-state actors

would try to project the seriousness of a crisis in order to impose sufficient political
pressure on the government for changes.

Two of the common strategies used are

continuous mass media coverage and collective actions.

Politicization processes are different among regimes depending on their
socio-political context.

As mentioned previously, Hong Kong’s politicization is

rooted in the immature and, to some extent, unpopular political party politics.

As

such, it is a politicization strategy that tries to downplay party identity during the
process.

Support from the people, that is, public opinion, is with no doubt the core

of the Crisis Strengthening Forces, and, as observed by the respondents,
politicization without party identity is the most effective way to achieve this in the
Hong Kong context, especially after the 2003 Demonstration.
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Politicization process without party identity is highly relevant to the State-society
Interactive Framework, as both of them view crisis as a development process.

More

importantly, it explains the deliberate effort from non-state actors in framing and
escalating an issue into a social crisis (i.e., Crisis Strengthening Forces), in order to
have more chances to influence government decision-making under a closed political
system without full democracy.

11.7

Comparative Perspective on Crisis Politics: SARS Experiences

The State-society Interactive Framework has demonstrated its strength in explaining
crisis politics in non-democratic regimes. Although the Interactive Framework is
developed based on the fragmented system in post-1997 Hong Kong - a
semi-democratic system with high level of freedom and liberty, it is still applicable to
other non-democratic, semi-democratic, and also some newly developed democratic
systems.

In this section, the SARS outbreak is selected as an example to illustrate

the crisis politics in three other Asian states, including Mainland China, Taiwan, and
Singapore.

The main goal of this section is to identify the possible political forces

(i.e., Crisis Strengthening and Weakening Forces) that may affect the crisis politics in
those nations, which could provide valuable insights and form a solid foundation for
the further development of the State-society Interactive Approach.

11.7.1 Mainland China
The People’s Republic of China is generally regarded as an authoritarian state under
the dominant rule of Chinese Communist Party (CCP), and China’s party-state nature
has been one of the spotlights in studies on crisis management of SARS.
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Identified

as the origin of the disease, the Chinese province of Guangdong saw a total of 5,328
SARS cases, with 3,250 deaths as of May 200365 (Cheng and Lye 2005, 208), the
highest number in the world.

The SARS outbreak in China was a hot topic in crisis management studies, with
analyses from various angles, including media control (Powers and Xiao 2008),
public health management (Tang 2003, Wong and Zheng 2004), and SARS elite
politics (Loh 2004, Loh and Yip 2004, Saich 2006).

From a crisis politics

perspective, the media control and elite politics in China is highly relevant to the
State-society Interactive Framework.

Specifically, the tight control on media is an

effective tool to suppress the Crisis Strengthening Forces, especially when the
Chinese government started to realize that the SARS outbreak could become a
political problem, rather than merely a medical problem (Cheng and Lye 2005, 211).
The observations on media control during SARS outbreak is summarized as follows.

Media Control during SARS
The issue of freedom of press in China has been widely criticized by the international
community, and the country was evaluated as “not free” by the Freedom House (He
2004, 182). As argued by He (2004), the CCP has developed a systematic media
control network through different means, such as license granting, censorship system,
“clean up” and crack down” of illegal publications, management and “rectification”
of newspapers and periodicals, and cyber censorship.

Indeed, the period between late 2002 and early 2003 was extremely sensitive to the
CCP leadership, as it was the time when the fourth generation leaders, led by Hu
65

Data obtained from Ministry of Health, PRC, and cited in Cheng and Lye (2005, 208).
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Jintao, was taking over the power (Zheng and Lye 2004, 50).

In this regard, it is not

surprising that some journalists in Guangdong were being criticized for their reports
of the appearance of an “atypical pneumonia” on local newspapers during the early
stages of the outbreak.

As Zheng and Lye (2004) added, the Chinese government at

that time aimed to create a “conducive environment” to ensure a national-wide
stability that would facilitate the smooth transformation of power to Hu.

After

suppressing the news for a few months, eventually, on 3 April 2003, almost half a
year after the first SARS case in Guangdong, the Chinese government held its first
press conference on SARS, announcing that there was no SARS case in Beijing, and
that the disease was under control in China (Eckholm 2006, 122).

Besides, the media control of CCP on newspaper could be identified through
newspaper discourse analyses conducted by some scholars.

For example, Huang

and Hao (2008) examined how People’s Daily, a CCP propaganda newspaper, and
Beijing Youth News, a market-oriented newspaper, covered the SARS crisis, and
found that both newspapers were consistent with the stance of CCP in handling
SARS, which is a reflection that the “newspaper censorship and publicity of
information about the epidemic were based on the Party’s strategies rather than their
own editorial decisions” (Huang and Hao 2008, 93).

From the perspective of the Crisis Strengthening and Weakening Forces, the media
control tactics had sufficiently dampened the state-society interactions, as not many
people (except those living in affected areas) realized the seriousness of SARS at the
very beginning. The sharp awareness of the potential political threat to the new
Hu-Wen leadership has forced the CCP to maintain a tight control on the spread of
information related to SARS.

In this case, media control was an effective and
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strong Crisis Weakening Force that had prevented the SARS outbreak from
becoming a huge political crisis that might affect the power transition to the fourth
generation of leadership.

SARS and the Hu-Wen New Leadership
The outbreak of SARS had given a great challenge to the new leadership of Hu
Jintao and Wen Jiabao. However, in contrast with Tung’s failure in Hong Kong,
SARS had, to some extent, strengthened the Hu-Wen leadership, as they presented a
more people-oriented and caring manner during the incident.

As Eckholm (2006)

observed:

“In many countries, a similar deadly fiasco might overturn the
government. In China, government creditability was low to begin with,
and my impression, based on widespread interviews in May and June of
2003, is that President Hu and Prime Minster Wen were, on balance,
personally strengthened by the events, even if broader trust in the system
sank to a new low. Their counterattack on SARS, if belated, came
across as strong and in keeping with the image the new leader had
cultivated of being more in touch with ‘the people’ than their
predecessors” (Eckholm 2006, 129).

The Hu-Wen’s public relations tactics were quite effective in upholding the
dampened creditability of the Chinese government during SARS. As mentioned in
the previous section, the political sensitivity at the time of SARS had made the
incident not merely medical issue, but a potential political crisis.

Thus, neglecting

the public health perspective, the CCP leadership had tried their best to minimize the
political influence of SARS on the new leadership.

There could be multiple

conclusions towards China’s public health system on disease control, however, from
a crisis politics perspective, the SARS outbreak did not reach the level of
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Governance Crisis in the State-society Interactive Framework.

In fact, the political impact of SARS on China’s new leadership was relatively minor.
It was to large extent associated with the long history of keeping public health
matters as top state secrets by the CCP (McNally 2003, 72).

In this regard, a tight

media control is an effective tool to maintain this phenomenon.

Media control in

China has not merely performed the role of “filter”, but is also in line with the old
Maoist way of propaganda, as McNally (2003, 73) observed:

“The party and media

mass mobilized society into confronting the SARS crisis… Media outlets also
portrayed the battle against SARS as a test of whole nation, exhorting people to rally
around the communist leadership to overcome the country’s hardship.” Thus, in
general, the crisis management of SARS in China was a battle of information flow
and propaganda. Although the health system of China has been widely criticized by
the outside world, the media control of China and the public relations tactics
performed by the new leadership had kept the Crisis Strengthening Forces at a low
level, and thus governance crisis was not observed in China in the SARS incident.

11.7.2 Taiwan
Taiwan was one of the most severely affected regions of SARS, with Taipei city and
Taipei county (now New Taipei city) recording the highest number of SARS cases
(Figure 11.1). The crisis politics of SARS in Taiwan was completely different from
its counterparts of Hong Kong and Mainland China across the strait. Since 1996,
Taiwan people have experienced full universal suffrage in electing their own
President.

In fact, all levels of government bodies, from the President to City

mayors, and from Legislative Yuan members to City Council members, are returned
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by direct elections.

At the time of SARS outbreak, Chen Shui-bian of the

Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) was the President, while the Taipei City was
headed by Ma Ying-jeou of the Kuomintang (KMT, or the Chinese Nationalist Party).
As some scholars suggested, the battle of SARS crisis was in fact a battle of publicity
between the DPP’s central government and the KMT’s Taipei city government. The
creation of public fears towards SARS by the Taipei city government was a weapon
to attack the DPP’s central government (Gao 2003, 66).

Figure 11.1 Geographical Distribution of SARS Probable Cases in Taiwan
Source: (Chen, Chien and Yang 2003, 308)

Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) of SARS Politics in Taipei
Gao (2003) provided detailed analyses of the de-crisis strategies of the Taipei city
government in dealing with SARS, and argued that the SARS crisis management of
Ma’s Taipei city government was completely a political operation campaign in order
to demonstrate their prestige over the DPP’s central government headed by Chen.
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Under the “Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) of SARS Politics in Taipei”
suggested by Gao, the Taipei city government had constantly adopted and reinforced
the shock therapies (Kimenyi and Mwabu 2007) to distinguish themselves from the
“gradual reaction” of Taiwan central government.

The SOP started with the emotional appearance on the mass media, which created a
sense of public fear.

It was followed by a series of shock therapies66 that made the

Taipei city government “battlefront fighter” of the SARS crisis.

In contrast,

regardless of whether the central government followed the city government’s shock
therapies or not, the city government would always win – if the central government
followed, it means the city government was acting more quickly.

If the central

government did not follow, the consequences of the disease would be borne by the
central government, not the city government.

From the angle of State-society Interactive Framework, the Taipei city government
managed by the KMT, an opposition party, was an extraordinary “non-state actor”, in
contrast with the DPP’s central government.

Making use of Taipei city as a

platform, the KMT was trying to project the seriousness of the SARS crisis to attack
the DPP’s popularity in order to increase their own. Although the SARS crisis
eventually did not reach the critical level of Governance Crisis, Ma’s Taipei city
government successfully transferred part of the political responsibility of the crisis,
and his performance during SARS as Taipei city mayor did not become a political
burden for his Presidential campaign in 2008.

66

For example, without coordinating with the central government, the Taipei city government
extended the home-isolation period from 10 days to 14 days and reduced the body temperature for
home-isolation from 38oC to 37.5oC, both of which were not based on the professional standard of
WHO, but to differentiate themselves from the central government (Gao, 2003: 78-79).
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There is no evidence that the KMT tried to make use of the SARS incident to
overthrow DPP’s regime.

In fact, they did not need to, as Taiwan is under full

democracy. Thus, in this case the Crisis Strengthening and Weakening Forces were
mostly provided by the KMT’s Taipei city government.
projected the seriousness of SARS.

On the one hand, they

On the other hand, KMT offered shock

therapies through the Taipei city government.

In democratic regimes, with the

presence of regular elections, it is not necessary for the oppositions to make use of
crises to impose government change.

Rather, they would want to gain as much

publicities as they could during the crises. This is especially true if the state control
part of the institution is controlled by two major parties, as in the Taiwan case of
central government versus the capital city government, or maybe the Executive
versus the Legislative.

Indeed, KMT had been in control of the Legislative Yuan

for most of the time during Chen’s presidency (2000-2008).

11.7.3 Singapore
Singapore was another Asian country that was significantly affected by the SARS
outbreak, with a total of 238 cases and a fatality rate of 13.9% (33 deaths) (Teo, Yeoh
and Ong 2008, 88).

Among the four regions discussed in this thesis (i.e., Hong

Kong, Mainland China, Taiwan, and Singapore), the political impact of SARS on
Singapore’s ruling People’s Action Party

67

(PAP) was minimal, although

then-Deputy Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong labeled SARS a “national crisis” with
“catastrophic consequences” in a parliamentary speech in April 2003.
67

The People’s Action Party (PAP) has been Singapore's ruling party since 1959. Since the 1963
general elections, the PAP has dominated Singapore's parliamentary democracy. Although there is
universal suffrage, the PAP has been criticized for the passing of laws that suppress free speech and
other civil liberties.
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Of course, credit should go to the crisis management efforts made by the
Singaporean government, as they enforced strict measures to contain the outbreak,
for which they received praised from the WHO as a “model” of crisis management
for other nations to emulate (Weber, Law and Tan 2008, 146). As mentioned in the
State-society Interactive Framework, government crisis management measures could
be a strong Crisis Weakening Forces, especially in the case of natural disease. Once
the spread of the disease has been controlled, there is no room for further political
manipulation.

The effective crisis management also made it hard for the

oppositions to attack the popularity of the ruling party. On the other hand, media
control in Singapore is also very tight, and Singaporeans enjoy much less freedom of
speech and assembly compared to Hong Kong and Taiwan.

“Triumph over Adversity”
Weber, Tan, and Law’s (2008, 152) study suggested that the success of Singapore in
the battle of SARS was mainly because of the Singapore government’s ability to gain
public compliance with directives on public and personal health.

They argued that

the government had successfully framed communicative responses to the crisis in
terms of “social responsibility” and “sacrifice”, under girded by “government
paternalism”.

Through different mass media, Singaporeans were told to be

community-oriented by truthfully reporting their symptoms and history of contact,
with no regard to their self-interest (i.e., social responsibility).

Moreover, as

illnesses such as SARS were usually given the “war” metaphors (Baehr 2006, Sontag
1999), the notion of “sacrifice” was rooted into the public and to those who worked
in the medical community.

All medical practitioners, victims of SARS, and

survivors are described as “war heroes”. Moreover, the Singaporean leaders had
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practiced what themselves preached to promote the importance of the directives (i.e.,
government paternalism), such as the self-quarantine of a Parliament member when
he found that he had treated a SARS-infected patient (Weber, Law and Tan 2008,
156).

In fact, state-society interactions in Singapore were positive, as most of the people
supported their government during the SARS incident.

With the cooperation of the

people, the Crisis Weakening Forces directed by the government was extremely
effective, and Singapore was safe eventually.

In this case, the Crisis Strengthening

Forces were weak, and the crisis politics was not obvious, evident from the fact that
the SARS incident was not linked up with some critical political issues, such as the
long paternalist rule of PAP.

In contrast, the paternalistic governance was said to be

quite effective in handling natural disease. Thus, SARS in Singapore was totally a
medical issue without any political implication.

11.7.4 Summary
This section serves as an evaluation on the application of the State-society Interactive
Framework on various governmental systems (partial democracy with a relative high
level of liberty in Hong Kong, authoritarian with very limited of freedom especially
on freedom of speech and political participation in Mainland China, liberal
democracy in Taiwan, and a relatively democratic parliamentary system in which
freedom is being restricted by the government under paternalistic rule in Singapore),
and discusses the potential for further studies.

Due to limitations in the scale of

research, a comprehensive analysis was not possible on the three regions other than
Hong Kong (Mainland China, Taiwan, and Singapore).
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Instead, the crisis politics of

SARS in the four regions, associated political issues, and a brief illustration on Crisis
Strengthening and Weakening Forces are given in Table 11.1.

The Forces are

categorized as “Weak”, “Moderate” and “Strong” for easy understanding.

In conclusion, crisis politics happens in all types of regime, especially if the crisis
were serious enough.

It is the relationship between crisis politics and the Crisis

Strengthening and Weakening Forces that is of interest. For example, in Singapore,
the crisis politics of SARS was not obvious, which might be related to the effective
crisis management efforts of the government (i.e., very strong Crisis Weakening
Forces).

If the Singapore government performed poorly in crisis management, the

outcome could be totally different, and might even become a “political bomb” that
would affect the People’s Action Party’s paternalistic rule.

The State-society Interactive Framework is a total crisis management framework that
puts all the political factors (i.e. Forces) that may contribute to a crisis into
consideration.

As could be seen from the real world examples, crises are not

individual cases.

In this regard, the Interactive Framework could provide a

comprehensive analysis on different actors and issues that might contribute to the
development of crisis politics.

Specifically, poor crisis management by the

government on any particular social problem could bring unexpected political
consequences, as can be seen from the Arab Spring.

The multi-crisis effect

consideration and the “battle” between different Forces are original contributions
brought by the State-society Interactive Framework to the field of crisis
management.
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Table 11.1 Summary Table of the SARS Politics in the Four Regions
Region

Hong Kong

Mainland China

Taiwan

Singapore

Regime type

Partial democracy

Authoritarian

Democracy

Paternalistic democracy

Party struggle between

N/A

Crisis Politics:
Political issues that
associated with SARS
Crisis Strengthening
Forces

-

Poor governance under

-

Fourth generation of leader

-

Tung

assuming power (i.e.,

DPP (central gov’t) and

-

Car-Gate scandal

beginning of the Hu-Wen

KMT (Taipei city gov’t)

-

Article 23 Legislation

era)

Very Strong

Weak to Moderate

Moderate

Weak

(severe public dissatisfaction)

(tight media control, imperfect

(struggle between central and

(tight media control)

information of the public)

Taipei gov’t, KMT challenged
DPP)

Crisis Weakening Forces

Catalytic Effect

Weak

Moderate

Moderate

Very Strong

(crisis management measures

(ineffective and delayed crisis

(crisis management

(effective crisis management

were seriously criticized,

management measures, but

effectiveness affected by party

measures, paternalistic rule)

multi-crisis effect that severely

quite successful public relations

struggle)

damaged gov’t legitimacy)

performance by leaders)

Yes

N/A

N/A

N/A

Stepping-down of principal

Stepping-down of front line

Stepping-down of front line

N/A

officials and CE, postponement

officials (no great impact to

officials (no great impact to

of Article 23 Legislation

ruling party)

ruling party)

(1 July 2003 Demonstration)

Political outcomes
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CHAPTER TWELVE: CONCLUSION
The field of crisis management has been dominated by western scholars, and as such
a liberal democratic system of government is taken for granted.

However, as a

Special Administrative Region of China, Hong Kong would not be able to enjoy a
full democracy at least until 2017.

Thus, it is doubtful that current crisis

management models and theories can be applied without modification in the Hong
Kong context.

In an attempt to develop a framework suitable for use in a limited

democracy, such as Hong Kong, the current thesis first applied two crisis
management approaches, that is, the Leadership Approach (top-down) and the
Politicization Approach (bottom-up) to the Hong Kong context to identify their
weaknesses and limitations.

With these in mind, the State-society Interactive

Framework is introduced.

The two crisis incidents selected as case studies in this thesis are the 1 July 2003
Demonstration and the Anti-High Speed Railway incident, both of which saw active
civic participation and involved controversies in different political aspects.

In fact,

the 1 July protest was a direct result of three crisis events, including the Antony
Leung Car-Gate Scandal, the outbreak of SARS, and the proposed legislation of
Article 23 of the Basic Law (National Security Ordinance), all of which happened in
the first half of 2003.

On the other hand, the Anti-High Speed Railway incident that

extended from late 2009 to early 2010 was related to the controversy on building the
Hong Kong Section of the Guangzhou-Shenzhen-Hong Kong Express Rail Link.
The crisis in 2003 had led to a major policy change (i.e., the postponement of Article
23 legislation) and the resignation of government officials, whereas the Anti-High
Speed Railway movement ended with no change in the government.
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Granted, there

was a significant difference in the number of participants between these two
movements.

However, other than simply focusing on the number of people, a more

valuable study would be to understand to what extent the crisis management theories
could explain the phenomena.

There are five elements in the Leadership Approach: Sense-making, decision-making,
meaning-making, terminating, and learning, and three dimensions in the
Politicization

Approach:

Constructing

severity,

agency,

and

responsibility.

Analyses of the case studies discovered two major limitations regarding to the
applicability of both crisis management approaches.

First, both approaches were

found to be in excellent in understanding conventional crises, such as political
scandals or natural disasters, but are not applicable to policy failure, since both
approaches depend significantly on the seriousness of the crises.

If the “culprit”

could be clearly identified, and the crisis development process simple and direct,
both approaches would be extremely helpful in understanding the whole crisis
management process.

If the crisis were more serious, it would be easier to divide it

into different stages for analysis.
constitutes a serious crisis.

However, there is no clear standard of what

Some challenges to the government, or so-called “social

events”, might not necessarily be the crisis scholars had in mind when they
developed their theories.

For example, the Anti-High Speed Railway incident had

not been taken to the level of governance crisis.

In fact, it did not even reach the

threshold for initiating an analysis under the Politicization Approach (i.e., serious
violation of core public values).

Second, both approaches are useful in the aftermath assessment of the crisis
development process, but are not explanatory enough to answer the current research
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question:

Why could some crises lead to change, but others could not. Although

the Leadership Approach claimed to be a step forward of other crisis management
approaches (Boin, 't Hart and Stern, et al. 2005, 9) that are in traditional handbook
style, it is, to a large extent, still thinking within a set of guidelines.

Specifically,

the five elements in the Leadership Approach, though demonstrating the major
components to be concerned by the government during a crisis, have failed to explain
why different crises would lead to different (political) consequences.

The

Politicization Approach, while more explanatory in nature, has a threshold
requirement on severity (i.e., core public values violation), which has limited its
application to assessing potential crises or other types of crises.

There are two reasons regarding the shortcoming of both approaches in the Hong
Kong context.

On the one hand, both approaches are unable to reflect the

complexity of Hong Kong’s political structure, that is, a semi-democratic legislature
under the administration of an almost authoritative executive branch.

It is obvious

that, without regular elections of the executive body, the survival of government
officials has no direct relation with their crisis management performance.

However,

the political sensitivity of crisis management to elections is a major concern in the
theories developed by western scholars (McConnell and Stark 2002).

Thus, the

absence of a well-developed electoral politics has made it hard to associate the
situation of Hong Kong with the theories.

On the other hand, the crisis

management approaches are unable to provide a comprehensive assessment on the
highly-politicized incidents in Hong Kong, as both of them view crisis and crisis
management from a particular perspective. The Leadership Approach focuses on
what should be done by the government during a crisis, whereas the Politicization
Approach, while famous for its illustration of blame construction, could not
257

completely reflect the politics of crisis management.

The State-society Interactive Framework proposed by the current study is able to
tackle the limitations of both Leadership and Politicization Approaches. There are
four elements in the Interactive Framework. First, a Crisis Development Ladder
has been developed to illustrate the relationship between crisis, governance crisis,
and government change.

Governance crisis is now described as a crisis that

provides sufficient threats on the legitimacy of the government or the survival of the
regime, and is differentiated from a simple crisis, which in its broadest sense, is
defined as an out of normal situation that requires government intervention.
Government change can be regarded as a kind of termination for the crisis, as it
involves either a stepping-down of a particular government official, or a change in
the institution (including policy change) as a whole.

The Crisis Development

Ladder serves as a path to demonstrate the possible political outcomes of a crisis.

The two other major components of the Interactive Framework are the Crisis
Strengthening Forces and Crisis Weakening Forces. These two forces represent the
interaction between the government and the public in a crisis.

Crisis Strengthening

Forces are regarded as the efforts made by different actors in the society, including
opposition parties, mass media, and pressure groups, who want to take the crisis
further up the Crisis Development Ladder. Crisis Strengthening Forces include, but
are not limited to, the political power of actors within the institution, such as
impeachment initiated by the oppositions in the legislature, the negative reports in
newspapers, the exposure of scandalous materials, and the collective actions (i.e.,
protest and demonstration) organized by different social groups. On the other hand,
the Crisis Weakening Forces mainly come from the government or pro-government
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parties or groups. They include supportive votes in the legislature that protect the
officials involved from the impeachment or motion of no-confidence.

The

supportive and positive mass media exposures also play an important role in
convincing the public that everything is under control. The struggles between the
two forces would determine whether a crisis would lead to a government change.

The most distinguishable feature of the Interactive Framework is the Catalytic Effect
of Crisis, which is similar to the policy window of opportunity suggested in
Kingdon’s (1995) Multi-stream Model.
suggested by Respondent C.

It is inspired by the word “catalyzer”, as

The Catalytic Effect of Crisis is defined as the

prominent event that intensifies in a very short period of time and creates an
opportunity for government change.

In most situations, the catalytic effect is

associated with the immense growth of Strengthening Forces and the decline of
Weakening Forces, and is, thus, an alternate way of viewing crisis as a means leading
to government change, especially in a limited-democracy like Hong Kong.

In order to make the State-society Interactive Framework more scientific and
objective, the newspapers discourse analysis method similar to that of Lee and Chan
(2011)was adopted, with an aim of measuring the changes in Strengthening Forces
and Weakening Forces in the mass media and identifying the existence of Catalytic
Effect of Crisis.

With reference to the two case studies, the 1 July 2003 protest was

definitely a catalyzer that led to the postponement of the legislation of Article 23 of
the Basic Law and the resignation of two officials.

This suggestion is substantiated

by the results of the newspaper analysis, which indicated a major shift of intensity
from Weakening Forces to Strengthening Forces during the protest period.
However, in the Anti-High Speed Railway incident, Strengthening Forces were
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insufficient, and hence, the incident was unable to move on to the stage of
governance crisis.

Moreover, there was an absence of catalytic effect, thus no

change was made by the government eventually.

This thesis has yielded three theoretical contributions to the arena of crisis
management and one empirical contribution to the study of Hong Kong politics.
First, the Interactive Framework is theoretically a complimentary contribution of
both top-down and bottom-up approaches, as it attempts to unite them on the same
playfield.

The Interactive Framework is an approach of multi-dimensional crisis

management, which intends to illustrate the relationship between the state and the
society during a crisis by using the two crisis forces.

Second, compared with the

current approaches that view crisis management as an assessment in the aftermath,
the Interactive Framework describes crisis development with respect to the changes
in Strengthening and Weakening Forces throughout the entire crisis.
explain the occurrence of multi-crisis effect.

It can also

Third, the Catalytic Effect of Crisis is

an original finding in crisis management studies that associates crisis with the
possibility of bringing government change.

Instead of perceiving crisis as an

abnormal situation, the catalytic effect emphasizes the importance of crisis in
directing the decision-making of the government. Turning an issue into a crisis is
definitely helpful in drawing public and government attention, as it may result in a
real change in the policy or the institution.

This crisis manipulating process by

different non-state actors is observed as a politicization process without party identity
under crisis provoking politics.

It refers to the creation of crisis, or making a crisis

more serious and notable, in order to serve certain political agenda.

Finally, the introduction of a new perspective on crisis-provoking politics in Hong
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Kong is the empirical contribution of this thesis.

People are unable to influence

political affairs effectively through formal means, given that universal suffrage is not
yet available in Hong Kong. The observed crisis-provoking politics could due to
the presence of incapable government officials that are able to survive under the lack
of an effective check-and-balance mechanism, though this point of view could be
disputed with reference to the colonial administration operated by the British.

In

contrast, the politicization process without party identity would possibly be changed
by the continual enlightenment of the civil society and party politics.

Until this moment, Hong Kong people are still enjoying a relatively free and liberal
society. This is the soil for civil society development, and is also an essential
condition for the crisis provoking politics of Hong Kong. A limited-democracy
with liberty allows Hong Kong people to escalate different social problems to the
level of social crisis, which provides sufficient Strengthening Forces to take the
agenda further.

If the catalytic effect were activated, as in the case of the

half-a-million people protest on 1 July 2003, there would be a good opportunity to
force the government to make major concessions.

In conclusion, with the political

development of Hong Kong towards democracy at stake, there will definitely be
increasing number of social and political crises.

The current political scandal

related to the unauthorized construction in the apartment of the Chief Executive
Leung Chun-ying is a predictable development under the crisis provoking politics.
Crisis is powerful, especially when the people realized that they can neither choose
their leader nor change the government without one.
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12.1

Avenues for Future Research

It is impossible to have a perfect model.
continuous improvement of a model.

However, efforts should be made to the
The State-society Interactive Framework

would be more impeccable with the incorporation of different mechanisms of force
assessment, of which newspapers discourse analysis as adopted in this research is
one, as newspapers coverage represents an important element in the analysis of Crisis
Strengthening or Weakening Forces. Nevertheless, there should be other potential
methods of assessment, qualitative or quantitative, available from different
disciplines, such as management studies or psychology. 68

With their help, the

Interactive Framework would definitely become more scientific and objective.
Moreover, borrowing ideas from different areas would help make the arena of crisis
management more multi-disciplinary, and will contribute to the creation of new
knowledge and new perspectives in this field.

Scholar should associate knowledge with the real world situation.

The soft

politicization under crisis provoking politics would be helpful for understanding the
power relationship between the state and society during periods of democratization
and political reform.

The Interactive Framework could be applied to those

countries and regimes that are newly democratized or are in the transitional period,
especially Asian countries, such as Burma.

Besides, countries that are now in the

elementary stages of democratization or are having an ineffective “democratic”
system should be also targeted, as in China and Singapore. However, the value of
the Interactive Framework in Western societies should not be underestimated.

68

In

A blame response analysis of the newspapers was conducted after a riot in the Netherlands. The
two basic questions the authors suggested were in line with the state–society interactive framework: (1)
What kind of blame can one be facing?; and (2) How is one to respond to blame?’ Please refer to
Resodihardjo et al. (2012, 231).
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fact, further studies should be made to investigate the necessary conditions for
government changes in democratic countries, for example, with limited time before
the next election, it is interesting to know how the government is going to deteriorate
the Strengthening Forces in order to minimize the possible damage to the popularity
during and after the crisis.

The ideas presented in the current study could be put to

test under different contexts, both theoretically and empirically. Although the field
of crisis management is comparatively new at this stage, it is full of potential for
further development, and it would definitely be beneficial to the academia and also to
the wellbeing of the people in the world.

263

APPENDIX I: REFERENCE LIST - OTHER SOURCES
Government Documents
(Only list out those without properly cited inside the main text or footnote)
1. CE’s Transcript, Government Press Release, 10 March 2003
2. Financial Secretary’s Q&A Transcript, Government Press Release, 9 March
2003
3. Government further clarifies legislative proposals to implement BL 23,
Government Press Release, 28 January 2003
4. Perceived Conflict of Interest in Your Purchase of a Car, The Chief Executive’s
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Office, 15 March 2003
Report of the Hospital Authority Review Panel on the SARS Outbreak, Hospital
Authority, September 2003
SARS in Hong Kong : from Experience to Action, SARS Expert Committee,
HKSAR Government, October 2003
The Basic Law, Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
The Financial Secretary’s Statement on the Purchase of a New Car, 15 March
2003)
Twelve-month Report on Implementation of the Accountability System for
Principal Officials, Constitutional Affairs Bureau 2003

Legislative Council Documents
1. Report of the Legislative Council Select Committee to inquire into the handling
of the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome outbreak by the Government and the
Hospital Authority, July 2004
2. Various Legislative Council Papers (please refer to the in text citation and
footnote for the reference code)
Web Sites
(Only list out those without properly cited inside the main text or footnote)
1. MTR. Express Rail Link. Available at:
http://www.expressraillink.hk/tc/database/faq.html
2. The Encyclopaedia of virtual communities in Hong Kong. Express Rail Link.
Available at:
http://evchk.wikia.com/wiki/%E5%BB%A3%E6%B7%B1%E6%B8%AF%E9
%AB%98%E9%80%9F%E9%90%B5%E8%B7%AF
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Newspapers
1. Apple Daily (2003-2012)
2. Hong Kong Economic Times (2003-2012)
3. Ming Pao (2003-2012)
4. Oriental Daily (2003-2012)
5. Sing Tao Daily (2003-2012)
6. South China Morning Post (2003-2012)
7. Ta Kung Pao (2003-2012)
8. The Sun, Hong Kong (2003-2012)
9. The Standard (2003-2012)
10. Wen Wei Po (2003-2012)
(please refer to the in text citation and footnote for exact date and/or article)
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APPENDIX II: PROFILES OF RESPONDENTS
Respondent

Interview Details

Respondent A

26 Apr 2011 (11:00)

(Preliminary)

Respondent’s Office

Profile
A is a former LegCo member and a senior politician who has
served the Hong Kong polity since colonial era. Being a
former leader of Pro-establishment Party E1, A is currently a
commentator in the mass media.

Occupation

Political
Affiliation

Commentator /
Consultant

Former Leader

Campaigner of a
human rights
NGO

Member of

of Party E1

The interview with A was a preliminary one, with an aim to
identify potential research focuses for the study of crisis
management in Hong Kong. A mentioned the significant role
of mass media during the crises, which ignited the idea of
conducting the newspaper discourse analyses.
Respondent B

19 Sep 2011 (19:45)

(Preliminary)

A café in Tsuen Wan

As a social activist currently working for a human rights
pressure group, B has been taking part in social movements in
opposition to major government infrastructure projects.
The interview with B was the second preliminary interview.
As a very vigorous social activist, B discussed some tactics for
pushing forward policy agenda, which served as a guide in the
study of crisis politics from a policymaking perspective.
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Party D2

Respondent C

14 May 2012 (17:30) As the leader of Pan-democrat Party D1, C is an active social
activist who is continuously taking part in social movements
Party D1
regarding civil disobedience.
Headquarters

Social Activist,
Politician

Leader of

LegCo Member

Committee
member of

Party D1

C was the first respondent participating in a semi-structured
interviewed using the set of research questions listed in
Appendix B. During the interview, C mentioned the
importance of “catalyzer’ in crises, which inspired the idea of
the Catalytic Effect of Crisis as a triggering point for
government change.
Respondent D

24 May 2012 (15:00) D is a LegCo member from Pan-democrat Party D2. Before
becoming a politician, D worked as a reporter and commentator
Party D2 District
in international news agencies.
Office
D analyzed the relationship between mass media, social
activists, and political parties during SARS based on personal
experiences. As a media practitioner and politician,
information provided by D was essential to understand the
interactions between different stakeholders in the event.
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Party D2

Respondent E

28 Feb 2013 (16:00)
Party E2
Headquarters

E is a senior officer of Pro-establishment Party E2, as well as a
researcher. E also serves as a commentator on newspaper for
political and social affairs in Hong Kong.

Senior Officer
of Party E2

Senior Officer

Supervisor of a
LegCo
member’s
district office

Committee
member of

of Party E2

E was the first respondent from the Pro-establishment camp,
and illustrated the complexity of “weak alliance” between
government and Pro-establishment parties. E’s observations
provided insights to study crisis development as changing of
“forces” – party support during a crisis is not a commitment,
but is highly dependent on the political environment and public
opinion.
Respondent F

7 Mar 2013 (16:00)
Party E3 District
Office

As a committee member of Pro-establishment Party E3, F is
also a freelance column writer who is interested in various
social issues. F is a current supervisor of a LegCo member’s
district office.
F’s commentaries and interviews appeared on mass media
recurrently. As a member of the Pro-establishment, F
admitted that they need to mind their words when discussing
controversial issues. F shared the same conservative mind set
with E in supporting government during political crises.
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Party E3

Respondent G

15 Mar 2013 (14:30)
Respondent’s
District Council

In addition to being a District Council member from
Pan-democrat Party D3, G is an active social activist with
concerns for a variety of social issues. G has been deeply

District Council
member, Social
activist

Committee
member of

Reporter

N/A

Party D3

involved in the Choi Yuen Village incident.

Office
G served as key informant for the Anti-high speed railway
incident. Moreover, G addressed the challenges and obstacles
of politicizing social issues to social crises based on experience
in different social movements. As a committee member of a
major Pro-democrat party, G is in good position to illustrate the
complicated relationship between social activists and political
parties, especially regarding controversial issues.
Respondent H

15 Mar 2013 (21:00)
A café in Causeway
Bay

As a reporter who had worked in a major newspaper in Hong
Kong, H is now working for a new media online, in addition to
being a current reporter of social and political issues.
The new media that H is working for has a strong pro-democrat
background. H explained how new media can mobilize
people in different social issues through internet platform, such
as Facebook, and could easily gather a critical mass in short
time.
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Respondent I

21 Mar 2013 (16:00)
Lingnan University

Leading the Pan-democrat Party D4, I is a politician and a
social activist with great concerns on issues related to the
minorities and grassroots. I was active in leading students’

Social activist,
Politician

Leader of

Social activist

N/A

Party D4

movement.
I illustrated the interrelations between government legitimacy
deficit and governance crisis, and believed that the lacking of
universal suffrage in Hong Kong has provided a political
environment for a crisis provoking politics.
Respondent J

22 Mar 2013 (15:30)

In addition to playing the role of an internet social activist, J

A café in Causeway
Bay

actively participates in different online new media. J is also
the manager of a website that monitors the service of public
transport.
J was a key actor in the latter stage of the Anti-High Speed
Railway incident, serving as informant and consultant for
Pan-democrat LegCo members. J’s major responsibility was
to provide data and information, and to draft questions
regarding the potential loopholes of the project for the LegCo
members during the filibustering of funding appropriation
stage.
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Respondent K

25 Mar 2013 (15:30)
A café in Causeway
Bay

K works as a reporter of political news for a major
pan-democrat news group in Hong Kong. K has previously
worked for a major Pro-Beijing newspaper in Hong Kong.

Reporter

N/A

District Council
member

Committee
member of

By comparing the two media companies that K worked for, K
experienced how the strong political preference of the
supervisors and editors influenced the news reporting style and
frames.
Respondent L

27 Mar 2013 (17:30)

Other than being a District Council member from
Pro-establishment Party E4, L is a committee member who

A café in Central

often acts as the party’s spokesperson and commentator with
high media exposure.
Similar to Respondent F, L is a party spokesperson who always
expresses opinion in front of the media on behalf of the party.
L said that party support is, to some extent, helpful to the
government during political crises or scandals. However, in
line with other Pro-establishment respondents, L admitted that
the actions of the party are heavily influenced by public
opinion, and they would not support the government if the
government were being criticized badly.
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Party E4

Respondent M

28 Mar 2013 (15:30)
A café in Tai Wai

As a member of Pan-democrat Party D5, M is a social activist
and author of books on social movements and political issues,
on top of being a commentator who appears on internet radio

Social activist,
Freelance writer

Member of

Reporter

N/A

Party D5

programs.
M has worked among the group of social activists, political
parties and media, and identified the uncompromising actions
and directions of these three groups. The distrust among the
three groups is deeply-rooted due to the short-term
ad-hoc-based orientation of different actors and a lack of
comprehensive political discourse towards the democratic
development of Hong Kong. Non-state actors worked
according to their best benefit, such as for vote or for individual
popularity.
Respondent N

29 Mar 2013 (19:30)

Besides being a chief reporter of local news of a Pan-democrat
newspaper in Hong Kong, N is experienced in reporting on a
A café in Yau Ma Tei wide range of policy issues.
In this interview, N disclosed internal practices of how
government promotes its political agenda to the public through
mass media.
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Respondent O

29 Mar 2013 (19:30)

Having a strong connection with government officials and
LegCo council members, O is a senior reporter of political
A café in Yau Ma Tei news in a Pro-establishment newspaper in Hong Kong.

Reporter

N/A

N/A

In this interview, O disclosed the internal practices of how
government influences newspaper reports towards different
crises and controversial issues. The mass media “frames” has
become a major force that influences the development of crisis
politics.
Respondent P

15 Apr 2013 (18:00)

As an active social activist who engages in a variety of social

Social activist,

movements regarding to democratization and labor issues, P is
in the head of a joint university student association.

Student leader

Lingnan University

Based on experiences gained as a social activist and student
movement leader, P analyzed the political culture of Hong
Kong regarding how an issue has to be framed and politicized
under a “pure” and “politics-free” environment, as the general
public has strong negative impression towards political parties
and political controversies. Only issues that are framed as
close to people’s livelihood and “apolitical” could reach the
critical mass attention and support.
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Respondent Q

19 Apr 2013 (15:00)
LegCo Complex
Building

With expertise on labor issues and poverty policies towards
grassroots, Q is a senior LegCo Council member, as well as the
party leader of Pro-establishment Party E5.

LegCo and
District Council
member

Leader of
Party E5

Q commented that governance crisis in Hong Kong is highly
dependent on the “bottom line” – if the interest of majority
Hong Kong people were being affected, the issue would
substantially become huge social and political crises that could
destroy the legitimacy of government.
Note:

All interviews were confidential; the names of interviewees are withheld by mutual agreement.
For political parties, “D” stands for Pan-democrats, “E” stands for Pro-establishment.
For respondents’ party affiliations, “Leader” stands for President or Vice-President of a party, “Committee member” stands for
Executive/Central Committee Membership of a party.
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APPENDIX III: INTERVIEW QUESTIONS
1.

What was your role in the incident/crisis/event?

2.

Do you think that the incident/crisis/event was successful / serious?

3.

To what extent you think the incident altered government decision?

4.

During the incident/crisis/event, could you observe any critical point?

5.

What are the major goals for social movement? How to achieve such goals? Are
there any helping hands?

6.

How would you comment on the relationship between mass media and social
movement? How would you comment on the relationship between political
party and social movement?

7.

How would you comment on the roles of political parties in current Hong Kong
polity?

8.

How would you comment on the roles of political parties in crises and scandal?

9.

Under the current political context, what would be the most feasible method to
alter government decision?

10. In general, are there any governance crises in Hong Kong currently? Why?
11. Do you think some issues are being politicized? How would comment on this
phenomena?
12. Do you think crises would lead to government change?
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